Chechnya and Russian polls
When the war in Chechnya had just started in December 1994, I wrote a letter to The Jakarta Post entitled Legacy of an Empire, calling on the Russian government to grant Chechnya and other autonomous republics the right to a confederation status, including the right to secede. I pointed out that by freeing these predominantly non-Russian ethnic republics, particularly such important territories of Tatarstan and Bashkortostan in the Volga-Ural region, the Russians would be relieved of approximately 17 million largely alien and often hostile subjects. I further argued that these autonomous republics should have the right to withdraw like the union republics of the former Soviet Union, such as Kazakhstan and Belarus, because the distinction between the two types of republics was not fundamental and was in fact was quite arbitrary.
How naive I was. Now, 19 months later, the war in Chechnya in the northern Caucasus is still dragging on and the autonomy that has been granted to the various republics is yet to include the right to a free self-determination or sovereignty. Yet, while Russia is opposed to the cessation of Chechnya and Tatarstan, it tacitly or even overtly supported the separatist movements of the Bosnian Serbs in Bosnia-Herzegovina, the ethnic Russians in Moldova and the Abkhassians in Georgia. Obviously, Russia's interference in these instances has been dictated by selfish interests rather than by any democratic or moral principle.
It seems that as far as the Chechens and the other non-ethnic Russians are concerned, it will make little difference whether the runoff -- to be held on July 3, 1996 -- is won by President Yeltsin or his nationalist-communist rival Gennady Zyuganov. It is difficult to predict which of the two contenders will win. On one hand, the fact that Russia is so different from the West in terms of history, culture and even religion could drive most Russians to vote for Zyuganov's group in the Duma (parliament's lower house) election in December 1995. Indeed, he is often considered to be equally responsible for Russia's political and economic humiliation at the hand of Western hegemonic ambitions. On the other hand, the intensive maneuverings and conspiracies undertaken by the president in the past two weeks or so may attract a large enough number of votes, which could result in either candidate winning by a narrow margin. The basic uncertainty, however, is probably caused by the notoriously capricious and unpredictable nature of the Russian electorate themselves.
One thing seems certain, though. Irrespective of who wins the next election, Russia's foreign policy is likely to be increasingly more assertive than it has been in recent years, evoking in the process perceived visions of Russia's glorious past. Under these circumstances, such issues as the independence of Chechnya and the other autonomous republics may have to be relegated to the limbo of history for the time being, unless, of course, international pressure could be brought to bear to induce the Russians to relent.
MASLI ARMAN
Jakarta