Civilian elite risks losing touch

By Ikrar Nusa Bhakti

JAKARTA (JP): The death of four Trisakti University students last May 12 motivated students to escalate their campaign for total reform. In the same way as Arief Rachman Hakim, a University of Indonesia student who was shot to death by the military in 1966, the four became martyrs and heroes for political reform.

In the two days after the shooting, there were massive riots in Jakarta and its surrounding satellite towns of Bekasi and Tangerang.

These were the worst riots in Indonesia's modern political history. Rumors making the rounds were plenty. One said the riots were the work of some military officers who wanted to imitate what their predecessors did during the Malari Affair in 1974, when they ordered hoodlums to loot and burn shopping centers in Senen, Central Jakarta.

Their intention was to deceive the public into believing that the riots were committed by students; thus, the public would condemn students and would not support their demonstration for total reform. The politics of scapegoating the students was unsuccessful.

Another rumor said they were organized by the military as an excuse for their chief commander, Gen. Wiranto, to stop student demonstrations.

Others speculated the riots were part of a power struggle among the military elite.

Another story had it they were organized to demolish symbols of development of Soeharto's regime.

The deaths of the students and the riots did not quash the students' determination to topple Soeharto as a precondition for total reform.

For the second time in Indonesia's young history, a student movement succeeded in forcing the president out of office. This time it was the most powerful man in Indonesia who had ruled with an iron fist for 32 years.

Several factors forced Soeharto to make the decision:

* The occupation of the House building by thousands of students. They were willing to sacrifice their lives rather than leave the building without Soeharto's resignation. The Armed Forces (ABRI) accommodative attitude toward students during their demonstrations boosted their spirit to topple Soeharto.

* Soeharto failed to reshuffle his Cabinet in time, and 14 of his ministers resigned.

* It seems probable Gen. Wiranto told Soeharto that ABRI could not support him any more.

There may have also been several external factors which contributed to expedite Soeharto's downfall, such as the delay in disbursement of International Monetary Fund's bailout contribution for Indonesia and the indirect support for student movements in the country.

In a way, these May student demonstrations in Indonesia can be regarded as a middle class revolution. Compared to previous student movements, this year's student movements were supported by almost all sections of society, particularly the middle class. Their support came in the form of money, food, printing materials, T-shirts, encouraging public opinion, organizing short courses to enhance students' critical ability, musical entertainment and others.

The middle class' help for the students can be divided into five categories:

First, those who had genuine motives for political and economic reforms or the true believers. They spent a lot of money to assist student demonstrations, without any political or economic interests except total reforms.

Second, former student activists who had tried to topple Soeharto's regime for more than 24 years and who were eager to end the dictatorship in Indonesia.

Third, those who were unhappy with the Soeharto's family business activities since the beginning of the economic crisis in July 1997, either because they lost their jobs or they could not compete with crony capitalists who were close to Soeharto's family.

Fourth, the newcomers or "free riders" who jumped on the bandwagon just before Soeharto's downfall.

Fifth, former Soeharto's cronies and aides who wanted to "wash their hands" to show to the people that they were clean and eager to dissociate themselves from corruption, nepotism and collusion. Students call this group "last-minutes heroes" or "eleventh hour heroes".

Although Soeharto has lost his power, students and civilian political elites still continue their demands for total reform. Many have never accepted Habibie as Soeharto's successor, because Habibie was very close to Soeharto and he is still considered part of the problem, a leader whose managerial capability to handle the present political and economic crisis still needs to be tested.

Some legal experts believe the transfer of power from Soeharto to Habibie was illegal or unconstitutional. In other words, the nation shows increasing signs of polarization over Habibie presidency and his cabinet. Students are also divided between those who support Habibie and those who still oppose him.

The aftermath of Soeharto's resignation can be regarded as a period of struggle for powers among political elites, without considering social and economic conditions.

Today, many former Soeharto cronies are forming new political parties as if, in this new era of political reform, people are free enough to do that without any consideration that their actions will endanger the nation's unity and stability.

It seems their understanding of the liberal democratic system was very limited. Unless statesmanship grows at the heart of Indonesia's political elite, this country will inadvertently be torn to pieces.

The present situation also sees a psychological war between military and civilian elites. While the civilian political elite is still screaming about total reform without any agreement on the future reform agenda, the military are preparing drafts of political development after Soeharto.

The military elite is also trying to show to the people that they are humble and accommodative toward the civilian elite who demand total reform.

Minister of Information Yunus Yosfiah's handling of the problem of the free press in Indonesia is an example of how ABRI approaches journalists.

In addition, ABRI Chief of Sociopolitical Affairs, Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono, showed the accommodative approach in dealing with the people and political elite.

The elite can still discuss political reform in cafes and hotels. The elite can also afford to think about "what menus will we pick to eat from today?", while the common people who live from one day to another ponder "what will we eat today?".

Unless the civilian elite take the people's stomachs into consideration, it is possible the grassroots groups will shift their allegiance from the civilian to the military elite in the next six months or so.

Although it is hard to believe at present, it is not impossible that the military will dominate the government because the civilian political elite cannot cope with the present economic and political crisis.

The writer is a researcher at the Center for Political and Regional Studies, Indonesian Institute of Sciences.

Window: In a way, these May student demonstrations in Indonesia can be regarded as a middle class revolution. Compared to previous student movements, this year's student movements were supported by almost all sections of society, particularly the middle class.