Sat, 09 Nov 2002

Conflicting paths to peace in troubled Aceh

Otto Syamsuddin Ishak, Sociologist, Civil Society Alliance for Democracy (Yappika), Jakarta

Militaristic politics will destroy the egalitarian values of the Acehnese. War will lead to their character assassination -- the Acehnese may be branded with a stereotype in connection with their acquaintance with fundamentalist Muslims.

Meanwhile, many forms of bombing as well as arms-related murders occurring from outside Aceh including Jakarta have been blamed on the Acehnese. Yet the Indonesian regime is also known as a party responsible for various crimes against humanity, both in war and conflict areas, and in places where non-governmental organizations (NGOs) emerge to fight for human rights in Indonesia's political order. All of this will echo loudly throughout the world.

The most tragic thing about the armed conflict in Aceh is the human destruction. Data compiled by a number of Aceh NGOs shows a rapid increase in the number of crimes against humanity toward the Acehnese from 2000 up to late 2002. These crimes against humanity can be broken down into arbitrary arrests (419 in 2000 to 981 cases in 2002), murder (524 to 1,113 cases), forced disappearances (140 to 267 cases), torture (549 to 1,706 cases) plus violence against women and children. Even more of these crimes were committed between 1976 and 1999.

These collected figures are the tip of a very broad and deep iceberg. The space for NGOs, victims as well as the community to take notes of, investigate and to report these crimes is becoming increasingly small.

So, what is the meaning of a political contract if it will become an instrument of the state to destroy all of those involved? The state has lost its significance, as it has killed an increasing number of people and destroyed their life systems, including their economy.

The armed conflict has lasted 26 years and negotiations began only in 2000. Despite all the losses there remains a strong conviction within the military elite that a negotiation can never solve the separatist question in Aceh. The answer is only war. This military settlement has dominated the views of Indonesian bureaucrats and politicians.

This conviction is not without its historical reasons. History shows that Indonesia's colonial war could only be settled by means of guerrilla warfare. This is why all agreements involving cease-fires with colonizers, such as the Linggarjati agreement and the Roem-Royen treaty, all with the involvement of a third party, were in effect only brief and later disrupted by militaristic action.

The Dutch, writes historian Anthony Reid, said their action was a policing act intended to stop disorder, and they declared the treaties no longer binding to them.

In its fight against the Dutch the Indonesian Military retreated to safer places, pursuing a scorched-earth policy on the way and waging guerrilla warfare. Pierre Heijboer even said that some Britons, Chinese and Japanese were subjected to robbery and murder. It was this guerrilla warfare waged by the Indonesian side that served as a milestone in the political history of its military, reinforcing the belief that it was actually the military's settlement that released Indonesia from the clutches of the Dutch on Dec. 30, 1949.

Strong belief in a militaristic settlement continues to shape the main strategy to solve the armed conflict in Aceh, reflecting the constant dualism in Indonesia's peace approach to conflicts.

On the one hand, it wishes to sit at the negotiating table -- while its military elite decide to go on with military operations -- so that the implementation of every agreement cannot happen. An exception to this was the first negotiation, the Humanitarian Pause.

This treaty was signed on May 15, 2000 and ended with terror, torture and the murder of members of the monitoring team as well as a number of humanitarian and human rights activists plus the arrest and harassment of negotiators of the Free Aceh Movement (GAM). The historical cycle, Indonesian style, had repeated itself. Before, it was the Dutch colonial rule that was subjected to this practice. Today, it is practiced against GAM.

Therefore, a negotiation does not pave the way for the termination of violence, in the perspective of renowned peace worker Johan Gaitung. The above dualism does not give room at all for efforts of reconstruction, reconciliation and resolution.

The end of violence may open up larger public space for civilians to reconstruct the crimes against humanity. A very phenomenal example, following the removal of the Military Operational Region (DOM) status on Aceh on Aug. 7, 1998, was the opening up of a chance for the Acehnese to indict the Indonesian Military and even keep them under control. This really crushed the image of the military and their political position in Indonesia's political system.

The armed conflict in Aceh surely has a broad destructive repercussion with respect to the right to live and the political, economic and cultural system of civilians in Aceh and in Indonesia. Violence contributes very basically to the destruction of all aspects of life, even if committed under the name of nationalism or territorial integrity. The armed conflict in Aceh has contributed chiefly to the conflict involving members of security forces, including among the police and army or within certain army/police units.

Likewise, the war has contributed to the weak condition of our laws -- for example the tribunal for human rights violations -- either linked with the war in East Timor or in connection with the shooting of students, and the May 1998 tragedy in Jakarta. The law has become subordinate to military politics.

The armed conflict in Aceh has contributed to the escalation of terror, armed crimes and murders conducted by unknown people, drug trafficking, the spread of counterfeit money and the level of corruption in Indonesia.

Therefore, the end to violence cannot be solved by the armed groups alone. It is a problem of the civilians in Aceh and has even become a political and economic problem faced by the nation and is related to their own image. Besides, it has become a problem, at least, for the nations in Southeast Asia.

The world community needs to encourage and pressure all parties relying on violence to bring the war to an end. In this way, civilians will gain the required space and strength with which they can implement the reconstruction, reconciliation and resolution to design Indonesia's civilized political, economic and cultural order.

The article is based on the writer's paper prepared for a Regional Workshop on Understanding Conflict in Asia, held in Jakarta on Oct. 29-31, by the Bangkok-based Forum Asia and the Alliance of Independent Journalists.