Corruption, a cultural indicator

Corruption, a cultural indicator

This is the first of two articles on corruption by Ignas
Kleden, a sociologist and the director of the Go-East Institute
in Jakarta, which focuses on East Indonesian affairs. He is also
a consultant with the Indonesian Anti-Corruption Watch.

JAKARTA (JP): Indonesia is one of the most corrupt countries
in the world. On the Transparency International Corruption
Perception Index, Indonesia ranks the 96th least transparent out
of 98 countries. Local newspapers and magazines report about
corruption cases that caused state losses in billions and
trillions of rupiah; smaller amounts of money are no longer
newsworthy. Besides, only a few people in the cases are sent to
jail anyway.

The country's first vice president, the late Mohammad Hatta,
among the country's most respected statesman, coined the local
term for the culture of corruption: budaya korupsi.

Taken seriously, the term includes corrupted social behavior
and corrupted cultural norms that have become the general
guideline for public behavior. This is maybe why some people have
suggested that corruption be legalized since it seemed very
unlikely to be eliminated.

By making it legal, so the argument goes, we could manage it
publicly and openly. As an illegal action, corruption will remain
underground so that only those familiar with the underworld will
become its beneficiaries. Making it legal and public would
provide the opportunity to organize a more equal distribution of
corruption.

If this were the case, Indonesia would be the first country in
which people could live legally from theft. There would be no
property rights, no public property and the rule of law would
very soon be replaced by the rule of the jungle.

Then only the strong could eat their fill, while the weak
would only be able to satisfy their hunger with the table scraps.

Academic anthropology has a similar concept -- the culture of
poverty. This notion refers to a situation where the habits of
the very poor remain in place even when these people have become
much better off. Their observance of time, for example, which
traditionally was very loose and undisciplined, will not be
transformed into strict punctuality even if they are now working
in big offices. Also, they will remain as unorganized as they
were before, even if they have risen to a position of power over
other people.

In the same vein, Indonesians initially became involved in the
practice of corruption because their income was still not
sufficient to cover their everyday expenses. However, this habit
seems to remain even after one is earning much more money as the
middle-manager of a private company or a high-ranking government
official.

At that stage corruption is not only something to meet basic
needs, but becomes a mental thing in that it plays into the
value-orientation and system of belief of a group of people.

Perhaps it is an exaggeration to speak of the culture of
corruption in Indonesia. It sounds too pessimistic and offers no
hope of overcoming it. However, there is no doubt that its long-
established and ever widening practices hint at some cultural
attitudes, indeed, some basic underlying assumptions which make
people inclined to think, not in the right way, but rather in a
distorted way.

First, corruption seems to be tolerable because people are
more interested in what one has achieved materially than in
questioning the process which led to that condition.

That somebody now has two luxury cars and two big houses in
very expensive locations in Jakarta is what matters for most
people. Only few would question as to how a government employee
officially earning less than Rp 3 million per month could afford
to have two houses worth Rp 2 billion and two luxury cars worth
at least Rp 1 billion.

With regard to government officials, corruption becomes all
the less questionable because in feudalistic thinking, still
prevalent in the minds of many, the social status of the powers-
that-be is expected to bring about material wealth as a natural
concomitant.

Material wealth is not something one achieves through economic
struggle, but is rather supposed to result from social status.

This belief often reaches the extent that those within the
bureaucracy trying to live honestly within their means have been
seen as unsuccessful or even foolish.

This cultural attitude is still more discernible in the
comparison between economic and political crime. Politicians and
the powers-that-be here are more sensitive to political
correctness than to economic accountability.

Someone who supposedly insults the president or a high-ranking
government official is easily brought to court, and is very
likely to arouse violent reactions from the followers of the one
insulted.

In contrast, those who do injustice to the people and inflict
severe financial losses to the state are easily protected by the
"presumption of innocence". People who take public funds either
by means of bribery or by means of political compulsion are not
subject to any political or legal deterrence.

The Indonesian Bank Restructuring Agency has become a symbol
of the softness of the Indonesian state as Gunnar Myrdal, in his
Asian Drama, would have it.

One of the main features which distinguishes a "soft state"
from a "hard state" in Myrdal's terms is the level of
determination to remain disciplined and follow the rules of the
game, as earlier agreed upon, and the persistence to strive for
economic goals by means of getting involved in economic
competition.

Economy as such is seen as an important pillar of social
development and political sustainability, so much so that
transgressions against the workings of economic policy and its
implementation will be treated as serious offenses which deserve
serious punishment.

Corruption would be treated as criminal offense, or as
dangerous as subversion. In a sense this is true, since such
corrupt practices as bribery, mark-ups, non-performing loans and
violations of a bank's legal lending limit undermine the workings
of the nation's economy.

The results of this economic subversion are discernible in a
high-cost economy, the nonsolvency of banks, the increasing price
of goods and import failures, which finally result in increasing
unemployment and widening impoverishment.

In a "soft state", political power and social status seem to
be more important than the economy, and there is no
correspondence between national ideals and the reality of
development.