China may have miscalculated over Mischief Reef (2)

China may have miscalculated over Mischief Reef (2)

By Bilveer Singh

This is the second of two articles examining China's recent
move on Mischief Reef in the South China Sea.

SINGAPORE (JP): There were a number of other developments
related to China's actions on Mischief Reef. First, despite its
economic problems, the Philippines Congress approved a US$2
billion arms build up program for the armed forces.

It would appear that the Chinese action has given substance to
the notion of a "China threat", with more countries in the region
likely to procure armaments to protect themselves and deter
China.

Second, even though Singapore has been silent on the issue in
the past, partly because it is not a claimant, during his state
visit to China, on May 11, Prime Minister Goh Chok Tong candidly
told Chinese Premier Li Peng that the dispute over the Spratlys
involved more than the question of sovereignty, or which country
should benefit from its resources.

It also involved the right of nations to navigate the waters
surrounding the islands in the South China Sea, a point that was
of concern to trading nations such as Singapore.

Third, the thorny issue dominated the Senior Officials Meeting
of the ASEAN Regional Forum in Brunei in late May, leading the
U.S. Secretary of State for East Asia and the Pacific, Winston
Lord, to conclude that, despite China's objections, "we
established the principle that the issue has to be treated
multilaterally, as well as bilaterally".

This represented a major diplomatic defeat for China, which
had hitherto refused to be officially engaged on the issue in a
multilateral forum. Coming less than two months before the forum
meeting, it was a clear signal to China that its actions in
Mischief Reef have unsettled too many countries in the Asia-
Pacific and that China stands to be increasingly isolated if she
persists in pursuing with her actions.

Fourth, Vietnam, the country which bore the brunt of earlier
Chinese military operations, quickly boosted its military
presence in the Spratlys, as well as calling for closer
cooperation with Russia and the U.S. in order to deter further
"island-grabbing" by China.

What was significant about the Chinese actions at Mischief
Reef was that it was the first of its kind against an ASEAN
member state.

That this was not accidental could be seen in two other
related actions. First, Beijing's claim to a section of the
Natuna seabed, about 250 kilometers north of Natuna Besar island
and second, on May 31, China's rejection of Malaysia's claim to
Layang-Layang, one of the islands in the Spratlys.

What these actions showed was that China has now targeted
ASEAN, as far as the South China Sea problem is concerned, and
the situation will get worse following Vietnam's admission to
ASEAN later in the month. Thus, a new fault-line has emerged, as
far as the South China Sea dispute is concerned, between China
and ASEAN.

However, unlike the past two military operations, the regional
and international reactions to China's occupation of Mischief
Reef indicates that Beijing may indeed have miscalculated. This
was largely a result of a number of factors.

First, China underestimated ASEAN, assuming that it would only
"bark" and then accept the annexation. However, as the ASEAN
countries were attempting to establish a "code of conduct" in the
region, as seen in the attempt to universalize the Treaty of
Amity and Cooperation, as well as to make it operational in the
contested zone through the ASEAN Declaration on the South China
Sea, the ASEAN countries were forced to act before it gathered a
steam-rolling momentum to the detriment of the region.

Even though the Chinese may have the military might, through
ASEAN's solidarity, the goal was to raise the political and
diplomatic costs of further Chinese aggression in the region.
Here, the Chinese may have underestimated ASEAN's threshold and
resolve to face up to a much more powerful claimant, and with one
which all the countries had close ties.

As a new post-Cold War era emerged in the region, it was
vitally necessary to establish clear-cut "rules" with regard to
territorial boundaries and through its solidarity, ASEAN made it
known to Beijing that its behavior was objectionable. Hence,
Beijing's underestimation of ASEAN, assuming that a weak and
divided regional organization would come to terms the fruits of
Chinese aggression.

The Chinese may also have underestimated the growing concern
all-over the world with the South China Sea as a region of great
global significance and that any conflict there would have wider
world-wide ramifications.

With the Chinese acquiring power projection capabilities, and
with growing concerns world-wide with the "emerging Chinese
superpower", there is great concern about the manner in which
China would use its newly acquired power.

As the issues are no longer bilateral in nature, China's South
China Sea policies have taken on greater meaning. To many, the
conflict in the Spratlys has come to be seen as the litmus test
of China's future behavior.

The key question is whether China will use its new found power
to behave in a responsible manner, or otherwise. Thus, most
countries in the region would use China's South China Sea policy
as a barometer as to how China would treat its weaker neighbors.

Dr. Bilveer Singh is a political scientist at the National
University of Singapore. His views presented in this article are
strictly his own.