Conflicts in Indonesia: A sociological review

Ignas Kleden Sociologist, The Center for East Indonesian Affairs Jakarta

Poso is the latest example of the inter-ethnic conflicts that have strikingly characterized political reform and the new millennium in Indonesia. Poso, however, is only one item in a long list that includes Pontianak, Sambas, Ambon, Sampit, Aceh and Papua.

At the end of 2001 one cannot avoid the tempting question: If all those conflicts are so difficult to overcome, how can one understand them analytically? To do this a series of critical questions needs to be answered, either empirically or hypothetically.

First of all, why have those conflicts occurred so often and so easily? If the occurrences are due to social discrepancies or cultural incongruities, are the local communities so vulnerable to misunderstanding and social maladjustment? If this is the case, one must be able to explain what has made them so sensitive in the last two to three years. Or, should one assume that they have long been so vulnerable without our being aware of it?

On the other hand, if conflicts occurred following deliberate instigation by provocateurs, were those troublemakers really well organized to provoke people to conflict and violence? What financial support did they have that gave them so much mobility from place to place and from one island to another?

If they do really exist, why on earth is it so difficult for the Indonesian government to find them and to bring them to justice? Why are the state agencies, which always succeeded in capturing student activists, suddenly so powerless in detecting the provocateurs?

Second, it has become increasingly clear that once a conflict occurs, it is very difficult to resolve. Sociologically speaking, communal conflicts have always occurred since time immemorial.

However, people involved in conflict and mutual killings have always been able to bring to an end the destruction and return to a peaceful situation, this being done through local conflict- resolution institutions, without which they would have long since perished.

The process and the ritual of reconciliation often serve as an opportunity to enlarge the scope of one's community by means of turning the once-opposing clan or family into new members of one's community after a peace agreement has been established. In Maluku, people say, "We are used to conflicts and killing, but we are also used to peace and reconciliation thereafter."

One can further pose the question as to why the traditional conflict-resolution institutions suddenly became so ineffective. Is this ineffectiveness due to the lack of resilience of local communities in the face of rapid social changes or is it the result of active destruction?

If the first possibility is true, can one identify social changes so that are detrimental to local conflict-resolution institutions? Why have local people lost their capacity to adjust themselves to ongoing social changes?

Conversely, if the ineffectiveness is due to deliberate destruction by unknown forces, what is the aim of this destruction? Why are some people so interested in destroying other people's lives by means of shattering their social institutions? What do they aim to achieve?

One can learn some lessons from experience in earlier years.

First, conflicts usually originate from trivial issues, then quickly escalate to wider violence and killing. The initial stage of conflict is usually ignored at worst and neglected at best, so much so that even the smallest misunderstanding is not eliminated early enough to prevent its progression toward violence.

There have always been comments regarding possible provocateurs, but very little has been done to capture the alleged offenders and bring them to justice. In the case of Sampit, the Dayaks categorically refuted they had killed the three Madurese, this being the casus belli of direct retaliation of the Madurese.

With hindsight, it is difficult to understand why efforts have not been made to clarify who might have been the real murderers. Why were the people from both sides left to wallow in mutual suspicion, with very little attempt to find out the truth?

Second, conflicts usually occur between two limited ethnic or religious groups, without much of an multiplier effect on other groups, as if ethnic groups could be clearly defined in terms of physical boundaries. The "boundaries theory" is now being seriously discarded among the theorists of ethnicity.

Furthermore, those involved in conflicts usually come from two groups with a relatively equal position in terms of both demography and culture. No serious conflict has so far occurred between majority and minority groups or between a dominant culture and a subculture. In other words, the conflicts were too limited to have been spontaneous. Muslims in Ambon also have Catholic relatives and so do the Christians. However, the Catholics were rather kept away from involvement in the conflict.

In the case of Sambas the Malays must also have had many relatives among the Dayaks, and yet the conflict was limited to the Malays and the Madurese, without any involvement of the Dayaks.

Third, on the basis of the above considerations one must examine the nature of those conflicts more seriously, whether they were really ethnic or more political in nature, although they happened (or were made) to take the form of ethnic antagonism.

This is important, because the wrong analysis will lead to efforts that might have been made with the best of intentions but which ultimately fail. This is because the approach to conflicts has not corresponded with what is at the bottom line: competition for political power, resentment of economic domination, or merely dissatisfaction and miscommunication owing to cultural differences.

Power differentials in politics and the economy can only be settled through government policy and policy implementation, whereas cultural differences have something to do with the sense of being recognized and respected, despite possible misunderstanding.

Indonesia has been an example of cultural differences for many centuries. The world largest civilizations are all present in this archipelago. However, there was very little war and conflict due to mere cultural differences or what has been termed Huntington's clash of civilizations. The fact that nowadays cultural differences so easily lead to conflict and violence cannot be explained historically, but should be better accounted for politically.

The term inter-ethnic conflicts might be misleading. Efforts should be made to tackle the existing conflicts politically, because otherwise it will be well-nigh impossible to understand why cultural differences have had such a powerfully destructive political impact. This is very true, given that the Soeharto hegemony sidelined cultural differences, making them a nonissue, or a political taboo, for three decades.