China aims to improve ties with ASEAN

China aims to improve ties with ASEAN

By Rizal Sukma

JAKARTA (JP): Chinese Prime Minister Li Peng's recent visit to
Malaysia and Singapore marked a further attempt by Beijing to
forge closer ties with ASEAN countries.

The visit provided a good opportunity for China to explain its
role and policies in Southeast Asia, in particular, and the Asia-
Pacific, in general.

In Singapore, for example, Li once again maintained that the
so-called "China threat" theory was baseless. China has also put
forward another proposal for joint cooperation in the Spratley
Islands. These developments, if sustained, will be welcomed by
the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) countries.

Despite such assurances, however, two main challenges remain
in future efforts to improve ASEAN-China relations.

1. How to deal with elements of "inconsistency" and
"uncertainty" in China's foreign behavior, especially with regard
to territorial conflicts in the South China Sea

2. How to address the question of Taiwan, either within ASEAN
or in the wider framework of the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF).

The first challenge poses a delicate problem for the way ASEAN
deals with China's behavior in the South China Sea and how the
association attempts to create a more predictable regional order
in the post-Cold War Southeast Asia.

The second challenge has wider implications as it would affect
the future course of ASEAN-China relations and determine the
future role of the association in the ARF. It poses a real
problem for ASEAN's role as "the primary driving force" in the
ARF process.

The South China Sea disputes would be the first "issue area"
directly affected by the inconsistency and uncertainty in China's
foreign behavior.

Due to the importance of national sovereignty and territorial
integrity for the Chinese leaders, it is likely that the search
for a peaceful solution to the South China Sea disputes would
continue at present pace and, therefore, present another
protracted problem for ASEAN to handle.

Based on its experience in seeking solutions to the Cambodian
conflict, in which China was involved albeit in a less direct
manner, ASEAN is all too familiar with how such a conflict
exposed its own weaknesses.

The Cambodian conflict has demonstrated how difficult it was
for ASEAN to deal with a regional security problem on a common
policy basis. It also demonstrated the difficulty that ASEAN must
face when it tackles the question of how best to respond to
China's role in the region.

More importantly, the Cambodian conflict revealed the limit of
ASEAN's capacity to play a moral role.

The South China Sea conflict, especially due to the
sensitivity of the issue and the presence of military elements,
will be a more delicate problem than the Cambodian conflict.

There is no guarantee that a quick solution, through the use
of force, would be viewed as a non-option for parties in the
dispute.

In this regard, China is seen as the main party which has the
tendency to move into that direction and use force to assert its
claims in the area.

The incident between China and the Philippines in early 1995,
over the status of the Mischief Reef, sent a clear sign that
Beijing had changed its approach. This suggested that Beijing was
no longer hesitant to make military moves against other
claimants.

Another area of concern for ASEAN is how far the strategy of
bilateral negotiations, currently employed by China, will divide
ASEAN's unity and cohesiveness.

China has repeatedly attempted to negotiate with other
claimants on a bilateral basis. The most recent bilateral talks
were held between China and Vietnam in April 1995. Such
developments, however, could present a new problem for ASEAN.

It is not unlikely that Vietnam, which recently became a
member of ASEAN, might be seen in some circles as already having
a dividing effect on the association. While at the same time
Vietnam may be seen as trying to manipulate its membership for
its own narrow interests vis-a-vis China.

In this regard, it seems that China understands very well the
problem confronting other claimants in the South China Sea
disputes. However, ASEAN claimants are more prepared than China
to accept a multilateral approach to the disputes.

Beijing seems to recognize that there might also be some
wariness among its rivals that such an approach would force them
to grant public recognition over the rights of others in the
area.

Indeed, ASEAN is well aware of such a possibility and it has
taken measures to deal with the problem accordingly, especially
at a multilateral level.

For example, ASEAN has always tried to persuade China to
respect the association-proclaimed codes of conduct -- such as
Zone of Peace, Freedom, and Neutrality (ZOPFAN) and the Treaty of
Amity and Cooperation (TAC) -- as the norms, values, and
principles around which the interests of all parties should
converge.

At the ASEAN Ministerial Meeting (AMM) in August 1995, ASEAN
foreign ministers issued a Declaration on the South China Sea
conflict calling all parties to "refrain from taking actions that
could destabilize the region ..."

More specifically, through Indonesia's informal initiative,
ASEAN has also begun to bring China into a dialog forum which
specifically explores the positive ways to manage the disputes.

