Clinton appeases China, in China

Clinton appeases China, in China

The Jakarta Post's Asia correspondent Harvey Stockwin
continues a series of articles on President Bill Clinton's
current visit to China with an analysis of the ways in which
Clinton appeased China -- even while the visit was proceeding.

HONG KONG (JP): When he returns from his current tour of China
to the United States on July 4th, Independence Day, President
Bill Clinton is unlikely to exit from Air Force One waving a
small piece of paper, and proclaiming, like British Prime
Minister Neville Chamberlain, that he has attained "peace in our
time".

Given that 1998 marks the 60th anniversary of the perfidious
Munich pact which inexorably led to World War Two, Clinton does
not want to liken himself in any way to Chamberlain. Nor does
Secretary of State Madeleine Albright, who took office
proclaiming that she was "a child of Munich", as if that meant
she knew enough about history's mistakes not to repeat them.

But as the Clinton administration has conducted relations with
China prior to, before and even during the President's visit, it
has exuded the same underlying pattern of appeasement which was
so ruinous when practiced by Britain in the 1930s -- and which is
always damaging to the stability of international relations.

One essential parallel between British behavior then and
American behavior now is that both powers too often made policy
based upon the recognition of weakness rather than a more self-
confident assumption of strength. As Henry Kissinger recently
noted, the Clinton Administration often exudes "discomfort with
the role power plays in international affairs".

The Chinese political elite, by contrast, being used to tough
power politics between factions at home, is equally adept at
power politics between nations. While Clinton too often acts out
of weakness, the Chinese frequently go to the opposite extreme.
They act out of an unrealistic assumption of strength. This can
be a dangerous game -- but not with Clinton, who appears to take
far too many of those Chinese assumptions at face value.

So, as a result of the U.S. appeasement, China has won a
famous victory in terms of domestic political advantage -- but
the victory carries a heavy price in terms of loss of
bipartisanship on China policy within the United States, which
may return to haunt the communist regime in the end.

The extent to which U.S. appeasement patterns have suffused
Clinton's China policy were plain for all to see right from the
start of the visit.

China withdrew visas already given to three reporters from
Radio Free Asia in the U.S.. RFA was originally a Congressional
initiative and is U.S. government-funded. Clinton protested the
Chinese decision -- but, at the same time, the White House warned
the journalists not to get on the plane.

All that a .S. President had to do was to quickly inform the
Chinese that the three had been accredited for the tour, and that
they would be on Air Force One when it arrived in Xian. If the
Chinese wanted a nasty incident filled with adverse publicity
right at the start of the visit, so be it. Almost certainly the
Chinese would have quickly given way, proclaiming loudly that the
withdrawal of the visas was a regrettable mistake by a low-level
official.

That is exactly what happened when then Prime Minister John
Major visited Beijing in 1991 to sign a Sino-British agreement.
Faced with a firm British "no", the Chinese deftly gave way.

It is instructive that the Chinese even tried to score a point
in this way -- when they already exclude the station by jamming
many, maybe most, of RFA broadcasts. They knew their man. They
knew that Clinton is almost congenitally incapable of standing up
for a matter of principle, and who hates confrontations. He has
given way to China so often that they tried it one more time.
And they won. Clinton's protestations got him nowhere. The
journalists stayed at home.

Next came the incident when at least four dissidents were
detained as Clinton arrived in Xian, and Chinese officials
frequently denied that anything untoward had happened. Petty
security officials in Xian then added fuel to the flames by
behaving towards some of the 375 newsmen accredited to the
Clinton tour as they perennially behave towards the Chinese
people -- as unthinking and often spiteful bullies.

One Xian official went further and reminded the U.S. media
that China was a free democracy, too. This had the advantage of
provoking ABC's Sam Donaldson to remind his network audience what
the Clinton Administration is in danger of forgetting -- that
China is a police state.

Again, the incidents were instructive for what they revealed
of the Chinese attitude towards Clinton. Outwardly, Beijing's
propaganda was saying many complimentary things -- notably that
Clinton ranked with Franklin Roosevelt and Richard Nixon in the
pantheon of Presidents who have been "Friends of China".

Inwardly, Beijing could not even be bothered to make sure --
as they easily could have done if they had tried -- that all
petty bullying was halted and that no dissidents were arrested
while Clinton spent 24 hours in Xian.

The U.S. reaction was instructive, too. There were protests,
there had to be, with all those 375 pressmen around. But they
lacked bite and sanction.

National Security Adviser Samuel Berger had to be positively
harassed by the American press before he could bring himself to
state the obvious -- that China's human rights record was
"dreadful", and that you don't sweep up people like rubbish when
someone comes a-visiting.

