Civilian leaders in Aceh undermine peace process

Civilian leaders in Aceh undermine peace process

Kirsten E. Schulze, Professor, International History,
London School of Economics

Aceh has once again become the subject of debate, first with
the announcement of syariah law as part of the special autonomy
package and then with Governor Abdullah Puteh's proposal for the
re-establishment of Kodam Iskandar Muda military command. The
latter has given rise to speculation that Aceh may again come
under military control. Popular perception is that the Indonesian
Military (TNI) has been manipulating the situation in order to
regain its political role and to impose a military solution.

The fact that the Security Recovery Operation is the only part
of the Presidential Instruction (Inpres) 4 which has actually
been implemented, the extension of the Inpres 4 with Inpres
7/2001 (on six comprehensive steps to settle the Aceh problem)
and now the efforts to re-establish the Kodam, all seem to be
pointing in that direction.

Having just recently returned from Aceh, there is no doubt
that the Security Recovery Operation is the only game in town.
But the question is not why the security forces are conducting an
operation but why the civilian leadership has not moved on the
other five non-security aspects of the comprehensive strategy
over the last 10 months.

The extension of Inpres 4 with Inpres 7 to provide additional
time for exactly that purpose, makes this question only more
pertinent. It also points to the fact that the current situation
in Aceh is less a case of "military conspiracy" than civilian
incompetence.

The most often cited reason by the civilian authorities is
that the situation is not yet conducive for implementing the
political, economic, legal, social and cultural aspects. This
answer in itself is quite revealing. On the one hand it shows a
lack of understanding of the comprehensive strategy. On the other
hand it displays a misperception of the meaning of "conducive."

With respect to the first, the key to the success of this
strategy, a strategy quite similar to those pursued in other
separatist and regional conflicts, is that security and non-
security aspects need to be implemented in tandem, preferably
parallel. The restoration of security has to be accompanied by
social, economic and political development in order to
consolidate those security gains.

Security alone cannot resolve this conflict as it does not
address the underlying causes of the violence. What the
restoration of security does is to create the space to allow for
the politicians to deal with the economic, political, and social
causes.

With respect to the second, conducive does not meant 100
perent secure; it means sufficiently stable. It does not rule out
the risk of losing development projects to renewed violence but
it considers this a risk worth taking. Economic development, if
implemented properly so that it reaches all aspects of society,
can go a long way toward reducing popular grievances and with it
conflict.

Real improvement in the every life of the average Acehnese
will slowly help to heal those wounds of the past related to
inequality and neglect. It will also provide the majority of the
people with what they long for -- a normal life, economic
security, opportunities for prosperity, and a real future for
their children.

Similarly real political dialog is absolutely crucial. The
negotiations with the Free Aceh Movement (GAM), however, have
been virtually non-existent since July last year. This lack of
political avenue, in turn, has left GAM with little more than
violence to express its dissatisfaction. It has also deprived the
people of the opportunity to contribute to shaping the future of
Aceh through an all-inclusive political process.

This had already been agreed in Geneva, but again has remained
unimplemented. Instead, political elites in Aceh and Jakarta
legislated a special autonomy package, the details of which have
yet to be fully worked out, and which has elicited little more
than apathy from the non-elite population never mind a sense of
ownership.

Sadly, the space created by the increased overall security has
been wasted on politicians who do not seem to be able to grasp
their responsibilities. Governor Abdullah Puteh is a case in
point but certainly not the only one. Indeed, this seems to be
quite a widespread malaise. Despite the fact that the districts
of Aceh Besar, Aceh Tenggara, Central Aceh, and Aceh Singkel have
been secured and the districts of West Barat, South Aceh, and
North Aceh are stable no movement has been made on the political,
economic, legal, social and cultural aspects of the comprehensive
plan.

Why has real economic development not begun in any of these
districts? Why is the infrastructure not being improved? Why are
employment opportunities not being created? Why are there no
negotiations? Why has the political process not been broadened to
become all-inclusive? Why have the internally displaced persons
not been rehabilitated? Why are the schools, which have been
burnt since last summer, not being rebuilt? And the irony of the
latter is particularly bitter since Governor Puteh had so
emphasized his commitment to education in his election campaign.

Instead of tackling these important issues head on and
grasping every opportunity to implement the non-security aspects
of the comprehensive strategy, there has been a tendency to look
towards "alternative mechanisms" of conflict resolution. Governor
Puteh's statements over the past two weeks illustrate this quite
clearly.

First syariah law was hailed as new mechanism for conflict
resolution and then it was the re-establishment of Kodam Iskandar
Muda. Syariah law in itself is not a mechanism of conflict
resolution and neither is the Kodam. While one can make many
sensible operational arguments for the need of a Kodam in Aceh,
which must, however, be weighed carefully against the perceptions
of the Acehnese population, the fact remains that there is no
military solution for this conflict. And that is exactly the
reason why a comprehensive strategy was devised.

Unfortunately, this point seems to have been lost on the
civilian leadership, which has yet to implement this strategy's
non-security aspects. Thus it is not the military -- despite
continuing human rights violations -- which is undermining the
conflict resolution process in Aceh, but it is the civilian
leadership which is undermining the comprehensive strategy.

The current situation in Aceh is clearly a case of civilian
incompetence -- a case of a good comprehensive strategy, badly
implemented.

The author is co-writing a book on conflicts in Indonesia.