Concerns over Straits of Malacca

Concerns over Straits of Malacca

Problems affecting safe navigation in the Strait of Malacca --
a narrow 900-kilometer waterway lying between Indonesia,
Singapore and Malaysia -- will remain of international concern
because, according to the International Maritime Organization
(IMO), at least 50,000 ships sail through the narrow channel
every year. They transport about 30 percent of the world's trade
goods and 80 percent of Japan's oil needs.

Over the last several years, the IMO has regularly issued
warnings about the rising threat of piracy in the strait, where
the majority of pirate attacks take place in Indonesian waters
compared to the waters belonging to the other littoral states.
With increasing terrorist activities in the region, it is
understandable that fears about security in this vital sea lane
have greatly increased.

Therefore, when Indonesia, as the chair of the 10-member
Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), hosts the ASEAN
Ministerial Meeting (AMM) from June 29 to June 30, followed by
the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF), security in the Strait of Malacca
will likely be one of the hottest issues to be discussed.

International concern over security threats in the strait was
also a central issue during the three-day international
conference on Asia that ended on Sunday in Singapore. Indonesia
itself adopted a low-profile stance during the conference,
although it did propose an ASEAN maritime security cooperation
forum to handle the issue.

According to the summary of the meeting's results, "Indonesia
recognized the legitimate interests of other countries in the
safety and security of the Straits and was willing to accommodate
and engage them."

Singapore proposed the idea of U.S. Marines helping to patrol
the vital waterway. Malaysia is against a physical U.S. military
presence but, in the words of Malaysia's defense minister Najib
Razak on Tuesday, "Malaysia believes it is always positive for us
to have shared responsibilities. But this shared responsibility
must not be at the expense of the sovereignty and territorial
integrity of the littoral states."

Knowing the sensitivities in Indonesia and Malaysia over
sovereignty issues, U.S. Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld in
his speech at the forum was very cautious in suggesting the
possible involvement of U.S. troops in securing the strait, while
nevertheless making it very clear that his country has strategic
interests in the channel.

How should Indonesians react to Singapore's stance and to the
strong possibility of a U.S. presence in providing security in
the strait? Some Indonesian officials clearly felt annoyed when
Singapore indicated its strong support for a stronger U.S.
presence in the region several weeks ago, arguing that the island
state was only thinking about its own interests, without
considering those of its neighbors. Singapore was using the
terrorist threat as a tool to justify the presence of foreign
forces in the region, these particular officials alleged.

There always has been strong public support here for the
government's rejection of the presence of foreign military forces
in any form in this region as it is feared that not only could
they endanger the sovereignty of the countries in the region and
destabilize their domestic politics, but could also provoke a
response from those upset by any such presence.

However, we must remember that Singapore is a sovereign state
that has the right to defend its own national interests --
although it is probably also right to say that officials in that
tiny but prosperous city state may sometimes fail to take into
account the sensitivities of its larger but poorer neighbors when
it settles on policies that also could affect them.

The Strait of Malacca is an international issue and safe
passage is guaranteed by international law. Therefore, we cannot
just say that only Indonesia, Malaysia and Singapore have the
right to deal with any problems concerning the waterway.

Indonesia cannot just refuse a foreign military presence there
without showing convincing evidence that it is capable of
securing the waterway, along with the other two littoral states.
It is indeed not very pleasant to hear that Indonesia is
currently not only unable to combat rampant piracy and robbery in
its part of the strait, but that it has also become a source of
security threats in the strait and, to a certain extent, also the
wider region.

The prolonged insurgency in Aceh poses a direct threat to
security in the strait, with arms and commodity smuggling by the
Free Aceh Movement (GAM) frequently occurring. The Indonesian
Navy has for years complained that it desperately needs more
equipment and money to combat piracy in the Strait of Malacca.

Therefore, we have no choice but to accept international
cooperation to secure the waterway. The question is, what form of
cooperation would be acceptable in the strait? We cannot just
revert once again to nationalistic jargon in refusing the
presence of foreign forces in the strait while at the same time
failing to carry out our own responsibility to secure this vital
maritime channel.