China may have miscalculated over Mischief Reef (2)

By Bilveer Singh

This is the second of two articles examining China's recent move on Mischief Reef in the South China Sea.

SINGAPORE (JP): There were a number of other developments related to China's actions on Mischief Reef. First, despite its economic problems, the Philippines Congress approved a US$2 billion arms build up program for the armed forces.

It would appear that the Chinese action has given substance to the notion of a "China threat", with more countries in the region likely to procure armaments to protect themselves and deter China.

Second, even though Singapore has been silent on the issue in the past, partly because it is not a claimant, during his state visit to China, on May 11, Prime Minister Goh Chok Tong candidly told Chinese Premier Li Peng that the dispute over the Spratlys involved more than the question of sovereignty, or which country should benefit from its resources.

It also involved the right of nations to navigate the waters surrounding the islands in the South China Sea, a point that was of concern to trading nations such as Singapore.

Third, the thorny issue dominated the Senior Officials Meeting of the ASEAN Regional Forum in Brunei in late May, leading the U.S. Secretary of State for East Asia and the Pacific, Winston Lord, to conclude that, despite China's objections, "we established the principle that the issue has to be treated multilaterally, as well as bilaterally".

This represented a major diplomatic defeat for China, which had hitherto refused to be officially engaged on the issue in a multilateral forum. Coming less than two months before the forum meeting, it was a clear signal to China that its actions in Mischief Reef have unsettled too many countries in the Asia- Pacific and that China stands to be increasingly isolated if she persists in pursuing with her actions.

Fourth, Vietnam, the country which bore the brunt of earlier Chinese military operations, quickly boosted its military presence in the Spratlys, as well as calling for closer cooperation with Russia and the U.S. in order to deter further "island-grabbing" by China.

What was significant about the Chinese actions at Mischief Reef was that it was the first of its kind against an ASEAN member state.

That this was not accidental could be seen in two other related actions. First, Beijing's claim to a section of the Natuna seabed, about 250 kilometers north of Natuna Besar island and second, on May 31, China's rejection of Malaysia's claim to Layang-Layang, one of the islands in the Spratlys.

What these actions showed was that China has now targeted ASEAN, as far as the South China Sea problem is concerned, and the situation will get worse following Vietnam's admission to ASEAN later in the month. Thus, a new fault-line has emerged, as far as the South China Sea dispute is concerned, between China and ASEAN.

However, unlike the past two military operations, the regional and international reactions to China's occupation of Mischief Reef indicates that Beijing may indeed have miscalculated. This was largely a result of a number of factors.

First, China underestimated ASEAN, assuming that it would only "bark" and then accept the annexation. However, as the ASEAN countries were attempting to establish a "code of conduct" in the region, as seen in the attempt to universalize the Treaty of Amity and Cooperation, as well as to make it operational in the contested zone through the ASEAN Declaration on the South China Sea, the ASEAN countries were forced to act before it gathered a steam-rolling momentum to the detriment of the region.

Even though the Chinese may have the military might, through ASEAN's solidarity, the goal was to raise the political and diplomatic costs of further Chinese aggression in the region. Here, the Chinese may have underestimated ASEAN's threshold and resolve to face up to a much more powerful claimant, and with one which all the countries had close ties.

As a new post-Cold War era emerged in the region, it was vitally necessary to establish clear-cut "rules" with regard to territorial boundaries and through its solidarity, ASEAN made it known to Beijing that its behavior was objectionable. Hence, Beijing's underestimation of ASEAN, assuming that a weak and divided regional organization would come to terms the fruits of Chinese aggression.

The Chinese may also have underestimated the growing concern all-over the world with the South China Sea as a region of great global significance and that any conflict there would have wider world-wide ramifications.

With the Chinese acquiring power projection capabilities, and with growing concerns world-wide with the "emerging Chinese superpower", there is great concern about the manner in which China would use its newly acquired power.

As the issues are no longer bilateral in nature, China's South China Sea policies have taken on greater meaning. To many, the conflict in the Spratlys has come to be seen as the litmus test of China's future behavior.

The key question is whether China will use its new found power to behave in a responsible manner, or otherwise. Thus, most countries in the region would use China's South China Sea policy as a barometer as to how China would treat its weaker neighbors.

Dr. Bilveer Singh is a political scientist at the National University of Singapore. His views presented in this article are strictly his own.