Thu, 04 Sep 2003

Combating terrorims in RI

Bantarto Bandoro, Editor, 'The Indonesian Quarterly', Centre for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS), Jakarta, bandoro@csis.or.id

The past few months have seen serious discussion on the dangers of terrorism. Much has occurred to convince the public here that the threat of terrorism is a serious matter, to be taken up at every level of public policy. This includes the bombing of JW Marriott hotel, the debate on whether Indonesia should adopt antiterrorist legislation like the Internal Security Act (ISA), and the capture of suspected terrorist mastermind Hambali, together with competing claims for legal jurisdiction over him. Most recently, there was the "antiterror trip" of President Megawati Soekarnoputri, which is believed to have bolstered antiterrorism cooperation with neighboring countries.

The threat has become even more serious, given that Indonesia is listed as one of the countries most likely to be targeted in terrorist attacks.

Among issues of current debate on terrorism here is the government's demand that it be given direct access to Hambali and that Hambali be tried here, and the earlier notion that Indonesia should adopt an ISA-type law, as in Malaysia and Singapore. The sentiment over the need for both seemed to have been encouraged by the feeling in government circles that Indonesia wished to be perceived as being more serious than before in combating terrorism.

Regarding Hambali, the government argued that the Indonesian intelligence services linked Hambali specifically with last October's Bali terrorist attack. Indonesia hopes that Hambali will reveal the extent of links between Jamaah Islamiyah (JI) and the international terrorist network al-Qaeda, and help investigators uncover fully what is behind the Bali bombing and other past bombings in Indonesia, apart from possible future terrorist acts here.

The government believes that it can claim Hambali from U.S. custody although it has no extradition treaty with the U.S., as the U.S. side has at least promised Indonesian investigators access to Hambali.

The continued detention of Hambali by the U.S. authorities and the demand by Indonesia, and some other neighboring countries, for an independent interrogation of Hambali and, if possible, that he be brought here for justice, reflect how the fight against international terrorism has caused differences in the way Jakarta and Washington conduct their antiterror policy.

The U.S. is likely to maintain its current policy and stance on Hambali until it genuinely feels that it has gleaned enough information about the linkages between Hambali and other terrorist acts against the U.S., especially the tragedy of September 2001.

Completion of Hambali's interrogation would not mean that the U.S. would later automatically send him to countries that also had an interest in him.

It is rather a "foolish assumption", as stated by our foreign minister Hassan Wirayuda (in the australian.news.com), that the U.S. would reach a point where it did not need Hambali anymore before it finally handed him over to Indonesia.

If Hambali were to be sent to Indonesia, it would rather be more of a political gesture by the U.S., which might feel the need to share the prize of its catch with other Southeast Asian countries affected by terrorist acts suspected to have involved Hambali and JI.

The U.S. is worried that sending Hambali back to the region would invite a repeat of what happened in the Philippines, when Fathur Rohman al-Ghozi managed to escape from detention. The U.S. may argue that Hambali's arrest was only made possible due to close cooperation between its Central Intelligence Agency and Thailand security authorities.

The U.S. probably has the strongest claim to put him on trial. Hambali was, as U.S. sources stated, among the most sought-after figures suspected of responsibility in the planning of the Sept. 11 attack, including through his involvement in arranging an early meeting with the airplane hijackers.

Indonesia, Malaysia, Singapore and Thailand have little choice but to acquiesce over Hambali's custody by the U.S. The U.S., however, should not monopolize the process of interrogation.

Hambali's detention should not cause a diplomatic rift between the U.S. and Indonesia and other Southeast Asian countries. We will see how Indonesia can give its best shot in its diplomacy with the U.S. in trying to get Hambali back. The appearance of Hambali in an Indonesian court, though hopes are dim, would help convince the public that JI exists here, contrary to the denial of some religious leaders.

Trying Hambali in Indonesia would also help refute the conspiracy theory that JI is a fabrication of the U.S. and that the U.S. is behind a string of bombings in the country.

What is perhaps more important for Indonesia to do now is to better coordinate the fight against terrorism and also to initiate tougher antiterror policies, which may have been unthinkable only a year ago.

An Indonesian-specific, ISA-type law would perhaps be appropriate to preempt terrorist acts, meaning that the government should be mandated to implement, indiscriminately, stricter antiterror policy. Despite criticism from advocates of human rights and democracy, such authority would certainly enable the security apparatus, including the military and intelligence services, to quell terrorism.

Terrorism, after all, is a national security issue and the government and opposing parties must be united in confronting this real threat. The danger of terrorism is something that we can no longer underestimate.