Civilian elite risks losing touch

Civilian elite risks losing touch

By Ikrar Nusa Bhakti

JAKARTA (JP): The death of four Trisakti University students
last May 12 motivated students to escalate their campaign for
total reform. In the same way as Arief Rachman Hakim, a
University of Indonesia student who was shot to death by the
military in 1966, the four became martyrs and heroes for
political reform.

In the two days after the shooting, there were massive riots
in Jakarta and its surrounding satellite towns of Bekasi and
Tangerang.

These were the worst riots in Indonesia's modern political
history. Rumors making the rounds were plenty. One said the riots
were the work of some military officers who wanted to imitate
what their predecessors did during the Malari Affair in 1974,
when they ordered hoodlums to loot and burn shopping centers in
Senen, Central Jakarta.

Their intention was to deceive the public into believing that
the riots were committed by students; thus, the public would
condemn students and would not support their demonstration for
total reform. The politics of scapegoating the students was
unsuccessful.

Another rumor said they were organized by the military as an
excuse for their chief commander, Gen. Wiranto, to stop student
demonstrations.

Others speculated the riots were part of a power struggle
among the military elite.

Another story had it they were organized to demolish symbols
of development of Soeharto's regime.

The deaths of the students and the riots did not quash the
students' determination to topple Soeharto as a precondition for
total reform.

For the second time in Indonesia's young history, a student
movement succeeded in forcing the president out of office. This
time it was the most powerful man in Indonesia who had ruled with
an iron fist for 32 years.

Several factors forced Soeharto to make the decision:

* The occupation of the House building by thousands of
students. They were willing to sacrifice their lives rather than
leave the building without Soeharto's resignation. The Armed
Forces (ABRI) accommodative attitude toward students during their
demonstrations boosted their spirit to topple Soeharto.

* Soeharto failed to reshuffle his Cabinet in time, and 14 of
his ministers resigned.

* It seems probable Gen. Wiranto told Soeharto that ABRI could
not support him any more.

There may have also been several external factors which
contributed to expedite Soeharto's downfall, such as the delay in
disbursement of International Monetary Fund's bailout
contribution for Indonesia and the indirect support for student
movements in the country.

In a way, these May student demonstrations in Indonesia can be
regarded as a middle class revolution. Compared to previous
student movements, this year's student movements were supported
by almost all sections of society, particularly the middle class.
Their support came in the form of money, food, printing
materials, T-shirts, encouraging public opinion, organizing short
courses to enhance students' critical ability, musical
entertainment and others.

The middle class' help for the students can be divided into
five categories:

First, those who had genuine motives for political and
economic reforms or the true believers. They spent a lot of money
to assist student demonstrations, without any political or
economic interests except total reforms.

Second, former student activists who had tried to topple
Soeharto's regime for more than 24 years and who were eager to
end the dictatorship in Indonesia.

Third, those who were unhappy with the Soeharto's family
business activities since the beginning of the economic crisis in
July 1997, either because they lost their jobs or they could not
compete with crony capitalists who were close to Soeharto's
family.

Fourth, the newcomers or "free riders" who jumped on the
bandwagon just before Soeharto's downfall.

Fifth, former Soeharto's cronies and aides who wanted to "wash
their hands" to show to the people that they were clean and eager
to dissociate themselves from corruption, nepotism and collusion.
Students call this group "last-minutes heroes" or "eleventh hour
heroes".

Although Soeharto has lost his power, students and civilian
political elites still continue their demands for total reform.
Many have never accepted Habibie as Soeharto's successor, because
Habibie was very close to Soeharto and he is still considered
part of the problem, a leader whose managerial capability to
handle the present political and economic crisis still needs to
be tested.

Some legal experts believe the transfer of power from Soeharto
to Habibie was illegal or unconstitutional. In other words, the
nation shows increasing signs of polarization over Habibie
presidency and his cabinet. Students are also divided between
those who support Habibie and those who still oppose him.

The aftermath of Soeharto's resignation can be regarded as a
period of struggle for powers among political elites, without
considering social and economic conditions.

Today, many former Soeharto cronies are forming new political
parties as if, in this new era of political reform, people are
free enough to do that without any consideration that their
actions will endanger the nation's unity and stability.

It seems their understanding of the liberal democratic system
was very limited. Unless statesmanship grows at the heart of
Indonesia's political elite, this country will inadvertently be
torn to pieces.

The present situation also sees a psychological war between
military and civilian elites. While the civilian political elite
is still screaming about total reform without any agreement on
the future reform agenda, the military are preparing drafts of
political development after Soeharto.

The military elite is also trying to show to the people that
they are humble and accommodative toward the civilian elite who
demand total reform.

Minister of Information Yunus Yosfiah's handling of the
problem of the free press in Indonesia is an example of how ABRI
approaches journalists.

In addition, ABRI Chief of Sociopolitical Affairs, Susilo
Bambang Yudhoyono, showed the accommodative approach in dealing
with the people and political elite.

The elite can still discuss political reform in cafes and
hotels. The elite can also afford to think about "what menus will
we pick to eat from today?", while the common people who live
from one day to another ponder "what will we eat today?".

Unless the civilian elite take the people's stomachs into
consideration, it is possible the grassroots groups will shift
their allegiance from the civilian to the military elite in the
next six months or so.

Although it is hard to believe at present, it is not
impossible that the military will dominate the government because
the civilian political elite cannot cope with the present
economic and political crisis.

The writer is a researcher at the Center for Political and
Regional Studies, Indonesian Institute of Sciences.

Window: In a way, these May student demonstrations in Indonesia
can be regarded as a middle class revolution. Compared to previous
student movements, this year's student movements were supported
by almost all sections of society, particularly the middle class.