Chaos comes of leaders' failure

Chaos comes of leaders' failure

By Christopher Lingle

DENPASAR, Bali (JP): Images of bloody street confrontations in
Indonesia provide an unavoidable impression that the country may
be slipping into chaos. With the removal of the strong hand of
President Soeharto at the helm, there are several interpretations
of why the country moved so quickly from order to disorder.

It could be claimed that it is simply a matter of the strains
of the economic crises that has led to these outbreaks. Yet
healthy democracies seldom see the breakdown in law and order
that is being threatened.

A reversal of cause and effect might provide a better under
standing of Indonesia's unhappy experiences. This alternative
view suggests that the institutions of Asian democracy and
policies justified by Asian values have retarded the transition
to more modern systems of governance. Decades of autocratic or
authoritarian rule under the guise of democracy have kept Asians
from participating in self-determination. Distrust of the legal
and judicial systems as well as finding their voices at the
ballot box to be ineffective have made manning street barricades
seem a logical step. Unfortunately, safety valves like organiza
tions of civil society that monitor or limit government power
tended to be systematically aborted or allowed to survive only if
they serve the ends of the regimes.

Either through action or deed, it is clear that many leaders
in the region believe that their citizens are not suited to the
rough and tumble uncertainty of democracy. These same Asian lead
ers have promoted Asian values or insisted on the viability of a
regional variant of Asian democracy. Reflecting a mixture of
paternalism and cynicism, this racially derisive view portrayed
Asians as incapable or unworthy of being involved in decisions
that affected their destinies. Happily these views have
themselves became a casualty of the economic crises affecting the
region since most supporters have become silent in the wake of
the ongoing turmoil.

Asian values and Asian democracy were predicated upon several
dubious premises. Both relied upon an assertion that Asians
possessed an unshakeable preference for order that justified
limiting their freedoms. In turn, the individual was subordinated
to the community and individual rights were seen as foreign
intrusions. It is no accident that this interpretation
conveniently supported the sort of autocratic, single-party
states and long-serving rulers that have dominated East Asian
politics.

Several myths were promoted about life and business in
Indonesia and much of the rest of East Asia were supported by
these political conditions. First, many believed that (at least a
little bit of) authoritarianism was beneficial in promoting
economic growth. A corollary was the most important determinant
of success in business or life was having the right political
connections. These deceptions had resonance when times were good
and economies were booming. In the long run, the stark reality is
that authoritarian government are unstable and political
connections provide no protections when speculative bubbles burst
or when export markets evaporate.

Then there was a belief that political rights were less
important to Asians than were economic conditions. This notion
was based upon a false dichotomy of economic and political free
dom. These rights are mutually supportive. Restraints on one will
impact upon the other. In all events, the retreat from politics
arose from the understanding that the costs of being involved in
opposition parties were high and painful while the benefits were
low. Now as economic uncertainty grows, it becomes rational to
express disfavor with the political status quo since the losses
are reduced.

Current instability in Asia is due to the lack of extensive
democracy. This will be a problem that will plague more regimes
in the future. There are several missing components in so-called
Asian democracy. In the first instance, suppression of opposition
parties has deprived most Asians of the sort of experience in
multiparty democracy. Without this, it is almost impossible to
develop a sense of political maturity and self-confidence.

Similarly, there are few active elements of what is known as
civil society. These are often spontaneous and voluntary group
ings that emerge to moderate the arbitrary exercise of power.
Asian democracy was about politicizing most elements of life that
led to high costs of standing up to the abuses of powerful
individuals or governments.

Another problem is that given the long tenure of specific
leaders or the dominance of a single party, it is not surprising
that the judicial systems are not fully independent. Instead of
the rule of law in many Asian countries the law was bent to serve
the purposes of a dominant leader or party.

Yet the struggle in Asia also reflects an inevitable and
universal process where the primacy of the collective over the
individual is increasingly seen as obstructive to progress. The
history of the evolution of social and political institutions of
mankind suggests a trend towards arrangements that assign a
greater role to the individual as the basis of community values
and a force for positive change.

In other words, moving from feudalism towards self-ownership
is a universal phenomenon. From a macro point of view, this is
seen in the widespread acceptance of democracy. Supporting the
micro basis is the development and implementation of individual
rights, including property rights to insure the compatibility
with pricing market structures. In the future, successful
communities will be those that facilitate rather than obstruct
this movement towards a greater role for the individual.

The transition process that has begun in Indonesia and
elsewhere reflects a fundamental shift arising from the conflict
between universal forces of modernization and embedded conserva
tism. However, it does not support the widely discussed images of
hidden hands and shadowy conspiracies that are seen as being
behind the violence. It is simpler than that. In sum, unrest and
political instability in Asia is not so much driven by economic
collapse as it is by leadership failure.

The writer is a Hong Kong-based independent corporate
consultant and adjunct scholar of the Center for Independent
Studies in Sydney who authored The Rise and Decline of the Asian
Century (Seattle: The University of Washington Press, 1998). His
E-mail address is: CRL@po.cwru.edu.