Coalition government is the only way out

This article is based on a presentation by political observer Cornelis Lay of Gadjah Mada University in a discussion on "Post- election Indonesia: Who is going to be the fourth president?" held in Yogyakarta last week on the occasion of the opening of The Jakarta Post representative office.

YOGYAKARTA (JP): Beside constitutional problems, the establishment of the next Cabinet will also be made more difficult or worse by the fact that the so-called reformists' agenda is never clear. They want to stop Habibie, Golkar and the New Order, but at the same time they do not want to accept Megawati, as a leader, and the Indonesian Democratic Party of Struggle (PDI Perjuangan). They refuse to accept anything. In a way they seem to be in a battle against all sides albeit without no clear direction.

As long as the reformist camp has no clear focus of where to go, it's quite predictable that the final winner will be the Indonesian Military. This has been the scenario of Indonesian politics for a long time.

There has been a mix-up between our desire to build an objective, reasonable, and acceptable system and that of supporting a particular figure out of a mere personal and emotional relationship. This has made all the arguments unclear.

It's a good sign indeed that many people are beginning to use the 1945 Constitution's amendment and even use it as a yardstick to distinguish between the status quo forces and the reformists. Yet, all the arguments they use to halt a particular force from being the leader of the nation is indeed substantively unconstitutional.

You can see this during the last few days. There is a tendency among certain people to use the so-called extra electoral process as a basic political mechanism to form the government. They said Megawati doesn't deserve the position as president because she is stupid, reticent and such. Habibie doesn't suit the position because of his close relationship to Soeharto. The only person suitable for the presidential position is, therefore, their man. Such a stance is certainly ignoring all the results of the elections.

It is time for us to show the nation that whoever wins the elections -- should we believe it as a democratic mechanism and the political parties the instruments to reach democracy -- will be the president, regardless if the party can't reach a single majority.

Extra electoral processes will only give us two possible winners: the Military or Golkar. No other parties are prepared to face such a situation. The question is whether we would like to build a system without an amendment to the 1945 Constitution.

The argument that we're facing a deadlock on is a logic coming from the 1945 Constitution. The Constitution says that the President is elected by the People's Consultative Assembly (MPR) based on the highest number of votes. Therefore we're making an assumption that such a regulation could make the presidential election process end up in a deadlock. Clearly, it's just wishful thinking of many groups of people who are surprised by their loss in the election. They dream of being supported by many people, but in fact there are only four to five of them.

The question is, could we put this back on the democratic track, meaning can we believe in both the party and the election mechanism? If we could, and a particular political party -- regardless if it is Golkar, National Mandate Party (PAN), National Awakening Party (PKB), or Indonesian Democratic Party of Struggle (PDI Perjuangan) -- wins the election at only 0.5 percent or even 0.01 percent above the average, it should be given the authority to govern this republic. Otherwise, we're only practicing the 1945 Constitution. In other words, all the arguments for changing the Constitution will be nothing but nonsense.

Unfortunately, this kind of confusion about the reform agenda has also been infiltrated by confusion in ideology. This is incredible. PDI Perjuangan or Megawati, for example, have been regarded as part of a conspiracy of Catholic and Christian minority groups. My serious question then is how could a person like Theo Safei who is rejected everywhere, have the power to influence all the political bosses in PDI Perjuangan? The same question can be posed to Sembiring Meliala, who is regarded as the second most influential person in PDI Perjuangan.

Such an exaggerated imagination is very dangerous and would bring the political process to two big political blocks. In Indonesian history again, once the fissure of nationalist and Islamic camps got stronger, the last winner was always the Armed Forces. There was no historical date refuting this fact. This is a political reality.

Should the reformist forces in the community fail to set themselves free from the confusion, the question about the next president would be irrelevant. The one we should look at is the candidate who will be from the Armed Forces ranks. The General Elections Commission (KPU), also plays a role. KPU chairman Rudini gave political parties amazing authority to campaign. His only dream was that small parties would gain votes and join in a coalition, and say "I will become the president". It was just that simple. And everyone was surprised to know that small parties gained no support.

I think it's time for us to reunderline that it's not the person that matters as the properness of someone who becomes irrelevant in an unclear system. Whoever the next president is, if he/she is elected through a non-electoral process, he/she will only result in a serious political problem of legitimacy.

