China's stance on South China Sea

China's stance on South China Sea

By Santo Darmosumarto

JAKARTA (JP): Conflict over territorial claims in the South
China Sea -- especially those related to the Spratly Islands --
remains a serious threat to regional stability. The Spratly
dispute -- involving Brunei, China, Malaysia, the Philippines,
Taiwan and Vietnam -- has repeatedly been stated as a possible
flash point for major regional conflict. Recognizing the
volatility of the situation, the issue became a priority item on
the recent Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN)
summit's agenda. ASEAN leaders agreed to develop a "code of
conduct", which would bar new occupation of land features and
expansion of existing structures in the disputed area. This
reflected a determination to prevent reoccurrences of military
conflict as well as enhance peaceful coexistence, which in turn,
would provide the environment necessary for further efforts to
solve the problem.

Unfortunately, the idea did not sit well with the Chinese, who
are seen as the disputes' main protagonist. Without China's
cooperation and commitment, the scope and effectiveness of
ASEAN's proposed solution would be limited, especially
considering that altercations have often involved Chinese
military and nonmilitary elements. Beijing has agreed to keep
discussion on the code of conduct going; however, this approach
may only be a ploy to buy time until the Chinese can come up with
an alternative and more beneficial proposal of their own.

China claims the entire South China Sea on the grounds of
historical accounts. Occasionally, it has resorted to using
military force as a means to settling claims and occupying land
features. Such an aggressive posture has often resulted in naval
clashes. Even though there has not been a major confrontation
since 1988 -- when China sank two Vietnamese vessels and killed
72 sailors -- the potential for one remains, as each dispute
intensifies military presence in the area. What appears to be a
small-scale arms race has instilled a climate of high tension in
the South China Sea. Moreover, claimants have perpetuated
feelings of animosity by engaging in "nonmilitary" methods of
expansion and occupation, such as erecting buildings and
structures on claimed islands as well as granting oil concessions
to foreign companies.

In China's case, its strategic interest in the South China Sea
stems from numerous reasons. Economically, maritime expansion and
exploration benefit development and modernization, which in turn,
provide support for greater defense expenditure. In addition to
this, Beijing's ambitions are encouraged by growing nationalist
tendencies among its policymakers, especially those in the
military. There is a growing belief that with the slow erosion of
communism, a new brand of nationalism has risen to fill in the
ideological vacuum. Such trends have attributed greater emphasis
on the need to preserve China's territorial integrity as well as
reclaim its past maritime glories. In turn, the ruling elite has
taken advantage of such nationalistic fervor to justify its
military programs and bolster its wilting legitimacy.

The modernization of China's military has largely been focused
on improving the People's Liberation Army Navy (PLAN). The naval
development can be observed not only in the PLAN's enhanced
weaponry, but also in the evolution of a doctrine calling for
increased power-projection. Even though these new additions are
not entirely state-of-the-art weapons, their growing presence in
the South China Sea will further regional security uncertainty.
Naval modernization does not immediately mean that the Chinese
will use force to occupy more islands, but rather that they seek
to bolster physical presence in the disputed area, which in turn
will boost their bargaining leverage in future negotiations.

However, China's ambitions in the South China Sea are
complicated by at least two factors. First, despite spending
considerable effort modernizing its navy, the military still
faces tremendous difficulties deploying forces within a long-term
strategy. In order to buy time while building up naval power,
Beijing realizes that alternative, nonmilitary approaches have to
be developed. Second, the region's political climate has
frequently not been conducive to carrying out assertive maritime
policies that are based purely on military strategy. This is more
relevant today considering the growing "China threat" perception
within and outside the region as well as the demonstrated ability
of rival claimants to unite as a group (e.g. ASEAN) in response
to China's aggressive moves.

In view of these challenges, Beijing frames its maritime
strategy within a policy of "Three NOs": NO claim specification,
NO multilateral negotiations, and NO internationalization. First,
China does not specify its maritime interests because it would
have difficulties justifying such historical claims within the
context of current international law. Second, China has declined
participation in official, multilateral discussions in order to
prevent itself from being pitted alone against other claimants,
which all belong to ASEAN. Third, China is adamant about keeping
the conflict within a regional framework because it fears that
bringing in outside actors would lessen its leverage during
discussions.

Furthermore, China pursues a pragmatic, "soft-hard" approach
in its South China Sea scheme. For example, while Chinese
diplomats announce intentions to engage in a regional-based joint
development of resources, the PLAN continues to flex its muscle
and occupy land features in the Spratlys. This paradoxical policy
is partially a result of Beijing's disjointed foreign
policymaking, i.e. growing friction between the Ministry of
Foreign Affairs and the People's Liberation Army, especially its
naval branch. However, more importantly Chinese interest in
cooperative agreements emerges whenever the regional political
climate is disadvantageous or they are not completely in control
of the territory in dispute; in events where the opposite
conditions exist, China has shown unwillingness to compromise.
Despite seemingly pursuing different approaches to the issue, it
remains clear that China intends to exert influence over the
entire -- if not, a significant majority of -- the South China
Sea.

The view above can be further exemplified by Beijing's
approach to the Spratly dispute between 1995 and 1998. Having
received strong condemnation from ASEAN over the takeover of
Mischief Reef, China agreed to participate in joint efforts to
develop the area's natural resources. However, when the economic
crisis broke down ASEAN's strength and unity, the Chinese were
quick to take advantage of the situation and began construction
on occupied reefs and islands as well as increased the presence
of its nationals (military and nonmilitary) in the area.

Based on this analysis, it is unlikely that China will agree
to ASEAN's proposed code of conduct soon. At the present moment,
the Chinese are faced with what seems to be a united stance among
ASEAN members. In similar situations in the past, Beijing has
appeared willing to engage in discussions just for the sake of
appeasing other claimants. Yet, it has not shown commitment to
participate fully in such discussions for fear of giving away too
much.

This does not render informal discussions on the South China
Sea useless. For example, the South China Sea Informal Working
Group, which held its 10th meeting in Bogor this week, has
provided an effective means toward engaging China in a
multilateral forum. Not only that, the currently proposed code of
conduct actually came about from years of deliberations within
the workshop. Considering that official channels of discussion
have frequently been frustrated, informal meetings have provided
mechanisms for establishing some form of regional security
framework. Such efforts will become more effective if ASEAN can
pose a strong and united voice. In doing so, this will dilute
China's dominance during negotiations and pressure the former
into accepting concessions that are mutually more beneficial.

The writer is a Jakarta-based researcher and analyst of
Southeast Asian security issues.