Concerns over Straits of Malacca

Problems affecting safe navigation in the Strait of Malacca -- a narrow 900-kilometer waterway lying between Indonesia, Singapore and Malaysia -- will remain of international concern because, according to the International Maritime Organization (IMO), at least 50,000 ships sail through the narrow channel every year. They transport about 30 percent of the world's trade goods and 80 percent of Japan's oil needs.

Over the last several years, the IMO has regularly issued warnings about the rising threat of piracy in the strait, where the majority of pirate attacks take place in Indonesian waters compared to the waters belonging to the other littoral states. With increasing terrorist activities in the region, it is understandable that fears about security in this vital sea lane have greatly increased.

Therefore, when Indonesia, as the chair of the 10-member Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), hosts the ASEAN Ministerial Meeting (AMM) from June 29 to June 30, followed by the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF), security in the Strait of Malacca will likely be one of the hottest issues to be discussed.

International concern over security threats in the strait was also a central issue during the three-day international conference on Asia that ended on Sunday in Singapore. Indonesia itself adopted a low-profile stance during the conference, although it did propose an ASEAN maritime security cooperation forum to handle the issue.

According to the summary of the meeting's results, "Indonesia recognized the legitimate interests of other countries in the safety and security of the Straits and was willing to accommodate and engage them."

Singapore proposed the idea of U.S. Marines helping to patrol the vital waterway. Malaysia is against a physical U.S. military presence but, in the words of Malaysia's defense minister Najib Razak on Tuesday, "Malaysia believes it is always positive for us to have shared responsibilities. But this shared responsibility must not be at the expense of the sovereignty and territorial integrity of the littoral states."

Knowing the sensitivities in Indonesia and Malaysia over sovereignty issues, U.S. Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld in his speech at the forum was very cautious in suggesting the possible involvement of U.S. troops in securing the strait, while nevertheless making it very clear that his country has strategic interests in the channel.

How should Indonesians react to Singapore's stance and to the strong possibility of a U.S. presence in providing security in the strait? Some Indonesian officials clearly felt annoyed when Singapore indicated its strong support for a stronger U.S. presence in the region several weeks ago, arguing that the island state was only thinking about its own interests, without considering those of its neighbors. Singapore was using the terrorist threat as a tool to justify the presence of foreign forces in the region, these particular officials alleged.

There always has been strong public support here for the government's rejection of the presence of foreign military forces in any form in this region as it is feared that not only could they endanger the sovereignty of the countries in the region and destabilize their domestic politics, but could also provoke a response from those upset by any such presence.

However, we must remember that Singapore is a sovereign state that has the right to defend its own national interests -- although it is probably also right to say that officials in that tiny but prosperous city state may sometimes fail to take into account the sensitivities of its larger but poorer neighbors when it settles on policies that also could affect them.

The Strait of Malacca is an international issue and safe passage is guaranteed by international law. Therefore, we cannot just say that only Indonesia, Malaysia and Singapore have the right to deal with any problems concerning the waterway.

Indonesia cannot just refuse a foreign military presence there without showing convincing evidence that it is capable of securing the waterway, along with the other two littoral states. It is indeed not very pleasant to hear that Indonesia is currently not only unable to combat rampant piracy and robbery in its part of the strait, but that it has also become a source of security threats in the strait and, to a certain extent, also the wider region.

The prolonged insurgency in Aceh poses a direct threat to security in the strait, with arms and commodity smuggling by the Free Aceh Movement (GAM) frequently occurring. The Indonesian Navy has for years complained that it desperately needs more equipment and money to combat piracy in the Strait of Malacca.

Therefore, we have no choice but to accept international cooperation to secure the waterway. The question is, what form of cooperation would be acceptable in the strait? We cannot just revert once again to nationalistic jargon in refusing the presence of foreign forces in the strait while at the same time failing to carry out our own responsibility to secure this vital maritime channel.