China benefits from U.S. policy on terrorism

S.P. Seth, The Korea Herald, Asia News Network, Seoul

Terrorism seems to have hijacked, for the time being at least, U.S. foreign and security policies. And, on surface, China is its greatest beneficiary. Beijing's broad support against global terrorism has won U.S. appreciation. Only last April, their relations had reached a crisis point over the spy plane incident. At that time Beijing temporarily held hostage the crew of the U.S. plane when it forced landed in Hainan.

Why has Beijing suddenly made such a metamorphosis? There are several reasons for this. But the most significant is communist China's compulsion for national and international legitimacy. How does its support on terrorism fit into it? It is quite simple.

China's economic reforms have created deep social and economic divisions across the board between classes (rich and poor), regions (coastal and interior) and between urban and rural areas.

Even though statistically China's economic growth of 7 percent is still quite impressive, it is not enough to soak up its growing unemployment.

Also, the country's urban-rural divide is widening, which has led to the growing migration of rural population into the cities in search of work. This floating mass of rural workers, estimated anywhere between 100 to 150 million, are people without a home. They are China's casual work force, but without legal status in their new urban environment. They are obviously exploited. At the same time, most of the urban crime is attributed to them. But they are tolerated as cheap labor, helping to keep labor costs generally low.

Which helps China's new robber-baron class (of private entrepreneurs and party apparatchiks) to make even more money. No wonder Jiang Zemin is keen to include capitalists into the party ranks to further cement this symbiosis; considering that the "princelings" of the party bigwigs are part of this new class.

Not surprisingly, with such linkages between the new economic class and the country's ruling apparatus, corruption is now endemic and institutionalized. And when things have reached such a pass, there is always the danger of a sudden popular explosion. More so if the country's disaffected elements of all sorts continue to receive encouragement and support from abroad, with the United States favoring democracy and human rights.

With growing rural and urban unrest, coupled with U.S. scrutiny and pressure (until now), China's ruling class is sinking deeper into illegitimacy. Hence, the need to encourage jingoism and the great power syndrome. But if the regime were to neutralize external "interference," things could be that much easier. And China will be able to use terrorism as a generic term to suppress all kinds of dissent and protest - be it the proponents of democracy, separatism, human rights advocate, Falun Gong or whatever.

Already, with its support of U.S. anti-terrorism, Beijing has acquired a measure of international respectability giving it more leeway to suppress internal opposition. For instance, it can now blow up the "separatists" in Xinjiang with impunity. Neutralizing America, if not getting it on its side, will be helpful for China's communist rulers. But it will presuppose ongoing U.S. involvement with terrorism over a long period to the virtual exclusion of its other international and strategic priorities. Which is unlikely.

Sooner, rather than later, the United States will have to readjust its terrorism strategy as one among its myriad priorities. Terrorism is an elusive enemy, requiring a much more diverse and broad-based struggle to hunt down its perpetrators. They should be pursued diligently but without landing the United States into a quagmire with the unintended effect of bleeding it white.

In that case, China will be the great winner being catapulted into a global power role. Therefore, Washington should not lose sight of its overall global strategy and role which, among other things, means keeping a careful watch on China's competing and contending global ambitions.

At the international level, China is, therefore, keen to use its new leverage for the United States to facilitate its power role. At least, that is how China sees it. For instance, President Jiang Zemin recently said (after meeting President Bush during the Shanghai APEC forum) that China and the U.S. "are two countries with significant influence in the world.

As such, we share common responsibility and interest in maintaining peace and security in the Asia-Pacific." In other words, Beijing is already visualizing the transformation of its relations with the United States from "strategic competition" (Bush's earlier words) to "strategic partnership" (Clinton's favored description).

A stable partnership with the U.S. will also help legitimize Jiang's legacy and his anointed succession in the wake of the next year's party congress. Therefore, the new turn in Sino-U.S. relations is important to communist China for legitimacy and power projection.

And if the U.S. were to prevail over terrorism, its positive impact on U.S. economy will reverberate all over the world, including China. In the meantime, China would have worked its miracle on the U.S.