China has opportunity in N. Korea at the expense of U.S. influence

S.P. Seth, Freelance Writer, Sydney, SushilPSeth@aol.com

The on-off nuclear talks with Pyongyang at Beijing are off again. Another meeting, though, is likely in a few months time to further explore the question of North Korea's nuclear disarmament. The impasse, however, continues.

At the recently concluded Beijing conference, Pyongyang offered a nuclear freeze in return for security guarantees, economic aid and diplomatic recognition. And they want the scope of their nuclear freeze to be limited to the 1994 agreement. Which means that it would only apply to its plutonium-based nuclear program. And they would be allowed the development and use of peaceful application of nuclear power. In other words, the U.S. and its allies would abide by the previous agreement to build two civilian nuclear reactors without the capacity to produce weapons-grade fuel.

Washington is not buying into it. According to a U.S. delegate to the six-nation Beijing conference (its participants included North and South Korea, U.S., Russia, China and Japan), "I'm not aware of any peaceful nuclear program" in North Korea. The United States, therefore, favors the complete dismantling of North Korea's nuclear activities, including its uranium enrichment project. Pyongyang denies undertaking uranium enrichment, though it apparently admitted its existence in talks with the U.S. a while ago.

The U.S. is not prepared to accept Pyongyang's word regarding its 'nuclear freeze' or whatever. According to James Kelly, the U.S. assistant secretary of state for East Asian affairs, "The U.S. seeks the complete, verifiable and irreversible dismantlement of all nuclear programs, including plutonium and uranium-based weapons."

Even though not much is resolved and the impasse continues, there is still a sense of relief at the continuing diplomatic parleys with North Korea. The alternative simply is unthinkable. And for this, the dialogue partners feel beholden to China. The argument goes that without Beijing's initiative and pressure, there probably would be no talks thus plunging the region into a disastrous catastrophe. It is assumed that Beijing is equally unhappy with North Korea's nuclear program and hence keen on its dismantling.

But shouldn't we question this glib assessment?

It is now known that China helped Pakistan with its atomic weapons program. And the latter sold the Chinese nuclear know-how to Libya, North Korea and others. According to the Washington Post, "Investigators have discovered that the nuclear weapons designs obtained by Libya through a Pakistani smuggling network originated in China..." It adds, " The Chinese designs were later resold to Libya by a Pakistani-led trading network...as well as [to] Iran and North Korea."

One can't imagine that Beijing was unaware of it all when Abdul Qadeer Khan, founder of Pakistan's nuclear program and the man at the center of the rogue nuclear trading network, was a familiar figure at the Chinese nuclear establishment. It apparently suited China then to have multiple small nuclear entities as a diversionary tactic against preponderant U.S. power. At the same time, it has helped to pin down India in South Asia and thwart it from becoming an alternative Asian power center.

The point to make is that China hasn't been averse to using its nuclear know-how as a strategic tool. Similarly, it wouldn't be averse to using North Korea to maximize its leverage with the United States, and to expand its regional role.

Washington is already banking on China to play a constructive role to bring about North Korea's denuclearization. And Beijing has let it be known that it shares U.S. concerns and is doing its best in that direction. But it has its limitations with Pyongyang's quirky regime. Therefore, Washington would need to give China some leeway to moderate Pyongyang. In other words, China is emerging as the middle-man with peace credentials.

And it is playing a skillful diplomatic game, without much hurry to exhaust its role. In any case the issue is going to be around for quite a while in some form or the other, enabling Beijing to maximize its power role. If it were really serious about squelching North Korea, it could put the squeeze by stopping its fuel and food supplies. It is amazing how successfully Beijing has been able to sell its facilitatory role in the North Korean nuclear imbroglio.

As long as Pyongyang is assured of its supply line from China, it can hold against U.S. pressure. And this gives Beijing enough space to maneuver and create U.S. dependence on its role. So much so that it felt confident enough to drop from a Xinhua report the U.S. pre-condition that it "seeks the complete, verifiable and irreversible dismantlement" of all North Korean nuclear programs. It obviously believes that this might not be the ultimate U.S. position.

Over-extended as it is in Iraq and Afghanistan, Washington is no position to undertake any pre-emptive military strike against North Korean nuclear installations. Without China on its side (an unlikely scenario), it will have to reckon with widening the area of conflict with that country. Therefore, Beijing is in the box seat preying on U.S. fears about North Korea's nuclear threat.

Unless the United States can reprioritise its strategic goals, China is likely to expand its regional role and power at U.S. cost. This is not what Washington would want.

It is not suggested, though, that China will, in the foreseeable future, be able to match U.S. economic, political and military power. But it might step into gaps created by U.S. over- stretch.