Of no less importance is the political reality indicating that PDI Perjuangan will collect more than 40 percent of the total votes. Yet, in reality, the seats it gets in the House of Representatives will be below that. It may be less than 35 percent of the total seats. This alone raises a serious question about representation. How can a political party which may win nearly 50 percent of the votes have less than 50 percent of the political representatives? This could be a serious problem in the future.

The political parties should also not think that the problem will end there. When the time comes for them to decide who will represent which territory, the questions about the percentage and the cumulative number will also become a serious matter among party representatives. We can probably see that a particular party gains a high percentage of votes in a particular regency. Yet, when it is compared to other regions cumulatively, the percentage becomes very low. In this case, on what basis should the party representative for the region be selected?

Take the case of PAN's votes, for example. If we use the Gunung Kidul village's percentage, it could be very high. Yet if it is compared to Sleman's, it will be very low. The question is who will represent PAN in Jakarta? It looks simple but it could result in an internal complication in the party as every person has an interest to be in power. In PDI Perjuangan, the same problem occurs, as well as Golkar or any other parties.

If the composition of the vote is stable like at present, there will be certainly two determining forces in the political process: PAN and the Armed Forces. The problem is PAN itself is facing a dilemma between a desire to join with PDI Perjuangan and the possibility to join with Golkar.

The first choice will cause the party's faction, supported by A.M. Fatwa and friends, to leave PAN, while the second choice will cause a conflict with the force or network supported by Faisal Basri and friends. This has made PAN powerless and left in the middle: it will become an opposition but will never form a coalition. It's a compromised choice, otherwise, PAN will be left behind by one of its factions. I think PAN is realistic in seeing this matter.

In the meantime, we seem to forget the tangible enemy of ours is the last symbol of the status quo force grouped in the Indonesian bureaucracy. The tension between elected politicians and the Indonesian bureaucracy during the 32 years of the New Order regime and the Golkar era will be difficult to conquer. I see that the concrete political conflict will occur at this level.

Just imagine how legislative candidates of political parties -- who are only elementary school graduates, have prejudices and extremely high political suspicions and were previous objects of harm of particular parties -- all of a sudden control the formal political structure on regional levels, have the authority to govern the region and state everybody as a thief practicing corruption, collusion and nepotism. At the same time, there are also highly talented bureaucrats who master high levels of information -- as they have been in power for 32 consecutive years -- and who have to obey whatever instructions they receive while there is no raise in their salary.

Indonesia's most crucial political issue will be in the balancing of these two forces. We can not imagine the new Indonesia without the existence of Golkar, Habibie, Megawati or PDI Perjuangan. Likewise, Mega could not imagine the new Indonesia without Islam, and so on.

It is, I think, time for the Islamic political force and the nationalist one to fully realize that this republic cannot be built only on one leg. That's why there is a need for both forces to move to the middle and build a healthy coalition or cooperation. It is the only possibility.

How can such a thing be done? There certainly should be PDI Perjuangan's accommodated politics as well as a desire to get closer to politics from the Muslim political forces.

The problem is Muslim political forces have been putting a distance between them and PDI Perjuangan for the last two years. This was evident when Muhammadiyah leader Mochtar Buchori declared himself a PDI Perjuangan member. He was indeed isolated from the Muslim political forces, the Muhammadiyah Muslim organization. This should become reflective material for the political forces to see that such a concrete political force might not be distanced. We have to be able to build a rational cooperation.

If this doesn't work, read once again Indonesian history. In 1927 Muslim youths and nationalist ones failed to reach an agreement. They succeeded in 1928. We thank God that there was Hatta who was able to be a bridge for both forces in 1945. We failed in 1959 and as a result the Armed Forces began to take an important role in Indonesian politics.

Should we fail again this time, we will certainly give the Armed Forces a mandate to rule the nation and say that they are the most important force in this republic. Such awareness should be built among the reformists.

How should we do that? Rector of Gadjah Mada University, Ichlasul Amal, has been trying to put this across. Among all limitations, the Gadjah Mada University has made a draft of it. We say there's no need to care so much about the person. Whoever the person is and whatever desire the person has in ruling the nation, as long as he/she is supported by a system which makes it possible for any proper check and balance, distribution of the authority and limitation of power, it can be guaranteed that he/she will not be the second Soeharto. (swa)