Chaos threatens June 7 polls

By Hermawan Sulistyo

JAKARTA (JP): The potential for further riots and other social disturbances, complicated by the current cloud of political uncertainty, has made some observers doubt whether the general election, scheduled for June 7, can in fact be held.

The elections are not only threatened by direct political causes, such as party affiliations, but also social turmoil and the aspirations of the people.

So, what implications do the opinions of the often neglected masses have on the elite and palace politics? Or, how will society's stability effect the general election and its immediate consequences?

To answer these questions, the six following scenarios may serve as examples. If society is adequately resilient to chaos, and can maintain order and survive throughout 1999, the most optimistic prediction is for the general election to go ahead with major hiccups. Failing this, however, a number of other scenarios are possible.

In the first scenario, the general election is smoothly organized, with monitoring systems working well. The result will be a democratic structure of power. In this scenario, there will be a relatively balanced sharing of power among competing political parties, with no majority in the House of Representatives.

The four parties expected to get the most votes -- the Indonesian Democratic Party of Struggle (PDI Perjuangan), National Awakening Party (PKB), National Mandate Party (PAN), and Golkar -- share more or less the same portion of support, with no substantial disparity shown in opinion polls. Golkar's future is the most difficult to predict. The party with immense funding and the broadest infrastructure has lately been experiencing turbulent internal conflicts.

With no single party gaining a majority -- a situation similar to the 1955 general election, the fairest in Indonesian history -- the parties must work to make concessions and alliances.

The Armed Forces (ABRI) representatives in the House will take a determining role in shifting the balance of power. ABRI's 38 allocated seats, about 7 percent of the total 550, guarantees this force almost as much power as each of the big four. If ABRI sides with the victor, as in the past, the problem of choosing the next leaders of the country will be simplified.

The new president and vice president could be a logical consequence of an alliance among parties. In political alliances, power sharing is necessary, and thus leaders of big parties such as Megawati Soekarnoputri and Amien Rais, may have the chance to lead the country as a team. Leaving aside improbable alliances such as between, say, PAN and PKB -- although political interests are always changing -- various pairings in the nations leadership are possible. We could have Amien-Megawati, Megawati-Amien, Megawati-Wiranto, or other such combinations.

In the second scenario, the general election will not be held smoothly. It would be marked by violations of election laws, planning flaws, dissatisfaction among parties and voters, and a general lack of democracy. The result would be an ongoing struggle among political parties.

For the presidential election, probably no candidate from any party, or even the army, could collect the minimum necessary votes to seize the presidential office. In such circumstances, and considering the general reluctance to ever admit political defeat, the only compromise is that the candidate "can't be ours", but likewise, "won't be yours".

In this case, someone without any political attachments or affiliations, has more chance of being accepted by all competing parties. Perhaps Nurcholish Madjid will have the chance to be this compromise. Such a candidate could also be someone with less "political flavor", although he or she could be a party person, such as Sri Sultan Hamengkubuwono (Golkar) or Ichlasul Amal (PAN). But a candidate could also be a military man, such as Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono.

The third scenario is that the general election is held but fails to perform as a means of democratic process. The situation could be chaotic, marked by unending conflicts between groups within the elite and the populace.

The best possible solution would be for the government to declare a "quasi state of emergency" and make it clear that the regime is indeed a transitional government. The only thing to do then would be to hold another election. However, there is no guarantee that the next election would proceed any better than the last. This situation would definitely need a strong leader to prevent the country from crumbling.

The fourth scenario is that the general election does not take place as scheduled. The military then takes over the government and runs the state in a junta-type rule. Many pro-democracy activists believe that the possibility of a military take-over is high. One reason for this is the view that the widespread riots and conflict are proof of the inability of a civilian regime to maintain order and stability, and thus gives the military the chance, and the rationale, to step in and take over the government.

For those presaging this scenario, the reported involvement of some military personnel in several riots is clear evidence of the military's intention to create tension and chaos in order to hijack power. But ABRI has repeatedly denied this possibility. In addition, there is little probability that civilian technocrats would support a governing junta. And without civilian technocrats, there is no way the military can overcome the economic crisis. The international community is definitely not in favor of a junta either.

In the fifth scenario, due to various reasons, particularly intensifying social unrest, the general election is delayed. Although the 1999 election is not realized, there is a positive push toward holding a later election when the situation returns to normal. Again, in this situation the military has greater room to maneuver. By taking an active role, a now more consolidated Armed Forces would lead the process toward a consensus on the delayed general election. But this scenario lacks rationale. A delayed election will increase political uncertainty, which in turn will worsen the social and economic condition.

The final scenario sees chaos and anarchy continuing and worsening, with high crime rates and social disruptions. Some observers, including the respected Abdurrahman Wahid (known as Gus Dur) even believe that a revolution is not an impossibility in the near future. However, revolution here seems a faint possibility, for the current situation lacks some common prerequisites: notable are the absence of an ideology and avant garde leaders and supporters. But this does not rule out a future revolution altogether.

Whichever scenario is closest to reality, one thing is clear, that societal forces will have a pivotal role in directing the course of political events. Yet unfortunately, this factor is often neglected and ignored by most politicians and members of the elite in their power play; it is regarded as a constant in the power equation. Only when riots break out will many politicians question the seemingly inexplicable factors beyond their palace politics.

Dr. Hermawan Sulistyo is executive director of Research Institute for Democracy and Peace (RIDeP).