Cloak and dagger tactics to crack down on terror

Cloak and dagger tactics to crack down on terror

Ray Zulfirman Parsioan Pulungan, Jakarta

As a senior high school student in Jakarta only a few years
before the spectacular fall of Soeharto in May 1998, I witnessed
the antics of Indonesians of my age or slightly older who were
involved in political activism in their own school or as street
protesters.

The school is located near a housing complex for senior
officers of the Army in South Jakarta. Only a few schoolmates,
many of them the sons and daughters of these servicemen,
participated in the movement, probably because their parents were
also targeted indirectly by these demonstrations.

So instead, like teenagers elsewhere in the world at that
time, they indulged in hedonistic pursuits, seeking refuge in
music, romance, drugs and a sad esprit de corps of male bravado
through clashing with students from rival high schools.

A small subset within this narrow-minded insular world was the
extracurricular Koran study groups that took place every day in
the school mosque after classes.

The students in these groups not only recited the Koran with
proficiency but also excelled in the daunting fourteen-subject
curriculum. Since I spent most of my childhood abroad, I decided
to join these groups to gain a better understanding of Islam and
at the same time get up to speed with unfamiliar subjects such as
civics. But perhaps a more practical aim, I also wanted to wait
out the routine rock-hurling and sword-swinging brawls as soon as
the school day ended.

The personal invitation to seek further knowledge of Islam
outside this setting came shortly and in hushed tones. A
schoolmate one year my senior approached me, offering to unlock a
new way of viewing the world around me -- but God willing, of
course. We held holding meetings twice a week at his house
accompanied by two other schoolmates and a well-groomed, older
man who supposedly held the key to our spiritual awakening.

He spoke fluent English and Arabic, and often recounted his
travels to Los Angeles and Bangkok. For transportation, he
switched regularly between driving a motorcycle and a nearly mint
car. The sharp contrast between his studied elegance and his
preaching of a militant brand of Islam sowed suspicion. I began
to think that he was some sort of covert agent with the misguided
mission of infiltrating a radical student group. Consequently, I
refrained from talking politics.

But he relished in it. In fact, our meetings broached such
worldly affairs as Bosnia-Herzegovina's ethno-religious strife
and Soeharto's ethnic Chinese cronies more frequent than, as I
had expected, moralistic narratives about the travails and
triumph of the prophet Muhammad and his cadre of devoted
followers. This politically charged atmosphere culminated in
calisthenics on an empty field lined with trees located about 30
to 45 minutes from south Jakarta. Our well-traveled group leader
evidently was also well-fit and wanted us to shape up.

The purpose, he hinted before our return, was to prepare
spiritually, physically and mentally-- as must all Muslims who
aspire to carry out the will of their maker. Correctly sensing
that the first run at training might have unnerved me, he
reminded me, in English no less, that I should not "rupture the
womb."

That was the last time I attended such a meeting.

The intention is to point out some gross misconceptions about
the young men (and women) who join these groups. First and
foremost, they aren't necessarily recruited from a feeder
pesantren network. I attended a secular public school while
another friend, who too was exposed to such groups, graduated
from an elite Roman Catholic school.

And finally, familial ties to such groups do not appear to be
the main motivation in turning to their teachings. My friend and
I are from liberal-minded families. Members of her group and
those in mine mostly came from trading families preoccupied with
material concerns. In short, we were drawn by the veneer of an
intellectual, moral and social sophistication that these groups
seemed to afford.

So how, then, can the government check the spread of these
multifarious groups? In lieu of a clean answer, I can offer two
suggestions regarding what the government should not do.

First, it should not single out, especially through formal
pronouncements, obvious hotbeds of militancy.

By announcing that the government will monitor a few
pesantrens, Vice President Jusuf Kalla committed an egregious
mistake. Such a policy will only lend itself to the worldview of
militants and those inclined toward militancy as being victims of
a depraved state and embolden and hasten their efforts to subvert
it. Cracking down on these highly secretive groups requires
cloak-and-dagger tactics.

Second, the government should not think in narrow parameters
by concentrating on pesantrens alone, although they're surely the
most visible and vociferous quarters where militancy seems to
flourish. Public and private high schools, and increasingly
junior high schools as well, in Indonesia's largest cities have
been serving as recruitment centers for militant groups.

The appeal is that most students in these schools are better
off financially than those in pesantrens, making their induction
into these groups doubly rewarding. The lack of attention to
these important pockets of militant activity is indicative of the
myopia in government policy.

The writer is now working on a documentary on militant Islam
in Indonesia.