What was instructive was Berger's reluctance to state this
simple truth (the Chinese authoritarian regime sweeps up people
all the time) just as, these days, nobody in the Clinton
Administration ever places the adjective "communist" next to the
noun "China".

All that Clinton had to do to get Chinese attention was to
state firmly that he would not continue with the Xian official
program until all four were released, and harassment had stopped.
But the Chinese knew in advance that he would never act that
decisively. So they just continued their normal habits of
striving for the impossible -- total security control throughout
their vast nation.

The Chinese took no notice of the half-hearted protests that
the Americans did issue -- and even President Jiang Zemin adopted
the evolving party line that nothing was really amiss in Xian.

What is also interesting is that evidently neither Clinton nor
his top advisers could point out to the Chinese leaders that if
they had reigned in their pursuit of total security control, and
allowed the U.S. press to interview those few rather sad
dissidents still visible in China today, it would make it that
much easier for the Clintonites to promote their "Emerging New
China" theme for the folks back home in the United States.
This rather obvious point was, however, a nuance too far for
Clinton -- and for the Chinese.

American appeasement reached its current apogee at 9 a.m. in
Beijing on June 27th as Bill Clinton arrived for his welcoming
ceremony outside the Great Hall of The People. This time the
security people had been even more thorough than in Xian. The
vast and lonely expanse of Tiananmen Square behind the ceremony
had been swept clean of all human beings. The Square, and
undoubtedly a large number of Chinese, were alone with their
memories of 1989.

Bill Clinton at least arrived in a black suit, but he did not
have the courage to wear a black tie.

Was it merely imagination? It seemed that Jiang Zemin, who
looks a trifle uncertain at the best of times, suddenly exuded
self-confidence. It would be understandable if it were so. For
Jiang, and his close political ally, former Premier Li Peng, must
regard Clinton's appearance in the square as a great victory in
the context of China's domestic politics.

The Chinese have made a point of insisting upon welcoming
ceremonies in the Square since June, 1989. Prior to that, the
communist regime had lost control of the square to the
demonstrating students, then to the demonstrating populace. Then
it lost legitimacy ("the mandate of heaven") by conducting the
Beijing Massacre largely outside, but also inside, Tiananmen
Square.

The communist regime has sought to win back legitimacy since
then by showing endless foreign visitors respectfully inspecting
the People's Liberation Army on the fringes of Tiananmen.

Bill Clinton's insistence, later in the day at his joint press
conference with Jiang Zemin, that the use of force in 1989 was
"wrong" would have gained real credibility had he refused a
welcoming ceremony in the Square.

If his mindset were not one of appeasement, he could have done
so.

Pointing to Zhou EnLai's famous handshake with Nixon as he
stepped off the aircraft at the airport, Clinton could have
argued that a similar greeting, and welcome, would have been to
China's advantage. Controversy within the U.S. would have been
avoided. Again, promoting the New China image by the
Administration would have become easier. The prospects for
renewed bipartisanship within the United States, which is also to
China's longterm advantage, would be increased.

Either that, or Clinton could have played hardball and said
that, since the Chinese insisted on a Tiananmen ceremony, he
would postpone a China visit for the time-being, perhaps
rescheduling it in November when he hoped to visit India.

Given Beijing's aim of making itself the sole paramount
partner of the US in Asia, such remarks, if made, would have
secured the Chinese leadership's attention: an airport ceremony,
or some other compromise, would have quickly arranged.

Clinton, firmly stuck in the appeasement mode, never said any
of these obvious things. Yet he could have made a very strong
case that it was not in China's interest, as well as his own, to
arouse needless ceremonial controversy.

China, anxious as ever to pursue the short term gain rather
than perceiving the longterm benefit, persisted with its
insistence upon Tiananmen. Trying to wipe the CCP's slate clean
of the 1989 shame remains a primary objective.

So Jiang and Li won their "victory". It probably counts for
something within the Chinese Communist Party, maybe a lot. But
for those Chinese (and foreigners) with memories of 1989, it was
a Pyrrhic victory at best. As the PLA soldiers marched past the
US President, bayonets at the ready, it was obvious that those
pictures would fade perfectly, on TV screens around the world,
into shots of the PLA advancing on the 1989 demonstrators.

China had insisted on the ceremony, because it knew Clinton
would give in.

One of the troubles with major nations that are appeased by
stronger nations is -- they never know when to stop.

But that is also true of those who do the appeasing.

Window: China, anxious as ever to pursue the short term gain rather
than perceiving the longterm benefit, persisted with its
insistence upon Tiananmen. Trying to wipe the CCP's slate clean
of the 1989 shame remains a primary objective.