Through such efforts, ASEAN clearly hoped to induce a certain
degree of predictability into the behavior of each party.
However, China's attitude and responses toward such ASEAN
initiatives seem to have made ASEAN's role more difficult in its
attempts to make the regional political relations more
predictable.

First, ASEAN has always been frustrated by inconsistency in
China's behavior. Second, China remains reluctant to use
multilateral forums in seeking solutions to the South China Sea
disputes and ignored calls by ASEAN to denounce the use of force
in solving the disputes.

With regard to the Taiwan question, the main problem for ASEAN
stems from growing signs of an independence push among the
Taiwanese leaders and people.

Since the end of the Chiang era in Taiwan, President Lee Teng-
hui -- a native Taiwanese who came to power in 1988 after the
death of president Chiang Ching-kuo -- has shown a tendency to
harbor a new vision for his country.

Tired of being a non-legitimate actor in the international
community, Taiwan opted for a more aggressive foreign policy
commensurate with its tremendous economic achievements and
strength.

Taiwan now pursues a new policy of t'an hsing wai-chiao
(flexible diplomacy) to create a larger diplomatic space for
itself and play a more important international role. Through this
new policy, Taiwan sought international recognition as a
political entity separate from mainland China.

The initial results of Taiwan's new policy in Southeast Asia
have been alarming for Beijing. Since the 1980s and early 1990s,
contacts between ASEAN and Taiwan officials, either at
ministerial or above ministerial levels, have been growing
significantly.

The diplomatic contacts have also been more substantial than
in any previous period. During the 1986/1991 period, for example,
Taiwan's direct investment in five ASEAN countries (not Brunei or
Vietnam) amounted to US$11.7 billion.

In this regard, Beijing resented the fact that Taiwan had been
able to use its economic advantage for extracting political and
diplomatic mileage in this region.

ASEAN would face a difficult problem if Taiwan really declared
itself an independent state separate from mainland China and
demanded recognition from them. This would be ASEAN's worst
nightmare.

There has not been any major discussion among ASEAN members on
how it should respond to such a possibility. The association's
attitude has been to leave any decision about the Taiwan issue to
the parties involved. Moreover, ASEAN continues to see the
problem in terms of the "One China Policy" and the fact that
"Taiwan is part of China".

Given such possibilities, ASEAN's position in the ARF would be
a difficult one. On the one hand, ASEAN clearly expects the ARF
to be a vehicle through which China's positive participation
could be assured.

For ASEAN, China's participation is a paramount priority for
any attempt at building a stable regional order. On the other
hand, the rise of the Taiwan question with its inevitable
implications for ASEAN shows that Taiwan is a significant
security problem which affects the stability of the Asia-Pacific
region.

For example, during Beijing's military intimidation of Taiwan
in early 1996, it was reported that Taiwan urged Indonesia,
Singapore, and the Philippines to provide military cooperation if
there was an outbreak of war (Yomiuri Shimbun as quoted in
Republika, March 12, 1996).

This demonstrates further that the question of Taiwan is not
an issue that ASEAN can easily avoid. Indeed, the Taiwan question
serves as the most visible issue linking the security of
Southeast Asia with that of Northeast Asia.

How, then, can ASEAN-China relations be improved in the
future?

Even though both "China problems" discussed above will become
pressing issues in China-ASEAN relations, it does not mean that
both sides have no positive ground upon which a better and more
constructive relationship can be forged.

Since the end of the Cold War, China's general attitude in
helping to create a stable relations in Asia-Pacific has been
constructive.

China, for example, has been an active and positive
participant in the multilateral dialog process aimed at fostering
political and diplomatic cooperation in the region.

More specifically, China has been an active player in the ARF.
It has also been responsive to the idea of greater military
transparency, even though this remains limited.

The publication of China's "white defense paper" in 1995, for
example, is clearly a promising sign. Even though the content of
the paper was criticized for its lack of transparency, it clearly
demonstrates that China is beginning to feel more comfortable
with the habit of dialog which will become the basis of a
multilateral security arrangement in the region.

There have also been other examples which suggest China's
growing conformity with the regional trend. All in all, ASEAN-
China relations will definitely undergo significant improvement
if the current trend of Confidence-Building Measures (CBMs)
between the two parties continue to evolve.

The problem now is that ASEAN would like to see an
acceleration of change in that direction.

The writer is a researcher at the Center for Strategic and
International Studies, Jakarta.