Chechnya and Russian polls

Chechnya and Russian polls

When the war in Chechnya had just started in December 1994, I
wrote a letter to The Jakarta Post entitled Legacy of an Empire,
calling on the Russian government to grant Chechnya and other
autonomous republics the right to a confederation status,
including the right to secede. I pointed out that by freeing
these predominantly non-Russian ethnic republics, particularly
such important territories of Tatarstan and Bashkortostan in the
Volga-Ural region, the Russians would be relieved of
approximately 17 million largely alien and often hostile
subjects. I further argued that these autonomous republics should
have the right to withdraw like the union republics of the former
Soviet Union, such as Kazakhstan and Belarus, because the
distinction between the two types of republics was not
fundamental and was in fact was quite arbitrary.

How naive I was. Now, 19 months later, the war in Chechnya in
the northern Caucasus is still dragging on and the autonomy that
has been granted to the various republics is yet to include the
right to a free self-determination or sovereignty. Yet, while
Russia is opposed to the cessation of Chechnya and Tatarstan, it
tacitly or even overtly supported the separatist movements of the
Bosnian Serbs in Bosnia-Herzegovina, the ethnic Russians in
Moldova and the Abkhassians in Georgia. Obviously, Russia's
interference in these instances has been dictated by selfish
interests rather than by any democratic or moral principle.

It seems that as far as the Chechens and the other non-ethnic
Russians are concerned, it will make little difference whether
the runoff -- to be held on July 3, 1996 -- is won by President
Yeltsin or his nationalist-communist rival Gennady Zyuganov. It
is difficult to predict which of the two contenders will win. On
one hand, the fact that Russia is so different from the West in
terms of history, culture and even religion could drive most
Russians to vote for Zyuganov's group in the Duma (parliament's
lower house) election in December 1995. Indeed, he is often
considered to be equally responsible for Russia's political and
economic humiliation at the hand of Western hegemonic ambitions.
On the other hand, the intensive maneuverings and conspiracies
undertaken by the president in the past two weeks or so may
attract a large enough number of votes, which could result in
either candidate winning by a narrow margin. The basic
uncertainty, however, is probably caused by the notoriously
capricious and unpredictable nature of the Russian electorate
themselves.

One thing seems certain, though. Irrespective of who wins the
next election, Russia's foreign policy is likely to be
increasingly more assertive than it has been in recent years,
evoking in the process perceived visions of Russia's glorious
past. Under these circumstances, such issues as the independence
of Chechnya and the other autonomous republics may have to be
relegated to the limbo of history for the time being, unless, of
course, international pressure could be brought to bear to induce
the Russians to relent.

MASLI ARMAN

Jakarta