Counter path to Aceh peace

Otto Syamsuddin Ishak, Sociologist, Civil Society Alliance for Democracy (Yappika), Jakarta

In terms of length, the present armed conflict in Aceh which started in 1976, is second only to the war the Acehnese waged against the Dutch colonial rule (1873-1942). The armed conflict in Aceh may also be considered as the Acehnese War Part II and the enemy is Indonesia.

This armed conflict in Aceh has affected many parties, such as foreign investors like ExxonMobil and other foreign companies owning the shares of capital-intensive projects in Aceh or strategic industries.

Peace-making has involved foreign non-governmental organizations (NGOs) such as the Henry Dunant Center, which includes representatives of the United States, Britain, Yugoslavia and Thailand as its "wise men", and some other international NGOs dealing with human rights and humanitarian affairs.

The reason for the involvement of so many parties is that the protracted armed conflict in Aceh has generated an adverse impact on both sides, as well as on neighboring countries (in the case of internally displaced persons) and other countries which have investment in the country.

This armed conflict is an act not only to destroy those parties relying on the strength of their weaponry, but also civilians and the markets, central to Aceh's economy. These last two have often been made objects of structural and cultural violence of the warring parties and have even been made objects of frustration when one party loses a battle.

A war involving armed political entities should not involve the market and the civilians although it is the principle of a war to distinguish only friends or foes.

Those involved in a war often encourage the market and civilians to form part of or to be opposed to the parties on the grounds of sacred integration and nationalism. Therefore, the involvement and the destruction of a market and civilians in a war violates not only classical war ethics and religious values, but also the values of modern life which apply universally -- human rights.

We can calculate roughly how much Indonesia has spent on Aceh's armed conflict, especially given that mobilization of troops in Aceh today is by far the number of soldiers ever deployed in Aceh's history of war. As many as 40,000 troops have been mobilized from outside Aceh and if each needs Rp 17,500 for their daily meal allowances, the Indonesian government must spend up to Rp 700 million a day only for their meals. Certainly, more money will be needed for the war zone of Papua and the other conflict-ridden areas such as Maluku, Poso and Kalimantan.

Some of the Indonesian soldiers reportedly receive funds from ExxonMobil channeled to them through the state oil company Pertamina. There are up to 150 military posts with at least 25 soldiers stationed at each post. Roughly, therefore, there are at least 3,000 soldiers, whose lunch fees must be borne by the foreign investors. The money spent on the side dishes totals Rp 52.5 million/day or some Rp 19 billion a year. Then there are security charges that must be borne by major foreign industries and estate companies, most of which are relatively found in hinter Aceh.

To buy bullets, Indonesia must fork out Rp 25 billion a day, or Rp 8.5 trillion a year. Of course, this budget does not include ammunition for heavy-duty guns such as armored vehicles, tanks, bazookas, bombs, grenades and fire bullets that can annihilate entire villages. This cost precludes armory, transportation means, communications, the construction of defense facilities, international campaigns and so forth.

For the armed conflict in Aceh, the cost has exceeded the state's budget for the military of Rp 32 trillion. The problem is where Indonesia can obtain legal funds to finance its war in Aceh.

This amount of money is of course spent neither on development nor on attempts to take Indonesia out of the acute economic crisis, nor efforts to improve and develop the market and the living quality of Indonesians. Instead, it has been spent on counterproductive destruction.

Other costs arising from the armed conflict in Aceh can be calculated on the extent of the destruction sustained by the market and the political and cultural systems. The destruction of the market includes the destruction of a production system, marketing network market facilities and the flight of investments from Aceh and Indonesia.

Therefore, an illegal economic system has found fertile ground and has become uncontrollable. People's capital has also been damaged owing to massive stealing, extortion, robbery and looting -- all developing fast in line with the war escalation and intelligence operations conducted by the parties.

As a result, the surviving political system is likewise devoid of morality. Corruption in the form of bureaucratic rents, the abuse of funds and the manipulation of funds through fictitious projects is a product of political collusion involving bureaucrats, businessmen, legislators and the military.

This collusion has gained intensity and frequency following the closure of the public space, where civilians or civilian community organizations can exercise control over their right of sovereignty as citizens of a republic. War kills a system or the potential and the chance to develop a system of democratic statehood. War will instead reinforce the establishment of a militaristic, authoritarian and centralized political system.