Civilians must be more aware of defense needs

Civilians must be more aware of defense needs

Sayidiman Suryohadiprojo, Former Governor, National Resilience Institute,
(Lemhanas), Jakarta

Earlier this month, the Ministry of Defense published its
first Defense White Book, titled The Defense of the Nation in the
21st Century. This is a commendable performance by the ministry
that deserves our praise. The ministry considers the publication
of the White Book important to inform the nation about national
defense and the need for its integrated implementation. The
second purpose of the book is to inform the international
community about Indonesia's defense policy.

Minister Matori Abdul Djalil stated that the title implies the
readiness of the people to defend the nation with all its mental
and physical strength. This statement reflects an attempt to
influence the people to fully participate in the nation's
defense.

But whether people would want to do so depends on whether
there are conditions that people feel are worth fighting for --
for instance, if they feel that life would be much worse than it
is now if the country was conquered by another nation. People
might not be fully satisfied with their present conditions, but
they may retain hope if they still trust and believe that their
leaders are trying to make things better.

The White Book makes it clear that the government, meaning the
President and the House of Representatives, is in charge of
national defense, with the Indonesian Military (TNI) as an
apparatus in the defense system. Since the government is in the
hands of civilians, national defense is under civilian control.

It is now the task of civilians with defense functions, to
become truly knowledgeable of defense matters. Civilians who are
elected or appointed as defense functionaries must have at least
knowledge of military strategy and defense management.

This is still a weakness in Indonesia and that has become a
source of unnecessary misunderstanding and conflict. The military
must have the conviction that the civilians in control have
strong aspirations to develop an effective defense system,
understand the defense problems and are willing to support the
establishment of an up-to-date military with adequate land, naval
and air forces.

The civilian leaders must be ready to listen and argue with
the military leaders if necessary, without suspecting the latter
of disloyalty. They should learn from former president Sukarno
and vice president Mohamad Hatta when they had to face then Gen.
Sudirman with his strong criticism of government intentions.

Both knew that Gen. Sudirman and the TNI argued for the sake
of the nation, but would always remain loyal and obey all the
government policies once the government made its decision.

In today's context, the White Book was finished before the
U.S. invasion of Iraq. There are, therefore, some judgments about
strategic conditions that are not realistic enough. There is, for
instance, no consideration about the new U.S. doctrine of
preemptive strikes and the possibility of violations of
international laws.

The Book did not visualize that the United Nations as the
highest international body would not and could not stop or punish
the U.S. from (allegedly) violating international laws. Of
course, Indonesia must belong to those nations that aspire to
have a more viable and effectively functioning UN.

But in the near future we cannot fully rely on the UN if
Indonesia becomes a victim of a preemptive strike. The experience
of Iraq has demonstrated the importance of national resilience of
each nation state. The aggressive U.S. behavior led to serious
disagreements in other international bodies, like the North
Atlantic Treaty Organization, the Organization of Islamic
Conference and the Association of Southeast Asian Nations.

The White Book considers small the possibility of outside or
foreign threats to Indonesia's sovereignty. This consideration
may be valid when the White Book was written, but it is no longer
the case now. Not only should Indonesia prepare itself seriously
against internal security problems, which are, in principle, a
National Police function, and with TNI support if necessary, but
the TNI has to prepare itself more intensively against possible
preemptive strikes from outside its borders.

The deterrence of such strikes requires the establishment of
strong and effective TNI forces on land, sea and air. These
forces must consist of regular forces equipped with the highest
technology the nation can acquire, which can execute conventional
as well as non-conventional warfare.

Regular forces must be supported by territorial forces on land
and possibly at sea to augment the strength of the regular
forces. This territorial warfare strategy depends very much on
the defense role of the people, which can only be achieved if the
TNI is close to the people and has its full confidence. That will
also enable the start of a compulsory military service which will
strengthen the nature of the TNI as a People's Armed Force.
A strong and effective defense system will become a leverage and
support the nation's diplomacy. Diplomacy, along with defense
capabilities, will hopefully deter ambitious nations from
considering a pre-emptive strike on Indonesia.

The Book's estimate of a low probability of outside attacks
has consequently neglected an appropriate consideration of
technology acquisition. It is high time for Indonesia to develop
its technological capabilities. India, for a long time a nation
with lower gross national product per capita than Indonesia, has
for more than 20 years, been able to manufacture most of its own
weapons systems. We must start to buy the technology we need in
countries interested enough to sell and must later develop our
own production capabilities.

Of course, this all requires money, but money will come if the
economic development makes progress. That is why we need
civilians in control of the defense establishment with strong
aspirations to build an effective defense organization with a
well-equipped and trained TNI as its nucleus. That happened in
India -- why should it not happen in Indonesia?

The very humble estimate of the Book for a defense budget of
3.86 percent of the GNP for the next 10 years to 15 years seems
to be quite unrealistic compared to what our neighboring
countries are doing and amid possible threats on the horizon.

Of course, it also depends very much on the size of
Indonesia's GNP which is why the national economy must increase
in size and productivity.

In spite of the shortcomings, the Defense White Book has made
a very valuable contribution to the start of a much better
defense organization.