Chicken as a crisis indicator

Chicken as a crisis indicator

By Hermawan Sulistyo

JAKARTA (JP): The country is still vulnerable to rioting and
social unrest due to the worsening political economy.

Besides political aspects, the deterioration of the economy
since the middle of 1997 has provided conditions conducive to the
occurrence of explosive riots or anarchy.

Other indicators more familiar for political economists,
ranging from a larger pattern of consumption to decreasing
purchasing power, can also be added.

The political economy of the people, therefore, can be used to
measure the vulnerability of society to unrest, anarchy and other
violent social dislocations. This rule can be called "the
political economy of chicken".

In the 1970s, for example, chicken was still regarded as a
luxury food because it was consumed only by middle and upper
class families. In the 1980s, the arrival of the massive modern
poultry industry resulted in much cheaper prices of the meat,
making it affordable for lower class families. But in 1998, when
the economic crisis intensified, many poultry companies went
bankrupt. Before closing down their operations, these companies,
in early 1998, sold their chicken at very low prices. For people
celebrating Idul Fitri or Lebaran festivities after the Muslim
Ramadhan fasting month, cheap chicken was a blessing.

In several places such as East Java, chicken sold at one-third
of its previous price levels. This fact alone temporarily
contributed to calming the political climate in early 1998, and
added to the already subdued political situation since the people
were restraining themselves during the fasting month. But, as it
became clear later, this was a pseudo-calmed political climate.

After Lebaran, which fell in 1998 on the last day of January,
the scarce supply of chicken drove its prices to double and then
triple. With money having been drawn upon for Lebaran, prices of
chicken were now unreachable. With no understanding of what was
behind the price hike, not to mention the price hikes for all
other consumer goods and services as shown by uncontrollable
inflation rates, frustration and dissatisfaction mounted.

Fanned by the increasing political tension, the potential for
a riot was then only a matter of time and logical consequence of
this explosive situation. What happened later was riots and
violent conflicts. Without any understanding of this "political
economy of chicken", it is impossible to assess mass upheavals
throughout the year of 1998. This is not to deny political causes
that in fact played a pivotal contributing role to social
dislocations.

In early 1999, the situation was similar to the previous year.
With most poultry companies already bankrupt, egg production was
very low, forcing the government to import egg. The increasing
demand for chicken meat and egg during Lebaran on Jan. 19 could
not be met by the domestic supply.

By a normal equation of the "political economy of chicken and
egg", the society's resilience was vulnerable immediately after
the Lebaran. With almost no public savings left, one week after
Lebaran was the last bastion of economic resilience. This was
particularly true for certain segments of occupational workers,
small-scale traders and those in the service industry.
Nonagricultural cities and regions were then the most vulnerable
areas for social dislocations, with riots as their most dangerous
type.

Also by a normal standard of the "political economy of chicken
and egg", agriculture-based communities were less vulnerable than
those of nonagricultural areas. There was hitherto only a few
recorded cases of rural or farming unrest. But it was an overly
pseudo-calm situation. Starting from Dec. 1, 1998, the government
stopped its subsidies for domestic sales of fertilizer and costs
for rice planting consequently doubled.

December 1998 was the planting season, so that an increase in
fertilizer price could normally cause peasant unrest. Many, if
not most, rice farmers, however, still held stockpiles of
fertilizer from the previous planting season. Dissatisfaction and
resentment were growing but still under control. Only small-scale
riots broke out here and there -- with the two best known cases
taking place in small towns in Central Java.

April 1999 is the next planting season of rice, after the
harvest season in March. With no increase in the government-set
floor price of rice, it will be hard for rice farmers to earn
profits from their harvest. Social unrest in rural areas and
rice-producing areas can thus be expected to take place after
April.

The potential for riots in rural areas, however, is not the
same as in nonagricultural areas. Different structures of land
ownership, production efficiency and consumption patterns all
contribute to the different levels of societal resilience. Some
areas are more vulnerable to social unrest than others. The
result is a more sporadic pattern of small-scale rioting, unrest,
anarchy and even a "merely" increasing crime rate. In a
longitudinal framework, the rural unrest could continue for
sometime until the next harvest season, which will fall in July.

This analysis of people's political economy might be too
optimistic. Social resilience is in fact not as strong as
expected. A few weeks before Lebaran, riots occurred in several
cities and areas -- like Lhokseumawe in Aceh, as well as
Tangerang and Karawang in West Java, to mention just a few. One
may argue that the riots were incited by provocateurs and thus
the causes and triggering factors were political rather than
anything else.

But without social, political and economic conditions
conducive to the eruption of social dislocation, it would be
impossible to spark a riot. The triggers were, therefore, less
important. They might be political in nature but could also be
only a brawl between kids, like what happened in Kalibata, South
Jakarta, recently. Even in remote areas, far from Jakarta, such
as Ambon in Maluku and North Sulawesi, riots broke out
unexpectedly.

Thus, based on the "political economy of chicken and eggs"
approach, we are facing a grim condition in the near future.
Under this condition, if the coming general election ever fails,
it will be caused more by popular unrest rather than elite
conflicts and fragmentation.

The writer is executive director of the Jakarta-based Research
Institute for Democracy and Peace (RIDeP).