Consequences of East Timor ballot

Consequences of East Timor ballot

After East Timorese overwhelmingly voted against integration
with Indonesia, Tjipta Lesmana, a social studies and politics
lecturer at the University of Indonesia, examines the
consequences of their choice. This article was prepared before
the introduction of martial law in East Timor beginning early
Tuesday.

JAKARTA (JP): A new full-scale civil war in East Timor is
apparently imminent if the Indonesian Military (TNI) fails to
stem violence launched by pro-integration militias, following the
announcement of the Aug. 30 ballot results.

The vote was, as expected, strongly won by proindependence
supporters (78.5 percent, versus 21.5 percent in favor of
autonomy). Violence erupted the day after the referendum.
Prointegration militias blocked the airport and detained for
several hours scores of United Nations Mission in East Timor
(UNAMET) personnel en route to Dili.

On Sept. 1, they rampaged through a neighborhood around UNAMET
headquarters, shooting, burning houses and sending hundreds of
panicked residents into the UN complex. Ian Martin, the UNAMET
chief, failed to conceal his deep resentment of Indonesian
police, so his calls for assistance were not answered promptly.
The latest unpredicted development has led the UN Security
Council to hold an urgent meeting.

The Habibie administration has be trapped into worldwide
condemnation. Australia, New Zealand and Canada called on the
Security Council to immediately send peacekeeping forces to East
Timor.

The scenes of violence, as a matter of fact, indicated that
the prointegration groups thought they would lose the ballot.
Everyone seems to be reminded of a slogan vigorously launched by
antiindependence leaders during the referendum campaign,
"Integration or War!". Tito Baptista, chairman of the United
Front for East Timor Autonomy, warned, "If we lose with 40
percent, it is enough to fight 100 years more." The warning was
the clearest indication of imminent bloodshed if East Timor lost
its autonomy status within Indonesia's jurisdiction.

The likelihood of a renewal of civil war was, indeed, echoed
by Foreign Minister Ali Alatas in February. Citing definite
consequences of bloodshed, at the time the Habibie administration
categorically rejected the idea of holding a referendum in East
Timor. But Alatas failed to convince the UN Secretary-General
Kofi Annan of his theory. And in New York, Annan preferred
Portugal's argument that a referendum was the best and fairest
alternative to solve East Timor's problem. One man, one vote, a
US$53 million project funded and organized by the UN, finally
turned into a fact.

Now that the result of the ballot has been unveiled, the
Habibie administration, not the least TNI, should have been ready
to accept a bitter situation in East Timor. East Timor is bound
to be scrapped from the Indonesian map. Wasn't it Habibie himself
who arrogantly proclaimed to the world that "If East Timorese
want to depart, go ahead"? Habibie even set a deadline of Jan. 1,
2000 for its separation. Describing the land as consisting of
nothing but rocks, he described the Indonesian government's
decision in 1976 to accept East Timor's integration as being on
humanitarian grounds.

The land was so poor, Habibie further said, 93 percent of
Timor's development budget was funded by the central government.
East Timor brings only a heavy burden to all Indonesians, instead
of gold.

This is only one side of the Habibie administration's stance
on East Timor hailed by the world community. But the other side,
represented by TNI, is a bleak one. TNI is indeed very upset with
Habibie's unpredicted policy on East Timor.

Officially, TNI Commander Gen. Wiranto has to support the
government policy. Covertly, however, the military sabotages it
by training pro-Indonesia militias and supplying them with
military equipment.

Under any circumstances, they would resist the land being
freed. Violence has intensified since the government announced
the choice between wide-ranging autonomy and independence to
Timorese. An estimated 500 people have died during the past five
months alone. Prointegration militiamen would not fight so
passionately without getting strong backing from the Indonesian
military. This is understandable if one realizes that tens of
thousands of TNI soldiers died since Indonesia took over East
Timor.

Using violence and intimidation to undermine the independence-
minded population, they hoped the poll would have a low response,
and then would challenge its legitimacy.

