China's Hu Jintao is in charge of foreign affairs

Natalia Soebagjo, Centre for Chinese Studies, Jakarta

The CCP's leadership line-up has been announced and, as predicted, Hu Jintao succeeded Jiang Zemin as the Party's Secretary-General. It is too early to tell how Hu will fare, but for the time being he will be preoccupied with consolidating his power, especially since he is surrounded by Jiang's men. Twelve of the 25-member CCP Politburo are identified as Jiang's people with only five close to Hu, while in the expanded Standing Committee, four out of nine are Jiang's allies and just two are Hu's. Results of a cabinet reshuffle next March will be telling.

What's striking about the latest leadership change was the relative smoothness of the transition. Obviously, Jiang Zemin was reluctant to leave, as proven by the number of his proteges placed in the current leadership, but he should be satisfied by the fact that the Party Constitution was amended to include his 'Three Represents', a watershed change which removes the stigma of being a capitalist in a nominally communist society. Besides, Jiang can still wield power from behind the scenes as Chairman of the Central Military Commission, albeit for an indefinite period of time.

What does this leadership change mean for us in the region? Probably not much. Most of the deliberations during the recent Party Congress focused on domestic issues and how to create a xiaokang, or wealthy society, which no doubt requires a peaceful environment both within and beyond China's borders. Indeed, peace and development has been the general policy line of the Chinese leadership since economics took center stage.

After almost 25 years of reform, China has now regained her confidence and is striving to regain Great Power status, driven by the nationalistic desire to see China rise in the hierarchy of the international power structure. Many see China now as a more responsible and prudent power, gradually integrating deeper into the international community.

According to Lowell Dittmer, the shifts in China's foreign policy during this period can be roughly divided into four phases beginning with China warming up towards the U.S. in an attempt to build an anti-Soviet united front (1978-1982) followed by Deng's independent foreign policy of peace (1982-1989), then reintegration into the international community after the shock of Tiananmen and the end of the Cold War (1989-1995) and, lastly, the bid for Great Power status under Jiang Zemin.

It is doubtful that Hu Jintao will usher in a new phase anytime soon, but this very much depends on external developments. Little is as yet known of Hu's thought regards foreign affairs, but his keynote address in a visit to Paris last November indicated that he supports multi-polarity. His attitude towards the U.S. is, however, quite clear. In May 1999, he strongly condemned the U.S. in the Chinese Embassy bombing incident, and during his visit to the U.S. in May this year, he warned the U.S. about its sale of sophisticated weaponry to Taiwan, underscoring the importance of the Taiwan issue in Sino- U.S. relations.

Jiang Zemin began his leadership by continuing and fine-tuning the line that Deng Xiaoping had laid down, and gradually stamping his own mark. Hu Jintao will be expected to do the same. China's vision of a new international order is one of multi- polarization, ideally without hegemony, power politics, conflict and confrontation. Jiang's preference for forging bilateral partnerships with nations based on comprehensive cooperation without firmly aligning with any particular state or group of states is the practical realization of this new international order.

As China becomes more confident, she will expect to be accorded the status and prestige that befits her, which some say smacks of neo-traditional diplomacy in an international order perceived by the Chinese as being hierarchical. Another feature of the Jiang era is the shift away from a policy of demilitarization to military modernization, which was an important concession that Jiang had to make given his lack of military experience when he first came into power.

Hu Jintao is now working with a foreign policy apparatus which, under Jiang, became more institutionalized and more professional. The major institutions involved in the foreign policy decision-making are the state, the Communist Party and the PLA, with the State Council running the foreign policy apparatus. The final say, however, lies with the CCP or, more precisely, a core from the Standing Committee.

In Mao's time, foreign policy decisions were made by Mao Zedong and Zhou Enlai. During the first decade of reform Deng had a few more people involved, such as Chen Yun, Hu Yaobang and Zhao Ziyang, who were subsequently replaced by Yang Shangkun, Li Peng and Jiang Zemin. When Jiang succeeded Deng, he and Li Peng were the main decision-makers. Institutionally, this core is known as the Foreign Affairs Leading Small Group, with the General Secretary in control as he is concurrently State President.

Although Hu Jintao himself has limited exposure to foreign affairs, it is expected that in the upcoming State Council leadership changeover in March, those with experience will be there to support him, such as Madame Wu Yi, who has been mentioned as vice-premier for foreign affairs and foreign trade. It is unclear who will be Foreign Minister because Li Zhaoxing, currently Deputy Foreign Minister, may not be promoted automatically because of his lack of diplomatic skills as displayed during his term as U.S. ambassador in 1998-2001.

Other possible candidates are Liu Huaqiu, who is now the director of the Foreign Affairs Office of the State Council, and Dai Binguo, currently head of the CCP Liaison Department. There was also talk of Zeng Qinghong taking charge of the Foreign Affairs Leading Small Group, but he has been given the responsibility of Secretary of the CCP Central Committee Secretariat, which means that he will most likely be more involved in internal Party administration.

The Chinese leadership knows full well that it would be counter-productive to take on an aggressive stance in its dealings with other major powers and regional states. There are, indeed, many foreign policy issues still outstanding, and these will be tackled by taking advantage of various bilateral and multilateral institutions. China has no choice but to wield its long-nurtured power prudently and responsibly; as any Great Power should in this new world order if it wants to gain the respect of others.

One sign of this is China's recent performance at the ASEAN Summit in Phnom Penh, during which she took part in establishing a framework for a China-ASEAN Free Trade Agreement and signed a declaration on cooperation on various non-traditional security issues, as well as gave additional aid to the host country.

For those of us in Indonesia, relations with China will continue to improve as trade and investment flows between the two countries grow apace and people-to-people exchanges increase.