Wed, 24 Mar 2004

Chen's win in Taiwan reflects aspiration for self-determination

Kavi Chongkittavorn, The Nation, Asia News Network, Bangkok

Incumbent President Chen Sui-bian's razor-thin victory on Saturday signals two broad but contradictory trends on the island of 23 million people -- a growing desire for self-determination versus increasing economic dependency on China.

In the coming months, leaders in Beijing and Taipei have to handle this dilemma with utmost finesse. Any misstep would be costly because it could trigger the use of force. But this worst- case scenario could be prevented if both sides across the Taiwan Straits commence the formal dialogue that has eluded them over the past four years.

While the failure of the much-feared national referendum on whether to boost Taiwan's military was an obvious setback for Chen, it could open the door for China to kick off formal talks without losing face. The referendum failed because too few Taiwanese, less than half of those who voted in the election, participated in it. This suggests that deep down the Taiwanese do not want to risk the wrath of China, preferring the business-as- usual climate that only Beijing can guarantee.

The status quo also serves China's immediate national interests as it continues with economic reform and consolidates its international standing and influence.

Despite China's preference for a coalition of the Chinese Nationalist Party and People First Party, the mainland has no choice now but to negotiate with the reigning Democratic Progressive Party. Further delay would be mutually destructive, as the island's nationalism is on a runaway train while calls for the use of force by hard-liners in Beijing will gain momentum.

Facing this tricky situation, diplomats and trade representatives in Taipei are quite ambiguous, if not as divided as the Taiwanese. Those from Western countries have been supportive of Taiwan's democracy, but quite a few of them have been weary of Chen's gung-ho presidency, viewing his national referendum as a provocation and an indirect declaration of independence. Before the ballot, the U.S., France and Russia went on the record to express concerns about the referendum.

They believe that military options could not be ruled out if Chen becomes more adamant about taking the road to independence. After all, Beijing realizes that Taiwan has been drifting away from the mainland, forging its own identity and a vibrant democracy.

Chen plans to introduce constitutional amendments in 2006 along with plenty of policies that would enhance Taiwan's national identity. The longer China waits the more difficult it will be to unite with Taiwan as more islanders start feeling they are Taiwanese rather than Chinese.

When push comes to shove China has several options for waging both psychological and physical war on Taiwan, several Western diplomats here said. Blockades in the Taiwan Straits and the seizure of islands near the mainland are a possible initial option. Then, if Taiwan does not back down from its independence quest, China can tighten the screws by firing missiles at key coastal industrial cities such as Kaohsiung before hitting the main targets such as Taipei.

If that happens, the U.S., bound by the Taiwan Relations Act of 1979, must come to the rescue. According to one high-ranking diplomat, who asked not to be identified, the island's defenses would last only two weeks against a Chinese military offensive. If the Taiwanese forces succumb quickly it would be a fait accompli for China. However, if they can fight for a sustained period, he said, the U.S. would be obliged to assist Taiwan by bringing the war to the mainland.

It is a frightening but realistic scenario -- something that has been discussed widely among military strategists in the U.S. and Europe. Interestingly, random interviews with young Taiwanese revealed that they believe the U.S. will come to the rescue if Chinese missiles hit their island.

Unlike their Western peers, diplomats and trade representatives from Southeast Asia were unanimous in their preference for the Chinese Nationalist Party, or Kuomingtang, which they see as the key to peace and stability in the region. They are happy with the current state of ASEAN-China relations. Treating Taiwan as part of China, it is natural that they do not stress the growing Taiwanese identity and increased democratization.

Chen's return will further weaken the KMT and have long-term implications on the island's political and economic landscape that can affect the ASEAN-China friendship.

A small number of the ASEAN representatives said that ASEAN must now try to bring the China policy in tune with the developments in Taiwan, moving toward a more realistic approach to the One-China principle. For the past three decades, the grouping has been adhering to this principle while continuing to maintain non-political relations -- especially trade, economic and cultural ties -- with the island China regards as a renegade province.

They have warned that ASEAN is losing Taiwanese investment to China, which has increased manifold. Taiwanese investment in Southeast Asia has been decreasing markedly, except in Vietnam, which the Taiwanese policymakers call the second China. Taiwan is now China's biggest investor and 47 percent of its exports go to the mainland.

Facing Chen's aggressive diplomacy and the referendum, China had approached countries in the West and this region to urge them not to support the referendum. By doing so China internationalized an issue that it had insisted was an internal affair.

Earlier this month, the three-day World China Unity Conference was held in Bangkok with the blessing of the Thai Ministry for Foreign Affairs. More than one thousand huaqiao (overseas Chinese) from more than two dozen countries attended the event. They issued a strong resolution denouncing Chen and the referendum.

Like China, ASEAN has to deal with Taiwan under the DPP. Increased uncertainty about China-Taiwan relations is a threat to ASEAN's economy. A military conflict between the two would be disastrous.