But the tactics were a total failure. The poll turnover was
surprisingly high: 98.5 percent of registered voters cast their
ballots. Now that the referendum has been conducted successfully,
the military had no other way except to launch violence anew,
contrary to their previous pledge to accept whatever the poll
result is.

President Habibie has pledged his administration's commitment
to cooperate with Portugal in implementing the second phase of
the referendum, i.e., toward the setting up of a transitional
government in East Timor.

In his national speech shortly after the announcement of the
poll results, Habibie also instructed TNI and the National Police
to secure peace and order, taking stern action with all parties
intending to obstruct the further reconciliation process.

As stipulated in the May 5 New York agreement, the Indonesian
security apparatus has the responsibility to safeguard voting
procedures up to the establishment of the transitional
administration in East Timor. Failure to adhere to this
commitment is tantamount to international intervention. And the
possibility of military intervention from the world community has
been echoed by several UN members.

There is a strong possibility that East Timor will turn into
"Southeast Asia's Kosovo" if the UN agrees to dispatch
peacekeeping forces. One of the arguments used by the North
Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) to send troops to Kosovo was
to protect ethnic Albanian lives from systematic evacuation by
Serbs. The same argument could probably be used in the case of
East Timor: International troops are needed to protect
proindependence people and UN personnel from attacks, because the
Indonesian police have failed to exercise their duty.

The loss of East Timor and the presence of multinational
troops there would put Habibie in an awkward position in the
coming General Session of the People's Consultative Assembly
(MPR). Outcries of nationalistic sentiment would overrun the
whole Assembly.

Believe it or not, he has absolutely no chance whatsoever to
be elected as the country's president. His failures to bring
former president Soeharto to court and to uncover the Bank Bali
scandal, indeed, have inflicted a very high cost on his political
future.

All of this messy drama could be attributed to Habibie's
impulsive leadership style. It began with his blundering
statement on Jan. 26 that East Timorese could have their
independence if the option of wide-ranging autonomy offered by
the government was rejected. A blunder because the MPR, the
highest state body in the country, was made to accept a fait-
accompli. Habibie was apparently not aware of MPR Act No.
VI/MPR/1978, which named East Timor as an integral part of the
Republic of Indonesia. He made the announcement to the world
community without prior consent from the MPR.

"If autonomy was rejected," said Foreign Minister Ali Alatas
in February, "we will hand in the East Timor problem to the MPR."

Alatas might have mistakenly thought that the MPR was
subordinate to the President, not the other way around. Yes, both
the President and the foreign minister forced the MPR to accept a
fait accompli.

Now the crucial question is: What happens if the MPR refuses
to revoke MPR Act No. VI/MPR/1978? Could Habibie just tell Koffi
Annan that East Timor is not eligible to follow its path of
independence?

Yes, Habibie has really put the MPR in a difficult position,
without any option except to allow East Timor to go.

In summary, there is a possibility that a new full-scale civil
war will erupt following the prointegration faction's loss in the
ballot.

But that will not take long, since international peacekeeping
forces will promptly destroy prointegration militiamen.

Second, we will see thousands and thousands of refugees
fleeing East Timor. Another human drama likened to Kosovo's will
be seen by the international community.

Third, Habibie's chances at the presidency are almost nil.

There is another sorry consequence which is no less crucial.
The loss of East Timor could trigger the independence-minded
population in Aceh to reaffirm their struggle. Three days after
Timorese cast their ballots, thousands of Acehnese gathered in
the capital and proclaimed their steadiness to defend Acehnese
dignity at whatever cost. The central government will see more
violence and explosive situations if a strong-arm approach is
used to stem those struggles.

And what about ethnic sentiments in Irian Jaya and Maluku?
Could anyone, even Gen. Wiranto, guarantee that East Timor's path
to independence will not affect Irianese and Maluku people to
follow the same path?

Things are getting worse nowadays because the Habibie regime
is keen to take the "easy option" in regard to ethnic violence
across the country. Now that thousands and thousands of people
have died and so many "God houses" and buildings have been
burned, no single criminal has been brought to court and
convicted. People are wondering what the hell is Habibie doing in
his palace?