Consequences of East Timor ballot

After East Timorese overwhelmingly voted against integration with Indonesia, Tjipta Lesmana, a social studies and politics lecturer at the University of Indonesia, examines the consequences of their choice. This article was prepared before the introduction of martial law in East Timor beginning early Tuesday.

JAKARTA (JP): A new full-scale civil war in East Timor is apparently imminent if the Indonesian Military (TNI) fails to stem violence launched by pro-integration militias, following the announcement of the Aug. 30 ballot results.

The vote was, as expected, strongly won by proindependence supporters (78.5 percent, versus 21.5 percent in favor of autonomy). Violence erupted the day after the referendum. Prointegration militias blocked the airport and detained for several hours scores of United Nations Mission in East Timor (UNAMET) personnel en route to Dili.

On Sept. 1, they rampaged through a neighborhood around UNAMET headquarters, shooting, burning houses and sending hundreds of panicked residents into the UN complex. Ian Martin, the UNAMET chief, failed to conceal his deep resentment of Indonesian police, so his calls for assistance were not answered promptly. The latest unpredicted development has led the UN Security Council to hold an urgent meeting.

The Habibie administration has be trapped into worldwide condemnation. Australia, New Zealand and Canada called on the Security Council to immediately send peacekeeping forces to East Timor.

The scenes of violence, as a matter of fact, indicated that the prointegration groups thought they would lose the ballot. Everyone seems to be reminded of a slogan vigorously launched by antiindependence leaders during the referendum campaign, "Integration or War!". Tito Baptista, chairman of the United Front for East Timor Autonomy, warned, "If we lose with 40 percent, it is enough to fight 100 years more." The warning was the clearest indication of imminent bloodshed if East Timor lost its autonomy status within Indonesia's jurisdiction.

The likelihood of a renewal of civil war was, indeed, echoed by Foreign Minister Ali Alatas in February. Citing definite consequences of bloodshed, at the time the Habibie administration categorically rejected the idea of holding a referendum in East Timor. But Alatas failed to convince the UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan of his theory. And in New York, Annan preferred Portugal's argument that a referendum was the best and fairest alternative to solve East Timor's problem. One man, one vote, a US$53 million project funded and organized by the UN, finally turned into a fact.

Now that the result of the ballot has been unveiled, the Habibie administration, not the least TNI, should have been ready to accept a bitter situation in East Timor. East Timor is bound to be scrapped from the Indonesian map. Wasn't it Habibie himself who arrogantly proclaimed to the world that "If East Timorese want to depart, go ahead"? Habibie even set a deadline of Jan. 1, 2000 for its separation. Describing the land as consisting of nothing but rocks, he described the Indonesian government's decision in 1976 to accept East Timor's integration as being on humanitarian grounds.

The land was so poor, Habibie further said, 93 percent of Timor's development budget was funded by the central government. East Timor brings only a heavy burden to all Indonesians, instead of gold.

This is only one side of the Habibie administration's stance on East Timor hailed by the world community. But the other side, represented by TNI, is a bleak one. TNI is indeed very upset with Habibie's unpredicted policy on East Timor.

Officially, TNI Commander Gen. Wiranto has to support the government policy. Covertly, however, the military sabotages it by training pro-Indonesia militias and supplying them with military equipment.

Under any circumstances, they would resist the land being freed. Violence has intensified since the government announced the choice between wide-ranging autonomy and independence to Timorese. An estimated 500 people have died during the past five months alone. Prointegration militiamen would not fight so passionately without getting strong backing from the Indonesian military. This is understandable if one realizes that tens of thousands of TNI soldiers died since Indonesia took over East Timor.

Using violence and intimidation to undermine the independence- minded population, they hoped the poll would have a low response, and then would challenge its legitimacy.

But the tactics were a total failure. The poll turnover was surprisingly high: 98.5 percent of registered voters cast their ballots. Now that the referendum has been conducted successfully, the military had no other way except to launch violence anew, contrary to their previous pledge to accept whatever the poll result is.

President Habibie has pledged his administration's commitment to cooperate with Portugal in implementing the second phase of the referendum, i.e., toward the setting up of a transitional government in East Timor.

In his national speech shortly after the announcement of the poll results, Habibie also instructed TNI and the National Police to secure peace and order, taking stern action with all parties intending to obstruct the further reconciliation process.

As stipulated in the May 5 New York agreement, the Indonesian security apparatus has the responsibility to safeguard voting procedures up to the establishment of the transitional administration in East Timor. Failure to adhere to this commitment is tantamount to international intervention. And the possibility of military intervention from the world community has been echoed by several UN members.

There is a strong possibility that East Timor will turn into "Southeast Asia's Kosovo" if the UN agrees to dispatch peacekeeping forces. One of the arguments used by the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) to send troops to Kosovo was to protect ethnic Albanian lives from systematic evacuation by Serbs. The same argument could probably be used in the case of East Timor: International troops are needed to protect proindependence people and UN personnel from attacks, because the Indonesian police have failed to exercise their duty.

The loss of East Timor and the presence of multinational troops there would put Habibie in an awkward position in the coming General Session of the People's Consultative Assembly (MPR). Outcries of nationalistic sentiment would overrun the whole Assembly.

Believe it or not, he has absolutely no chance whatsoever to be elected as the country's president. His failures to bring former president Soeharto to court and to uncover the Bank Bali scandal, indeed, have inflicted a very high cost on his political future.

All of this messy drama could be attributed to Habibie's impulsive leadership style. It began with his blundering statement on Jan. 26 that East Timorese could have their independence if the option of wide-ranging autonomy offered by the government was rejected. A blunder because the MPR, the highest state body in the country, was made to accept a fait- accompli. Habibie was apparently not aware of MPR Act No. VI/MPR/1978, which named East Timor as an integral part of the Republic of Indonesia. He made the announcement to the world community without prior consent from the MPR.

"If autonomy was rejected," said Foreign Minister Ali Alatas in February, "we will hand in the East Timor problem to the MPR."

Alatas might have mistakenly thought that the MPR was subordinate to the President, not the other way around. Yes, both the President and the foreign minister forced the MPR to accept a fait accompli.

Now the crucial question is: What happens if the MPR refuses to revoke MPR Act No. VI/MPR/1978? Could Habibie just tell Koffi Annan that East Timor is not eligible to follow its path of independence?

Yes, Habibie has really put the MPR in a difficult position, without any option except to allow East Timor to go.

In summary, there is a possibility that a new full-scale civil war will erupt following the prointegration faction's loss in the ballot.

But that will not take long, since international peacekeeping forces will promptly destroy prointegration militiamen.

Second, we will see thousands and thousands of refugees fleeing East Timor. Another human drama likened to Kosovo's will be seen by the international community.

Third, Habibie's chances at the presidency are almost nil.

There is another sorry consequence which is no less crucial. The loss of East Timor could trigger the independence-minded population in Aceh to reaffirm their struggle. Three days after Timorese cast their ballots, thousands of Acehnese gathered in the capital and proclaimed their steadiness to defend Acehnese dignity at whatever cost. The central government will see more violence and explosive situations if a strong-arm approach is used to stem those struggles.

And what about ethnic sentiments in Irian Jaya and Maluku? Could anyone, even Gen. Wiranto, guarantee that East Timor's path to independence will not affect Irianese and Maluku people to follow the same path?

Things are getting worse nowadays because the Habibie regime is keen to take the "easy option" in regard to ethnic violence across the country. Now that thousands and thousands of people have died and so many "God houses" and buildings have been burned, no single criminal has been brought to court and convicted. People are wondering what the hell is Habibie doing in his palace?