Contemplating a military coup

Contemplating a military coup

Kusnanto Anggoro
Senior Researcher
Centre for Strategic and
International Studies (CSIS)
Jakarta

Historian Andrew Janos wrote in 1964 that a military coup in
the United States "would be too fantastic to contemplate, not
only because few would actually entertain the idea, but also
because the bulk of the people are strongly attached to the
prevailing (democratic) political system" (The Seizure of Power:
A Study of Force and Popular Consent, Research Monograph No. 16,
Center for International Studies, Princeton University, 1964, p.
39).

According to Janos, a coup against an elected democratic
government could only occur if political apathy prevailed as the
dominant feature in society.

Three decades later, Charles J. Dunlap Jr., then a lieutenant
colonel and Deputy Staff Judge Advocate, U.S. Central Command, at
MacDill AFB, Florida, envisaged an American military coup in
2012. (The Origins of the American Military Coup 2012, Parameter,
Winter 1992-1993: pp. 2-20). The main ingredient behind the
coup, according to Dunlap, was widespread exasperation with
democracy.

Such contrasting views deserve special attention. Janos was a
civilian, who believed in participatory politics. On the other
hand, Dunlap was a military officer concerned more with effective
government. To him, a military coup was possible if people became
disillusioned at the apparent inability of elected government to
solve the nation's dilemmas.

Arguably, the post-2004 election will lead to such an
environment. Indonesia's societal malaise was readily apparent in
2003.

According to a poll earlier this year, 78 percent of
Indonesians believed the country was on the "wrong track." One
researcher declared that social indicators were at their lowest
level in 20 years. The country suffered from a "deep pessimism
about politicians and government after years of broken promises."

Meanwhile, TNI's political faction in the People's
Consultative Assembly (MPR) abstained from two votes leading up
to the special legislative session in 2001. Generals refused to
uphold President Abdurrahman "Gus Dur" Wahid's emergency decree,
designed to keep him in power. Still, in Maluku and Aceh military
operations succeeded in reducing the brutality that often
characterizes territorial military action.

With such "political neutrality and professional" conduct,
Janos' and Dunlap's theses appeared to be mutually reinforcing.

People began to dream of a return of the Soeharto legacy. As
people are looking for someone or something that could produce
workable answers to the nation's crises, the military appears to
have been successful in restoring a considerable degree of public
confidence. Of course, political oxygen as such may be
insufficient for a military coup.

Nonetheless, another oxygen prevails, i.e. a praetorian guard
mentality in the military. Both the ouster of Gus Dur (2001) and
discussion on Article 19 of the draft of the Armed Forces bill
(2003) indicate some important points. Disobeying Gus Dur,
constitutionally the supreme commander of the military, was not,
according to the military, an act of insubordination. With a
strong belief that "loyalty to the government must be in line
with that to the people," the move against him was justified
because the president was engaging in a political struggle with
his legislature, also political institutions.

While the fall of Gus Dur showed that the military can
continue to influence events, debate on Article 19 of the draft
of the Armed Forces bill may illuminate another military
fixation.

Indeed, the article, under which the Armed Forces chief is
required only to inform the president 24 hours after deploying
troops when he determines the well-being of the state is at risk,
was not an indication that army conservatives were preparing a
contingency measure in anticipation of anything going wrong in
the 2004 election.

In fact, argument used in the discussions related to more
practical issues, for instance intercepting intruding foreign
aircraft into Indonesian's territory or uncontrollable communal
conflict in remote areas. Changes of personnel in the drafting
committee of the bill were not necessarily predestined to the
return of Army conservatives, though some of them brought
orthodoxies.

Nonetheless, the article did not fall from the sky. The whole
discussion about the military has regressed to the patterns that
existed before Soeharto's fall from power. Since mid-2001 senior
officers have been genuinely concerned about the civilian
political leadership, about the involvement of party leaders in
money politics and especially, about their perception that
politicians show more concern for rebel casualties in places like
Aceh than the casualties of their own army.

Military coups have been seen somewhat less frequently since
the mid-1980s. The failure of military regimes in Latin America
to resolve the economic and political problems appeared to have
made the military much more reluctant to intervene in politics.
In contrast to past crises, the armed forces sat on the sidelines
through economic crises such as the Asian crisis in Thailand in
1998 or the Argentinean crisis of 2002.

Failed transition to democracy, either in the form of
ineffective government, the shortsighted interest of civilian
elites or mounting corruption, could invite military
intervention, although this should not necessarily end up with a
military regime.

In Pakistan (1999), Pervez Musharraf moved in with the promise
of fighting corruption. In Cote d'Ivoire and the Central American
Republic (2002) the military serves as an arbiter between
civilian leaders.

Democracy is a fragile institution that must be continuously
nurtured and scrupulously protected. The old credo that the
military is the guardian of the state is taking on special
meaning for the Indonesian Armed Forces, amidst a prevailing
strong ideological fixation and an ingrained, self-defined,
quasi-religious mission of protecting the state.

At present, few generals envisage such a coup. The political
role of the military will not end in 2004. I was somewhat nervous
when an active general told me, "despite being no longer in the
legislature, the military will use the authority with which it is
vested to take part in safeguarding and controlling the reform
movement."

By definition, a military coup is simply the use of the threat
of military force to remove a particularly unpopular leader; the
military may not directly assume power. This occurred twice in
the Philippines in 2003. Let us hope that the 2004 elections do
not fail to establish an effective government, and thereby
further deepen political apathy.

Kusnanto Anggoro is a lecturer, postgraduate studies program
University of Indonesia, Jakarta.