Civil-military ties revisited

By Todung Mulya Lubis

This is the first part of two articles based on a presentation at a symposium to honor the contribution of scholar Daniel S. Lev to the Southeast Asian Studies and Societies, University of Washington. The function was held on March 13 at the university campus in Seattle.

SEATTLE, Washington: The Indonesian Military (TNI) has always believed that it has a role in the sociopolitical field. It has never subscribed to the traditional role of only maintaining defense as it is normally in many countries.

Gen. Sudirman, the founder and first Army commander, argued in 1945, for instance, that the military should not, by any means, be perceived simply as a dead tool of the government; the military was a part of society with a specific duty.

The founding fathers, who happened to be civilians, did not regard the military as a sociopolitical force. There is no provision in the 1945 Constitution stipulating that the military should play a sociopolitical role. Implicitly, the military were placed as a national defense force to guard the country. Needless to say, civilian supremacy has been adhered to by the government since independence.

Military involvement in state affairs seemed to be very limited to its traditional role. The minister of defense had always been in the hands of a civilian. This does not mean that the military voluntarily accepted its restricted role; it dreamed that one day it would gain an extended role.

In 1957-1958, the military gained a historical opportunity to extend its role after civilian governments failed to maintain stability and national integrity.

They failed to suppress local rebellions in North Sumatra, West Sumatra, South Sumatra, West Java, Kalimantan and North Sulawesi. President Sukarno declared martial law, followed by the establishment of the Dewan Nasional (National Council) which included military officers.

For the military, its presence in the Dewan Nasional marked a new era of a wider role.

Gen. A.H. Nasution, then the military commander, carefully and systematically extended military involvement into the economic and political fields. The military started engaging in the oil business, and then initiated a functional group, which later became the Golkar Party.

It was under this situation that Nasution introduced the concept of the "middle way" which basically reinforced Gen. Sudirman's dream that the military should also have a sociopolitical role.

The position of the military was not particularly prominent, but it was a beginning. From 1958 onward, our history seemed to be very generous to military participation in sociopolitical affairs at the local and national level, in the executive, legislature and in the judiciary.

Gradually, the military's expanded role made it a formidable political force that not only shared, but controlled, a substantial part of governing.

The middle way was translated into dwi fungsi (dual function), a concept that reiterates the function of the military as both a military force and a sociopolitical force.

Dwi fungsi was further elaborated at a series of seminars organized by the Army in 1965, 1966 and 1967, while in 1982 the government enacted Law No. 20/1982, which legalized the concept.

The law underlined the victory of the military over civilian supremacy. It is indeed interesting to note that all political parties at that time -- Golkar, the United Development Party (Muslim-based PPP) and the Indonesian Democratic Party (the nationalist PDI) unanimously endorsed the law.

A survey by Notosusanto, an Army historian, found that the military held most positions in the local and central government as governors, mayors, regents, ministers, secretary-generals and director generals.

The military had substantial seats both in the legislative body and in the Supreme Court. The number of military personnel involved outside military affairs would be excessive if their involvement in the economy were to be included.

But Soeharto refused to acknowledge that the military's overrepresentation in government was, in other words, a hegemony of a militaristic government.

Although as a state there existed the legislature, the judiciary, the political parties and the media, in truth there was no social control.

Every branch of power was co-opted, and the reelection of Soeharto as president for more than 30 years served as historical evidence of the authoritarian nature of the regime.

This is, of course, not to say that there were no critical elements within society, such as the student movement and non- governmental organizations (NGOs). The two forces were among the remaining few that could still voice criticism.

So although almost every legal and political document reiterated that Indonesia subscribed to the notion of democracy, there was no such experience.

Human rights were hardly observed or guaranteed by the government. It was a "western" concept with no roots in society.

The government often accused those working for human rights as subversive and anational. It was obsessed with economic development, security and order. The Soeharto government did not want to repeat the failure of the Sukarno government in its economic development.

Like it or not, the Soeharto government deserved some credit for several economic successes despite the widening gap of rich and poor. When the crisis hit in 1997, the foundation of Soeharto's economic development inevitably collapsed.

Corruption was so systematic and widespread that it made Indonesia one of the worst corrupted countries after Nigeria and Cameroon.

Officials have corrupted 30 percent of the national budget every year, according to rough estimates by anticorruption monitoring organizations. Cronyism, which lead to the super rich among the well-connected, helped to sabotage equal income distribution.

Soeharto's protege, B.J. Habibie, took over but was unable to effectively govern because of political stigmatization against him. The same old people from Soeharto's era surrounded him, and they basically did not welcome significant change. The repressive and corruptive government remained.

Although many doubted the sincerity of the new administration, a sense of optimism prevailed. Habibie's transitional government paved the way to a more democratic society.

The military was forced to realize that times were changing; it had to deal with the unraveling of its past abuses.

Both the media and local communities, including victims' relatives, exposed atrocities, such as in Aceh, Lampung, Tanjung Priok and Irian Jaya.

One way or another, the military had to be made accountable. The criticism led to the setting up of various inquiry commissions, which produced recommendations to bring those involved in rights abuses to court. From one case to another, the military suffered an unimaginable defeat leading to forced adjustment. It had to start thinking about "repositioning" itself in the new political landscape.

The writer is a lawyer and human rights activist, and writer of In search of human rights: Legal and political dilemma of Indonesia's New Order, 1966-1990 (Gramedia, 1993).