Confidence is Habibie's challenges
By Benny Subianto
JAKARTA (JP): Two days before announcing his resignation on May 21, Soeharto asked a group of nine Islamic leaders whether appointing Habibie, his vice president cum golden boy, as president would guarantee an end to the troubles. None of the nine Islamic leaders wanted Habibie to be President.
Habibie's subsequent appointment has been widely questioned by many parties, including some of his supporters. Constitutional law experts have debated the legality of his appointment because the People's Consultative Assembly (MPR) decree which appointed Soeharto president has not yet been revoked. Politicians and political observers have also voiced their doubts about the legitimacy of Habibie's presidency.
These questions have arisen firstly because of doubts over Habibie's power base and his commitment to political reform and democratization. There are also grave doubts over his ability to deal with the monetary crisis and recultivate confidence in the Indonesian economy. Finally, Habibie himself has been tarnished by the corruption, collusion, and nepotism of the old regime and must at some time in the future answer these accusations.
Doubts over Habibie's ability to deal with the monetary crisis stem from his reputation as a free-spending eccentric who has a penchant for projects of an excessively grand nature. This, and his famous zig-zag theory to explain the rate of inflation, has severely damaged his credibility in financial and economic circles around the world.
Genuine pro-reform politicians and activists have not endorsed Habibie's administration. This stance is quite understandable because Habibie is inseparable from Soeharto's regime and its now notorious corruption, collusion, and nepotism.
Decisions taken by members of Habibie's family to resign from positions of power and influence are strong confirmation of Habibie's indulgence in the bad practices of the old regime. Both foreign and local media have revealed that immediate and distance relatives of Habibie have benefited considerably from corrupt, collusive and nepotistic practices.
For example, it is clear that development projects on Batam island are firmly controlled by the Habibie clan. His brother, J.E. "Fanny" Habibie replaced him as head of the Batam Industrial Development Authority. His son, Thareq, and an aunt have a US$100 million joint venture project to build a resort area on the island, and his brother Timmy, who heads the Timsco conglomerate, is planning to construct a $1 billion dollar container terminal.
Furthermore, Habibie's younger sister, Sri Rejeki, chairs a foundation that runs the island's hospital and schools. Her husband is the former CEO of Batam Island Development Authority and still holds exclusive rights to manage the island's ports.
Habibie dismissed these accusations in an interview with The New York Times, saying that his family's wealth was due to their high education and talent. It is true that his family are blessed in both of these respects, but Habibie has shown himself to be naive by denying that he abused his position of power to advance the business interests of his family.
Habibie hopes to stay in power until the end of next year and it is likely that he is buying time to prepare himself to stand in the next presidential election, although last week he said he would not be a presidential candidate in the election.
These circumstances have forced Emil Salim, a former cabinet member and respected pro-reform figure, to resign from the Group of Six, a grouping which is set to become a loyal opposition to the new President.
Emil believes that an election should be held immediately and that Habibie should not be allowed to buy time for himself. Furthermore, he argues that Habibie's occupation of the country's highest office will create market distrust, obstruct the flow of capital back into the country and delay economic recovery.
Habibie's uneasy relations with the Armed Forces (ABRI) are well-known. The simmering animosity between the President and ABRI dates from when he controlled the purchase of weapons, ships, and jet fighters. Soeharto's decision to hand over control of some key military-owned industries to Habibie did little to improve this situation.
Habibie's only power base is the Association of Indonesian Moslem Intellectuals (ICMI). The association played a strategic role in securing Habibie's nomination as vice president, but reports of a rift between him and ICMI emerged ten days before he took over the presidency. Habibie naively stated on May 9 that the ICMI call for a cabinet reshuffle and an extraordinary session of the People's Consultative Assembly (MPR) amounted to harassment of the Assembly.
ICMI is a complex and heterogeneous organization established in 1990 under the auspices of the Soeharto regime. Habibie was assigned to lead and control the newly born Islamic intellectual organization. The association benefited from Habibie's close ties to Soeharto but adopted a mildly critical stance toward the New Order regime. Habibie successfully built a political power base inside ICMI and secured the sympathies of a number of other Islamic groups in the process because the association is made up of a number of different groupings, including intellectuals, scholars, academics, professionals, government bureaucrats, officials, and political activists.
Although this diverse grouping has no obvious political constituents, the association has always maintained that it represents marginalized and underprivileged Moslems, who happen to be the majority of Indonesians.
ICMI has served as a vehicle for a number of different types of political careerists who saw it as an effective means through which to advance their interests under Soeharto's repressive regime.
Some ICMI figures apparently actively assisted Habibie during the transfer of power, the formation of his cabinet, and in implementing policy thereafter.
Twelve of the thirty six cabinet members have belonged to ICMI at some time in their careers, so it not surprising that political observers have labeled it an ICMI cabinet.
It is nevertheless too much too presume that Islamic politics will secure Habibie's political future. One ICMI member who belongs to Habibie's inner-circle admits that he is worried about the possibility of social unrest, or even revolution, as a result of a further deterioration in economic conditions over the next few months.
In spite of Habibie's unpromising political future, some ICMI figures still hope to influence the design of a blueprint for Indonesian politics under Habibie. It seems that the group of Catholic intellectuals who under the patronage of the late Gen. Ali Moertopo assisted Soeharto design a political blueprint in the late 1960s has become something of a model for some ICMI figures.
But those in Habibie's inner circle who support his plan to stay in power until late 1999 must face a number of challenges.
The association has no basis on which to claim it is pro- reform. Its main objective, to varying degrees, is to encourage the development of Islamic society, not democratization.
Furthermore, the new government has yet to introduce any credible policies or take any convincing action to restore public and international confidence in Indonesian politics and the economy.
Habibie's cabinet must also prove that it can provide a sufficient supply of affordable staple food, stabilize social and political conditions, and attract back foreign investment and Chinese-Indonesians who were forced to flee last months riots.
Finally, Habibie must deal with challenges to his regime, but unlike Soeharto, who had the full support of Western countries during the Cold War, he will face close scrutiny of his every move from the global community.
The writer is an observer of political affairs based in Jakarta.
Window A: ICMI has served as a vehicle for a number of different types of political careerists who saw it as an effective means through which to advance their interests under Soeharto's repressive regime.
Window B: In spite of Habibie's unpromising political future, some ICMI figures still hope to influence the design of a blueprint for Indonesian politics under Habibie.