Chaos threatens June 7 polls

Chaos threatens June 7 polls

By Hermawan Sulistyo

JAKARTA (JP): The potential for further riots and other social
disturbances, complicated by the current cloud of political
uncertainty, has made some observers doubt whether the general
election, scheduled for June 7, can in fact be held.

The elections are not only threatened by direct political
causes, such as party affiliations, but also social turmoil and
the aspirations of the people.

So, what implications do the opinions of the often neglected
masses have on the elite and palace politics? Or, how will
society's stability effect the general election and its immediate
consequences?

To answer these questions, the six following scenarios may
serve as examples. If society is adequately resilient to chaos,
and can maintain order and survive throughout 1999, the most
optimistic prediction is for the general election to go ahead
with major hiccups. Failing this, however, a number of other
scenarios are possible.

In the first scenario, the general election is smoothly
organized, with monitoring systems working well. The result will
be a democratic structure of power. In this scenario, there will
be a relatively balanced sharing of power among competing
political parties, with no majority in the House of
Representatives.

The four parties expected to get the most votes -- the
Indonesian Democratic Party of Struggle (PDI Perjuangan),
National Awakening Party (PKB), National Mandate Party (PAN), and
Golkar -- share more or less the same portion of support, with no
substantial disparity shown in opinion polls. Golkar's future is
the most difficult to predict. The party with immense funding and
the broadest infrastructure has lately been experiencing
turbulent internal conflicts.

With no single party gaining a majority -- a situation similar
to the 1955 general election, the fairest in Indonesian history
-- the parties must work to make concessions and alliances.

The Armed Forces (ABRI) representatives in the House will take
a determining role in shifting the balance of power. ABRI's 38
allocated seats, about 7 percent of the total 550, guarantees
this force almost as much power as each of the big four. If ABRI
sides with the victor, as in the past, the problem of choosing
the next leaders of the country will be simplified.

The new president and vice president could be a logical
consequence of an alliance among parties. In political alliances,
power sharing is necessary, and thus leaders of big parties such
as Megawati Soekarnoputri and Amien Rais, may have the chance to
lead the country as a team. Leaving aside improbable alliances
such as between, say, PAN and PKB -- although political interests
are always changing -- various pairings in the nations leadership
are possible. We could have Amien-Megawati, Megawati-Amien,
Megawati-Wiranto, or other such combinations.

In the second scenario, the general election will not be held
smoothly. It would be marked by violations of election laws,
planning flaws, dissatisfaction among parties and voters, and a
general lack of democracy. The result would be an ongoing
struggle among political parties.

For the presidential election, probably no candidate from any
party, or even the army, could collect the minimum necessary
votes to seize the presidential office. In such circumstances,
and considering the general reluctance to ever admit political
defeat, the only compromise is that the candidate "can't be
ours", but likewise, "won't be yours".

In this case, someone without any political attachments or
affiliations, has more chance of being accepted by all competing
parties. Perhaps Nurcholish Madjid will have the chance to be
this compromise. Such a candidate could also be someone with less
"political flavor", although he or she could be a party person,
such as Sri Sultan Hamengkubuwono (Golkar) or Ichlasul Amal
(PAN). But a candidate could also be a military man, such as
Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono.

The third scenario is that the general election is held but
fails to perform as a means of democratic process. The situation
could be chaotic, marked by unending conflicts between groups
within the elite and the populace.

The best possible solution would be for the government to
declare a "quasi state of emergency" and make it clear that the
regime is indeed a transitional government. The only thing to do
then would be to hold another election. However, there is no
guarantee that the next election would proceed any better than
the last. This situation would definitely need a strong leader to
prevent the country from crumbling.

The fourth scenario is that the general election does not take
place as scheduled. The military then takes over the government
and runs the state in a junta-type rule. Many pro-democracy
activists believe that the possibility of a military take-over is
high. One reason for this is the view that the widespread riots
and conflict are proof of the inability of a civilian regime to
maintain order and stability, and thus gives the military the
chance, and the rationale, to step in and take over the
government.

For those presaging this scenario, the reported involvement of
some military personnel in several riots is clear evidence of the
military's intention to create tension and chaos in order to
hijack power. But ABRI has repeatedly denied this possibility. In
addition, there is little probability that civilian technocrats
would support a governing junta. And without civilian
technocrats, there is no way the military can overcome the
economic crisis. The international community is definitely not in
favor of a junta either.

In the fifth scenario, due to various reasons, particularly
intensifying social unrest, the general election is delayed.
Although the 1999 election is not realized, there is a positive
push toward holding a later election when the situation returns
to normal. Again, in this situation the military has greater room
to maneuver. By taking an active role, a now more consolidated
Armed Forces would lead the process toward a consensus on the
delayed general election. But this scenario lacks rationale. A
delayed election will increase political uncertainty, which in
turn will worsen the social and economic condition.

The final scenario sees chaos and anarchy continuing and
worsening, with high crime rates and social disruptions. Some
observers, including the respected Abdurrahman Wahid (known as
Gus Dur) even believe that a revolution is not an impossibility
in the near future. However, revolution here seems a faint
possibility, for the current situation lacks some common
prerequisites: notable are the absence of an ideology and avant
garde leaders and supporters. But this does not rule out a future
revolution altogether.

Whichever scenario is closest to reality, one thing is clear,
that societal forces will have a pivotal role in directing the
course of political events. Yet unfortunately, this factor is
often neglected and ignored by most politicians and members of
the elite in their power play; it is regarded as a constant in
the power equation. Only when riots break out will many
politicians question the seemingly inexplicable factors beyond
their palace politics.

Dr. Hermawan Sulistyo is executive director of Research
Institute for Democracy and Peace (RIDeP).