Chinese challenge: Strategic encirclement of India

By Gurmeet Kanwal

NEW DELHI: China's growing power and influence in Asia poses a long-term strategic challenge to India. For many decades now, despite protests to the country, China has been pursuing a carefully orchestrated plan for the strategic encirclement and containment of India and has been gradually enlarging its sphere of influence towards Southeast Asia and the Bay of Bengal.

China's strategic maneuvering and its intransigence in resolving the long-standing territorial and boundary dispute with India are sources of potential conflict. Its foreign and defense policy initiatives are obviously designed to marginalize India.

China continues to be in occupation of and lays claim to large areas of Indian territory. In Aksai Chin in Ladakh, China is occupying some 30,000 square kilometers of Indian territory since the 1962 war with India.

Pakistan illegally ceded over 5,000 sq km of territory in Pakistan occupied Kashmir to China in 1963. Through this China built the Karakoram highway, the land link between China and Pakistan.

China continues to claim that the reunification of Arunachal Pradesh with China, about 90,000 sq km of Indian territory, is a sacred duty and is yet to recognize Sikkim's accession to India.

The China-Pakistan nexus in the nuclear, missiles and military hardware fields poses a present and future military challenge. Eventually, Indian and Chinese strategic and economic interests will clash.

It is not so well known that the post-1962 Line of Actual Control (LAC) between India and China is yet to be physically demarcated on the ground and delineated on military maps.

The undelineated LAC is a major destabilizing factor. Patrol face-offs are fairly common and armed clashes can take place at any time. Despite the Border Peace and Tranquillity Agreement of 1993, and the Confidence Building Measures (CBMs) in the military field since 1996 it is remarkable that even the LAC is yet to be demarcated.

It is in India's interest to strive for an early resolution of the territorial dispute with China so that India has only one major military adversary to contend with and is able to redeploy at least some of the 10 to 12 mountain divisions, and four to six squadrons of the Indian Air Force from the Tibetan border to its western border to gain a decisive military edge against Pakistan.

India may even consider "downsizing" a few army divisions and utilize the savings for the qualitative upgradation of the army.

Perhaps the real reason for China dragging its feet in resolving its dispute with India is to enable Pakistan to continue to destabilize India through its proxy war, without fear of major military retaliation due to the specter of a two-front war.

India also needs to be watchful of China's increasing military involvement in Myanmar, which has the potential to impinge on India's trade and maritime interests.

China's wooing of Nepal and Bhutan, its sale of sophisticated military technology to Pakistan, Bangladesh and Myanmar, and the possibility of it acquiring naval bases, and over-land and air- routes to such bases in the countries around India, are areas of concern for India's security.

Even though China's navy is still decades away from acquiring the long-range capability necessary to operate with some degree of assurance in the Indian Ocean, these aspects need to be constantly monitored.

Since the Gulf War of 1991, China has stepped up its efforts to modernize the People's Liberation Army (PLA). The PLA has been engaged in raising a large number of rapid deployment divisions and in improving mobility and logistics support capability, while upgrading its ability to undertake operations, improve air defense capability and institute state-of-the-art command and control systems.

All these endeavors aim at creating a modern fighting force capable of undertaking swift offensive operations in area away from China's borders in keeping with China's strategy of fighting a limited war under high-tech conditions.

The upgradation of the military logistics infrastructure in Tibet is continuing at a steady pace. China has been actively engaged in building new roads, supply lines and airfields close to the Indian frontier. A resurgent and militarily strong China may eventually attempt to force a military solution to the long- standing territorial and boundary dispute. Hence, a future border conflict between these two Asian giants cannot be ruled out.

In the short-term, India's strategy should be to ensure the sanctity of the LAC, that is, effective border management, while maintaining adequate dissuasive conventional military strength. India must substantially increase its diplomatic efforts to seek early resolution of the territorial dispute.

Efforts to develop military infrastructure in the border areas for the speedy induction of forces need to be stepped up to ensure that local conflagrations can be immediately addressed.

India must also maintain a strong capability to defend its island territories in the Bay of Bengal and to safeguard its maritime interests in its Exclusive Economic Zone.

India needs to establish strategic linkages with the US, Russia, Israel, South Africa, Iran, Myanmar, Vietnam, Taiwan, Japan and South Korea to counter-balance China's growing power and influence.

India's strategy should also focus on developing adequately powerful leverages to make it incumbent on China to act quickly to resolve the territorial dispute between the two countries.

There would be immense advantages in commencing the sale of modern military hardware to Vietnam. The Defense Research and Development Organization could provide technical known-how to Vietnam's nascent armament industry. The Chinese people's latent yearning for democracy should also be discreetly encouraged.

If necessary, India should also be ready to play the Tibet card, something it has avoided doing for almost half a century. A more assertive policy is called for on Tibetan autonomy, the honorable return of the Dalai Lama to Tibet, India's growing concern at human rights violations in Tibet and early resolution of the issue of thousands of Tibetan refugees in India.

Diplomatic efforts should simultaneously be made to increase India's influence and leverages in the Central Asian Republics, Myanmar, Nepal, Bangladesh and with the ASEAN countries. The large number of multinational companies that are unhappy with their business ventures in China should be persuaded to invest in India instead through attractive offers.

The long-term requirement is to match China's strategic challenge in the region and develop a credible military deterrence against the use of nuclear and missile weapon systems. Threats posed by nuclear-tipped ballistic missiles cannot be countered by the deployment of land forces and conventional air power alone.

Hence, India must develop, test and operationally induct Agni- I and Agni-II IRBMs into the armed forces. The priority should be to field a 5,000 km plus ballistic missile within the next three to five years. The acquisition of air-to-air refueling capability to increase the range of India's nuclear-capable fighter-bomber aircraft, is an urgent requirement. India should also develop ICBMs and induct SLBM-armed nuclear powered submarines, and thus put in place a "triad" of nuclear forces.

Realistic deterrence against China can only be achieved by developing the capability to target major Chinese cities with megaton-clash nuclear weapons. There is no need to be either hawkish or wimpish in relations with China and no need to fear China militarily.

-- The Statesman/Asia News Network