Civil-military ties revisited

Civil-military ties revisited

By Todung Mulya Lubis

This is the first part of two articles based on a presentation
at a symposium to honor the contribution of scholar Daniel S. Lev
to the Southeast Asian Studies and Societies, University of
Washington. The function was held on March 13 at the university
campus in Seattle.

SEATTLE, Washington: The Indonesian Military (TNI) has always
believed that it has a role in the sociopolitical field. It has
never subscribed to the traditional role of only maintaining
defense as it is normally in many countries.

Gen. Sudirman, the founder and first Army commander, argued in
1945, for instance, that the military should not, by any means,
be perceived simply as a dead tool of the government; the
military was a part of society with a specific duty.

The founding fathers, who happened to be civilians, did not
regard the military as a sociopolitical force. There is no
provision in the 1945 Constitution stipulating that the military
should play a sociopolitical role. Implicitly, the military were
placed as a national defense force to guard the country. Needless
to say, civilian supremacy has been adhered to by the government
since independence.

Military involvement in state affairs seemed to be very
limited to its traditional role. The minister of defense had
always been in the hands of a civilian. This does not mean that
the military voluntarily accepted its restricted role; it dreamed
that one day it would gain an extended role.

In 1957-1958, the military gained a historical opportunity to
extend its role after civilian governments failed to maintain
stability and national integrity.

They failed to suppress local rebellions in North Sumatra,
West Sumatra, South Sumatra, West Java, Kalimantan and North
Sulawesi. President Sukarno declared martial law, followed by the
establishment of the Dewan Nasional (National Council) which
included military officers.

For the military, its presence in the Dewan Nasional marked a
new era of a wider role.

Gen. A.H. Nasution, then the military commander, carefully and
systematically extended military involvement into the economic
and political fields. The military started engaging in the oil
business, and then initiated a functional group, which later
became the Golkar Party.

It was under this situation that Nasution introduced the
concept of the "middle way" which basically reinforced Gen.
Sudirman's dream that the military should also have a
sociopolitical role.

The position of the military was not particularly prominent,
but it was a beginning. From 1958 onward, our history seemed to
be very generous to military participation in sociopolitical
affairs at the local and national level, in the executive,
legislature and in the judiciary.

Gradually, the military's expanded role made it a formidable
political force that not only shared, but controlled, a
substantial part of governing.

The middle way was translated into dwi fungsi (dual function),
a concept that reiterates the function of the military as both a
military force and a sociopolitical force.

Dwi fungsi was further elaborated at a series of seminars
organized by the Army in 1965, 1966 and 1967, while in 1982 the
government enacted Law No. 20/1982, which legalized the concept.

The law underlined the victory of the military over civilian
supremacy. It is indeed interesting to note that all political
parties at that time -- Golkar, the United Development Party
(Muslim-based PPP) and the Indonesian Democratic Party (the
nationalist PDI) unanimously endorsed the law.

A survey by Notosusanto, an Army historian, found that the
military held most positions in the local and central government
as governors, mayors, regents, ministers, secretary-generals and
director generals.

The military had substantial seats both in the legislative
body and in the Supreme Court. The number of military personnel
involved outside military affairs would be excessive if their
involvement in the economy were to be included.

But Soeharto refused to acknowledge that the military's
overrepresentation in government was, in other words, a hegemony
of a militaristic government.

Although as a state there existed the legislature, the
judiciary, the political parties and the media, in truth there
was no social control.

Every branch of power was co-opted, and the reelection of
Soeharto as president for more than 30 years served as historical
evidence of the authoritarian nature of the regime.

This is, of course, not to say that there were no critical
elements within society, such as the student movement and non-
governmental organizations (NGOs). The two forces were among the
remaining few that could still voice criticism.

So although almost every legal and political document
reiterated that Indonesia subscribed to the notion of democracy,
there was no such experience.

Human rights were hardly observed or guaranteed by the
government. It was a "western" concept with no roots in society.

The government often accused those working for human rights as
subversive and anational. It was obsessed with economic
development, security and order. The Soeharto government did not
want to repeat the failure of the Sukarno government in its
economic development.

Like it or not, the Soeharto government deserved some credit
for several economic successes despite the widening gap of rich
and poor. When the crisis hit in 1997, the foundation of
Soeharto's economic development inevitably collapsed.

Corruption was so systematic and widespread that it made
Indonesia one of the worst corrupted countries after Nigeria and
Cameroon.

Officials have corrupted 30 percent of the national budget
every year, according to rough estimates by anticorruption
monitoring organizations. Cronyism, which lead to the super rich
among the well-connected, helped to sabotage equal income
distribution.

Soeharto's protege, B.J. Habibie, took over but was unable to
effectively govern because of political stigmatization against
him. The same old people from Soeharto's era surrounded him, and
they basically did not welcome significant change. The repressive
and corruptive government remained.

Although many doubted the sincerity of the new administration,
a sense of optimism prevailed. Habibie's transitional government
paved the way to a more democratic society.

The military was forced to realize that times were changing;
it had to deal with the unraveling of its past abuses.

Both the media and local communities, including victims'
relatives, exposed atrocities, such as in Aceh, Lampung, Tanjung
Priok and Irian Jaya.

One way or another, the military had to be made accountable.
The criticism led to the setting up of various inquiry
commissions, which produced recommendations to bring those
involved in rights abuses to court. From one case to another, the
military suffered an unimaginable defeat leading to forced
adjustment. It had to start thinking about "repositioning" itself
in the new political landscape.

The writer is a lawyer and human rights activist, and writer
of In search of human rights: Legal and political dilemma of
Indonesia's New Order, 1966-1990 (Gramedia, 1993).