China's stance on South China Sea

By Santo Darmosumarto

JAKARTA (JP): Conflict over territorial claims in the South China Sea -- especially those related to the Spratly Islands -- remains a serious threat to regional stability. The Spratly dispute -- involving Brunei, China, Malaysia, the Philippines, Taiwan and Vietnam -- has repeatedly been stated as a possible flash point for major regional conflict. Recognizing the volatility of the situation, the issue became a priority item on the recent Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) summit's agenda. ASEAN leaders agreed to develop a "code of conduct", which would bar new occupation of land features and expansion of existing structures in the disputed area. This reflected a determination to prevent reoccurrences of military conflict as well as enhance peaceful coexistence, which in turn, would provide the environment necessary for further efforts to solve the problem.

Unfortunately, the idea did not sit well with the Chinese, who are seen as the disputes' main protagonist. Without China's cooperation and commitment, the scope and effectiveness of ASEAN's proposed solution would be limited, especially considering that altercations have often involved Chinese military and nonmilitary elements. Beijing has agreed to keep discussion on the code of conduct going; however, this approach may only be a ploy to buy time until the Chinese can come up with an alternative and more beneficial proposal of their own.

China claims the entire South China Sea on the grounds of historical accounts. Occasionally, it has resorted to using military force as a means to settling claims and occupying land features. Such an aggressive posture has often resulted in naval clashes. Even though there has not been a major confrontation since 1988 -- when China sank two Vietnamese vessels and killed 72 sailors -- the potential for one remains, as each dispute intensifies military presence in the area. What appears to be a small-scale arms race has instilled a climate of high tension in the South China Sea. Moreover, claimants have perpetuated feelings of animosity by engaging in "nonmilitary" methods of expansion and occupation, such as erecting buildings and structures on claimed islands as well as granting oil concessions to foreign companies.

In China's case, its strategic interest in the South China Sea stems from numerous reasons. Economically, maritime expansion and exploration benefit development and modernization, which in turn, provide support for greater defense expenditure. In addition to this, Beijing's ambitions are encouraged by growing nationalist tendencies among its policymakers, especially those in the military. There is a growing belief that with the slow erosion of communism, a new brand of nationalism has risen to fill in the ideological vacuum. Such trends have attributed greater emphasis on the need to preserve China's territorial integrity as well as reclaim its past maritime glories. In turn, the ruling elite has taken advantage of such nationalistic fervor to justify its military programs and bolster its wilting legitimacy.

The modernization of China's military has largely been focused on improving the People's Liberation Army Navy (PLAN). The naval development can be observed not only in the PLAN's enhanced weaponry, but also in the evolution of a doctrine calling for increased power-projection. Even though these new additions are not entirely state-of-the-art weapons, their growing presence in the South China Sea will further regional security uncertainty. Naval modernization does not immediately mean that the Chinese will use force to occupy more islands, but rather that they seek to bolster physical presence in the disputed area, which in turn will boost their bargaining leverage in future negotiations.

However, China's ambitions in the South China Sea are complicated by at least two factors. First, despite spending considerable effort modernizing its navy, the military still faces tremendous difficulties deploying forces within a long-term strategy. In order to buy time while building up naval power, Beijing realizes that alternative, nonmilitary approaches have to be developed. Second, the region's political climate has frequently not been conducive to carrying out assertive maritime policies that are based purely on military strategy. This is more relevant today considering the growing "China threat" perception within and outside the region as well as the demonstrated ability of rival claimants to unite as a group (e.g. ASEAN) in response to China's aggressive moves.

In view of these challenges, Beijing frames its maritime strategy within a policy of "Three NOs": NO claim specification, NO multilateral negotiations, and NO internationalization. First, China does not specify its maritime interests because it would have difficulties justifying such historical claims within the context of current international law. Second, China has declined participation in official, multilateral discussions in order to prevent itself from being pitted alone against other claimants, which all belong to ASEAN. Third, China is adamant about keeping the conflict within a regional framework because it fears that bringing in outside actors would lessen its leverage during discussions.

Furthermore, China pursues a pragmatic, "soft-hard" approach in its South China Sea scheme. For example, while Chinese diplomats announce intentions to engage in a regional-based joint development of resources, the PLAN continues to flex its muscle and occupy land features in the Spratlys. This paradoxical policy is partially a result of Beijing's disjointed foreign policymaking, i.e. growing friction between the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the People's Liberation Army, especially its naval branch. However, more importantly Chinese interest in cooperative agreements emerges whenever the regional political climate is disadvantageous or they are not completely in control of the territory in dispute; in events where the opposite conditions exist, China has shown unwillingness to compromise. Despite seemingly pursuing different approaches to the issue, it remains clear that China intends to exert influence over the entire -- if not, a significant majority of -- the South China Sea.

The view above can be further exemplified by Beijing's approach to the Spratly dispute between 1995 and 1998. Having received strong condemnation from ASEAN over the takeover of Mischief Reef, China agreed to participate in joint efforts to develop the area's natural resources. However, when the economic crisis broke down ASEAN's strength and unity, the Chinese were quick to take advantage of the situation and began construction on occupied reefs and islands as well as increased the presence of its nationals (military and nonmilitary) in the area.

Based on this analysis, it is unlikely that China will agree to ASEAN's proposed code of conduct soon. At the present moment, the Chinese are faced with what seems to be a united stance among ASEAN members. In similar situations in the past, Beijing has appeared willing to engage in discussions just for the sake of appeasing other claimants. Yet, it has not shown commitment to participate fully in such discussions for fear of giving away too much.

This does not render informal discussions on the South China Sea useless. For example, the South China Sea Informal Working Group, which held its 10th meeting in Bogor this week, has provided an effective means toward engaging China in a multilateral forum. Not only that, the currently proposed code of conduct actually came about from years of deliberations within the workshop. Considering that official channels of discussion have frequently been frustrated, informal meetings have provided mechanisms for establishing some form of regional security framework. Such efforts will become more effective if ASEAN can pose a strong and united voice. In doing so, this will dilute China's dominance during negotiations and pressure the former into accepting concessions that are mutually more beneficial.

The writer is a Jakarta-based researcher and analyst of Southeast Asian security issues.