Wed, 29 Jul 1998

Class struggle may supersede racial conflict

Political and economic reform has reached a stalemate. Lawyer Todung Mulya Lubis examines its likely impact on social development.

JAKARTA (JP): Why should we call the Habibie administration a New Order II regime? The answer is because this government is just a continuation of the previous one, which can be labeled as the New Order I administration.

President B.J. Habibie is not only implementing a system of government and using political machines similar to those used by Soeharto, he is also employing the personnel involved in the old regime. The philosophy and spirit of the two governments are also alike.

It is very difficult to look for distinctions to conclude that the current administration is a new regime. The only thing missing in the New Order II government is Soeharto.

The ascent of Habibie to power is not comparable with that of Corazon Aquino as Philippine president. The explosive euphoria following Soeharto's resignation quickly ebbed and many people suddenly realized that no significant change had occurred.

The reform movement only removed the tip of the "iceberg" but its body remained. The tip has now resurfaced and its shape is exactly the same as the previous tip.

Skepticism among Indonesians is understandable because they cannot accept the involvement of old personnel in the new regime.

Hosni Mubarak was initially welcomed cynically when he became Egyptian president following the assassination of Anwar Sadat, because the former was regarded as visionary. Mubarak proved himself as a new president capable of leading his country to further advancement even though his personnel were the same as those employed by Sadat.

People's reluctance to accept the New Order II government is apparently caused by its lack of transparency and commitment to reform. Habibie's first state address after he took power on May 21 did not reflect his commitment to total reform or include a clear agenda for the complete change demanded by the people.

The new government has freed political prisoners, lifted a ministerial decree on the revocation of news organizations' licenses and promised special autonomous status for East Timor. It ratified the ILO's Convention on Freedom of Association for Workers and launched an agenda for the protection of human rights.

But whoever replaced Soeharto would have done the same if he did not want to be likened to the former autocrat. Such actions were a conditio sine qua non. Credits should go to the people, who have struggled for their rights for such a long time.

With the worsening economy, every party must behave realistically and be ready to sacrifice. But, the people are very eager to see the government implement concrete reform policies. Such policies should include the following:

* The release of political prisoners must be conducted without discrimination. The government's fear of the emergence of communism is no longer realistic because the ideology has lost its legitimacy, both domestically and internationally.

* The government must launch a comprehensive agenda for the protection of human rights. It must ratify the Covenant on Civil and Political Rights as well as the Optional Protocol. Why will the government ratify only the Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, and the Convention Against Torture, Cruel, Inhuman and Degrading Treatment and Punishment?

* The government must take concrete action against those involved in corrupt, collusive and nepotistic practices.

* The general election should be accelerated from the government-set schedule of mid-1999. The government can do this by issuing a regulation in lieu of law as its legal basis.

* The government must establish an independent fact-finding team to investigate those involved in recent massive riots, sexual harassment, arson and abductions of political activists. The slow pace of the investigation indicates the government's reluctance to protect human rights.

The list, which could easily be extended, shows that the government has not introduced a clear agenda for reform. It is, therefore, understandable if the current regime is regarded as having no sense of crisis, considering how the worsening economy is affecting the people.

It is difficult to imagine what might happen in the coming months, when the number of unemployed poor people increases.

Will there be a social explosion?

The massive robberies at shrimp ponds, coffee plantations, teak forests and groceries reflects people's poverty, anger and impatience.

It also reflects the inability of the security authorities and the law enforcers to face up to the crippling economy. The robberies may also lead to a motion of no confidence in the government or to angry protests by the poor against the rich, a class -- not racial -- struggle.