Chan's 'win-win strategy' succeeds

Chan's 'win-win strategy' succeeds

By Ikrar Nusa Bhakti

JAKARTA (JP): The first stage of Papua New Guinea's political
drama was over on March 26, 1997, when Prime Minister Sir Julius
Chan temporarily resigned after he survived in the motion of no
confidence in parliament the day before.

In line with the horse-trading politics between Chan (People's
Progress Party) and Sir Michael Somare (Pangu Party), the cabinet
chose John Giheno from Pangu Pati (Papua and New Guinea Union
Party) as the acting Prime Minister.

Chan did not want to resign under military pressure. To do so
would signal the end of parliamentary democracy in PNG. The
opposition parties were also reluctant to topple Chan. For them,
complying with the wishes of the military would have meant
political suicide.

Chan's resignation after he survived a parliamentary motion of
censure against him was part of his "win and win strategy". It
reveals a brilliant ability to manage conflict between the
government, opposition and military.

He wanted to resolve conflict between the Rascals gang and
every day Papua New Guineans and to restore order to PNG's polity
and the National Capital District (NCD).

In other words, Chan had wanted to maintain civilian
government control over the military and to stabilize the
situation before it got out of hand.

His decision was timely as the climate was ripe for a
military-backed coup, following the political instability and
constant economic crises from 1994.

In an effort to stem civilian-military tensions, Chan had
promised Major Walter Enuma, a friend and follower of the deposed
chief of PNG Defense Forces Brig. Gen. Jerry Singirok, that he
had forgiven Singirok and his loyalists.

The central issue in the civilian-military relationship in
contemporary PNG is the question of how to deal with the
secessionist movement in the copper and gold rich island of
Bougainville.

In 1964 Conzinc Riotinto of Australia (CRA) began exploring
for copper on Bougainville. The Panguna copper mine began
production in 1972, rapidly becoming an large mine by world
standards in terms of both production and size. Since 1972,
Bougainville Copper Limited, (BCL) two-thirds owned by Conzinc
Riotinto of Australia (CRA) and one-third by Broken Hill
Proprietary Ltd (BHP), has contributed about 16 percent of PNG's
internally generated income and 44 percent of its export revenue.

Of income generated by the mine between 1978 and 1987, about
60 percent went to the national government, 35 percent in foreign
shareholders; and 0.2 percent to local landowners.

In the 1980s, the PNG government came under strong pressure
from an improved share of the profits from both the provincial
government, and from Bougainville representatives in the national
parliaments.

In 1988, after a period of discontent, the Panguna Landowners'
Association finally called on BCL to surrender half of total
profits gained since the founding of the mine, and 10 billion
Kina (US$10) for long-term environmental damage.

Dissatisfied with BCL's response, villagers rebelled. In
November 1988, militant landowners under the leadership of
Francis Ona bombed nine installations, closing the mine for
several days, and eventually forced the mine to close on May 16,
1989.

These rebellions continued, particularly after Francis Ona and
Sam Kaouna established the Bougainville Revolutionary Army (BRA).

There have been a few large scale military operations in
Bougainville in 1989, such as "operation blueprint", "operation
footloose" and many smaller ones.

However, the Papua New Guinea Defense Force (PNGDF) which
consists of 3,700 military personnel, divided into the army, navy
and air force, plus members of the police have been unsuccessful
in defeating the BRA, which consists of about 1,000 militia
fighters and only 200 with modern weaponry.

The clash between PNG's defense forces and BRA can be regarded
as a tribal war between a modern army and scantily equipped
guerrillas who continue to use bows and arrows.

The PNG government has staged more than 12 sessions of dialog
since 1989 in an attempt to conclude the rebellion in
Bougainville. This has included broad-ranging talks with
delegation from Bougainville in 1990 aboard the New Zealand ship,
Endeavor.

The talks were undertaken only two months after Francis Ona
had proclaimed independence of Bougainville from PNG on May 17,
1990 installing himself as president.

War and diplomacy have so far been ineffective in handling the
crises in Bougainville. This led Chan to look to Sandline
International's mercenaries in January 1997. This step led to a
dispute between the government and the military under Brig. Gen.
Jerry Singirok, preceding riots and demonstrations.

The failure of military operations in Bougainville has been
caused by several factors. Firstly, PNG's defense forces found
themselves undermanned, undertrained, underpaid and outflanked in
it the offensive against the secessionist movement in
Bougainville.

The defense forces have only 3,700 military personnel, divided
into Army, Navy and Air Forces, scattered in military barracks in
Port Moresby, Wewak, Manus, Kiunga, Vanimo, Kieta and Alotau.

Although the PNG military have been trained in Australia since
1991, the results have still been unsatisfactory. Some have also
been trained in the U.S. and a few of them in the Indonesia.

The defense forces have also been underequipped. There are
few armed vessels. There are no jet fighters or armed
helicopters. This armory is just inadequate to support military
operations in Bougainville.

Secondly, military operations have also been hindered by
extensive intervention from the PNG politicians, particularly
those from South Bougainville. It has reduced the army's
fighting moral and caused extensive military frustration with
civilian government.

Many in the military believe that civilian politicians pay
insufficient attention to them and their families. The army has
lost about 200 soldiers since the Bougainville rebellion erupted
in 1988.

Thirdly, there has been a lack of cooperation and even open
rivalry between the army and the police force.

Fourthly, the BRA has been supported by local and national
politicians and the people of the Buka and Bougainville islands.
The PNG military has basically been outflanked in their
Bougainville operations.

Successful defeat of the Bougainville rebellion will depend on
cooperation between civilian government, the military, and the
police force.

Chan was probably wrong when he chose to use mercenaries to
put down the rebellion. However, this decision was recommended by
Australian military advisers stationed in Port Moresby. Chan
failed to discuss the Sandline contract with Cabinet or
Parliament as secrecy was necessary to avoid BRA's knowledge of
the plans and criticism from the opposition.

However, the Australian media let the cat out of the bag just
before mercenaries arrived in PNG, sparking a political crises.
This is similar to former Australian prime minister Paul
Keating's tactics with the Australia-Indonesia security agreement
with President Soeharto. Keating kept knowledge of the
discussions secret for 18 months before informing other members
of the cabinet and public.

The Australian government should bear partial responsibility
for the Bougainville crises, but it has stuck to the principle
that it is an internal matter for PNG.

Is it appropriate for the Australian government to act as
mediator considering its involvement in the dispute ? Besides
the Bougainville copper mine, Australian companies have invested
widely in the mineral resources sector, copper, gold, silver, oil
and gas based operations.

Australia has a responsibility to strengthen the PNGDF by
providing more effective military training and more military
equipment. It is also in Australia's interests to help PNG to
maintain stability and national unity.

The two countries have been tied up with the 1986 Joint
Declaration of Principles part which of its is an obligation of
one party to help another in a crisis.

Otherwise, PNGDF will always be ineffective in forcing BRA to
participate in political dialogs with the PNG politicians.
Furthermore Australia will be isolated from regional security
problems in the South Pacific.

The writer is a researcher at the Center for Political and
Regional Studies, Indonesian Institute of Sciences, Jakarta.