Corruption, a cultural indicator

This is the first of two articles on corruption by Ignas Kleden, a sociologist and the director of the Go-East Institute in Jakarta, which focuses on East Indonesian affairs. He is also a consultant with the Indonesian Anti-Corruption Watch.

JAKARTA (JP): Indonesia is one of the most corrupt countries in the world. On the Transparency International Corruption Perception Index, Indonesia ranks the 96th least transparent out of 98 countries. Local newspapers and magazines report about corruption cases that caused state losses in billions and trillions of rupiah; smaller amounts of money are no longer newsworthy. Besides, only a few people in the cases are sent to jail anyway.

The country's first vice president, the late Mohammad Hatta, among the country's most respected statesman, coined the local term for the culture of corruption: budaya korupsi.

Taken seriously, the term includes corrupted social behavior and corrupted cultural norms that have become the general guideline for public behavior. This is maybe why some people have suggested that corruption be legalized since it seemed very unlikely to be eliminated.

By making it legal, so the argument goes, we could manage it publicly and openly. As an illegal action, corruption will remain underground so that only those familiar with the underworld will become its beneficiaries. Making it legal and public would provide the opportunity to organize a more equal distribution of corruption.

If this were the case, Indonesia would be the first country in which people could live legally from theft. There would be no property rights, no public property and the rule of law would very soon be replaced by the rule of the jungle.

Then only the strong could eat their fill, while the weak would only be able to satisfy their hunger with the table scraps.

Academic anthropology has a similar concept -- the culture of poverty. This notion refers to a situation where the habits of the very poor remain in place even when these people have become much better off. Their observance of time, for example, which traditionally was very loose and undisciplined, will not be transformed into strict punctuality even if they are now working in big offices. Also, they will remain as unorganized as they were before, even if they have risen to a position of power over other people.

In the same vein, Indonesians initially became involved in the practice of corruption because their income was still not sufficient to cover their everyday expenses. However, this habit seems to remain even after one is earning much more money as the middle-manager of a private company or a high-ranking government official.

At that stage corruption is not only something to meet basic needs, but becomes a mental thing in that it plays into the value-orientation and system of belief of a group of people.

Perhaps it is an exaggeration to speak of the culture of corruption in Indonesia. It sounds too pessimistic and offers no hope of overcoming it. However, there is no doubt that its long- established and ever widening practices hint at some cultural attitudes, indeed, some basic underlying assumptions which make people inclined to think, not in the right way, but rather in a distorted way.

First, corruption seems to be tolerable because people are more interested in what one has achieved materially than in questioning the process which led to that condition.

That somebody now has two luxury cars and two big houses in very expensive locations in Jakarta is what matters for most people. Only few would question as to how a government employee officially earning less than Rp 3 million per month could afford to have two houses worth Rp 2 billion and two luxury cars worth at least Rp 1 billion.

With regard to government officials, corruption becomes all the less questionable because in feudalistic thinking, still prevalent in the minds of many, the social status of the powers- that-be is expected to bring about material wealth as a natural concomitant.

Material wealth is not something one achieves through economic struggle, but is rather supposed to result from social status.

This belief often reaches the extent that those within the bureaucracy trying to live honestly within their means have been seen as unsuccessful or even foolish.

This cultural attitude is still more discernible in the comparison between economic and political crime. Politicians and the powers-that-be here are more sensitive to political correctness than to economic accountability.

Someone who supposedly insults the president or a high-ranking government official is easily brought to court, and is very likely to arouse violent reactions from the followers of the one insulted.

In contrast, those who do injustice to the people and inflict severe financial losses to the state are easily protected by the "presumption of innocence". People who take public funds either by means of bribery or by means of political compulsion are not subject to any political or legal deterrence.

The Indonesian Bank Restructuring Agency has become a symbol of the softness of the Indonesian state as Gunnar Myrdal, in his Asian Drama, would have it.

One of the main features which distinguishes a "soft state" from a "hard state" in Myrdal's terms is the level of determination to remain disciplined and follow the rules of the game, as earlier agreed upon, and the persistence to strive for economic goals by means of getting involved in economic competition.

Economy as such is seen as an important pillar of social development and political sustainability, so much so that transgressions against the workings of economic policy and its implementation will be treated as serious offenses which deserve serious punishment.

Corruption would be treated as criminal offense, or as dangerous as subversion. In a sense this is true, since such corrupt practices as bribery, mark-ups, non-performing loans and violations of a bank's legal lending limit undermine the workings of the nation's economy.

The results of this economic subversion are discernible in a high-cost economy, the nonsolvency of banks, the increasing price of goods and import failures, which finally result in increasing unemployment and widening impoverishment.

In a "soft state", political power and social status seem to be more important than the economy, and there is no correspondence between national ideals and the reality of development.