'Civilian face' the ultimate goal of police reform
By Winahyo Soekanto
DENPASAR (JP): The recent remark of Lt. Gen. Ryamizard Ryacudu that he was not even sure who was to blame for Jakarta's incapability to cope with the unrest in Aceh, was quite telling of the current state of police-military ties.
The commander of the Army's Strategic Reserves Force (Kostrad) said that when police were being killed in Aceh, it was not because they were incapable but because the situation was not theirs to handle in the first place. "The police are not there to handle (rebel) groups. Those who sent them there should be blamed," he said.
"We need to see which kind of situations should be handled fully by civilians, which need police interference, and which should be handled by the military," he said. "The military has been too kind all this time. We have been very restrained, accepting the suggestions of many parties, rather than carrying out immediate operations in Aceh."
Indeed the police have time and again showed, in many of Indonesia's hotspots such as Maluku and Central Kalimantan, to be incapable of convincing the public of their value as a national resource.
One of the victims of the ethnic unrest in Central Kalimantan town of Sampit was a successful Madurese businessman who lost personal assets worth more than Rp 1 billion in the violence.
As soon as he reached safety in Surabaya, he expressed his outrage by demanding that the Central Kalimantan Police chief and Sampit Police chief be sacked. He accused the two officers of standing by and doing nothing to prevent the first sparks of violence from spreading.
The National Police are indeed one of the institutions that have consistently reaped criticism. During the New Order regime many people thought of various degrading names they slapped on the force.
Hence the term priit jigo, a term that describes a police officer who signals to a motorist to pull over, leading to the immediate loss of money for any traffic violation, real or imagined. There was also the insulting remark about how, if you reported the theft of a chicken, you would soon lose a goat or a cow to the police.
The police received a historically significant law when the government freed them from their long-standing position as subordinate to the military. The force started to adjust to the new situation through a number of symbolic gestures, such as changing their uniform, renaming their ranks, as well as restructuring their organization.
The challenge of standing alone, however, has proven to be much greater. Police often appear to be at a loss as to what to do. Even when the killing frenzy had escalated in Sampit, military leaders said that they were not going to venture there without a request from the police.
When the military did enter, they clashed with the police already posted in the conflict area -- so badly in fact, that the police and the military troops then had to be confined to different areas of operation.
Anyone could come up with a further list of evidence of the police's ineptitude. The Christmas Eve bombing, the continued disappearance of Tommy Soeharto, the destruction of Golkar offices in East Java, and the unrest in Sampit are some of the instances.
Criticism also poured in from the military following their separation. The police seem to be reluctant to ask for assistance in cases where the military traditionally possess greater skills and experience. This includes cases regarding intelligence information or explosives. This reluctance becomes more apparent when police encounter criminal cases involving members of the military.
But the police have made some progress, most notably in their way of handling protesters. They deserve commendation for managing to prevent protesting supporters and opponents of Gus Dur at the House of Representatives from clashing despite being separated by only a distance of three meters.
They appeared to be more patient and skilled in appeasing protesters, which was also appeasing to the public eye.
Is the reform of the National Police an isolated phenomenon in an era of rapid social restructuring? Certainly not, but reform euphoria and changes in peoples' values have so far failed to present the police with enough time to undertake fundamental changes.
Concerns have been voiced that, for a certain period of time, the police will not be able to do more than merely respond to social change. What needs to be emphasized, however, is the real need for support from society, in general, to prevent the police force from losing their confidence.
A legal expert once said that when a military cadet leaves the academy, other stages of education await him. But when a police cadet leaves his academy he is immediately plunged into the battlefield, namely his community.
Today, with their newfound independence at stake, the police should equip their cadets with the understanding that because the community is their battlefield, they must remain close to it.
Some good advice toward achieving this purpose has been coined in the recommendation of the Brussels-based International Crisis Group for reorganization, that the police launch short and medium-term programs, overhaul their training system, establish an overseeing body as well as necessary legislation.
The ultimate goal of reform of the National Police will certainly involve replacing their military approach with one that is wholly civilian in nature. The police should remain an organized civil force, committed to maintaining law and order, and who are characterized with wisdom, prudence, sagacity and shrewdness.
This may be a lofty ideal, but a reflection of the public's longing nonetheless.
The writer is a lawyer based in Denpasar.