Chan's 'win-win strategy' succeeds

By Ikrar Nusa Bhakti

JAKARTA (JP): The first stage of Papua New Guinea's political drama was over on March 26, 1997, when Prime Minister Sir Julius Chan temporarily resigned after he survived in the motion of no confidence in parliament the day before.

In line with the horse-trading politics between Chan (People's Progress Party) and Sir Michael Somare (Pangu Party), the cabinet chose John Giheno from Pangu Pati (Papua and New Guinea Union Party) as the acting Prime Minister.

Chan did not want to resign under military pressure. To do so would signal the end of parliamentary democracy in PNG. The opposition parties were also reluctant to topple Chan. For them, complying with the wishes of the military would have meant political suicide.

Chan's resignation after he survived a parliamentary motion of censure against him was part of his "win and win strategy". It reveals a brilliant ability to manage conflict between the government, opposition and military.

He wanted to resolve conflict between the Rascals gang and every day Papua New Guineans and to restore order to PNG's polity and the National Capital District (NCD).

In other words, Chan had wanted to maintain civilian government control over the military and to stabilize the situation before it got out of hand.

His decision was timely as the climate was ripe for a military-backed coup, following the political instability and constant economic crises from 1994.

In an effort to stem civilian-military tensions, Chan had promised Major Walter Enuma, a friend and follower of the deposed chief of PNG Defense Forces Brig. Gen. Jerry Singirok, that he had forgiven Singirok and his loyalists.

The central issue in the civilian-military relationship in contemporary PNG is the question of how to deal with the secessionist movement in the copper and gold rich island of Bougainville.

In 1964 Conzinc Riotinto of Australia (CRA) began exploring for copper on Bougainville. The Panguna copper mine began production in 1972, rapidly becoming an large mine by world standards in terms of both production and size. Since 1972, Bougainville Copper Limited, (BCL) two-thirds owned by Conzinc Riotinto of Australia (CRA) and one-third by Broken Hill Proprietary Ltd (BHP), has contributed about 16 percent of PNG's internally generated income and 44 percent of its export revenue.

Of income generated by the mine between 1978 and 1987, about 60 percent went to the national government, 35 percent in foreign shareholders; and 0.2 percent to local landowners.

In the 1980s, the PNG government came under strong pressure from an improved share of the profits from both the provincial government, and from Bougainville representatives in the national parliaments.

In 1988, after a period of discontent, the Panguna Landowners' Association finally called on BCL to surrender half of total profits gained since the founding of the mine, and 10 billion Kina (US$10) for long-term environmental damage.

Dissatisfied with BCL's response, villagers rebelled. In November 1988, militant landowners under the leadership of Francis Ona bombed nine installations, closing the mine for several days, and eventually forced the mine to close on May 16, 1989.

These rebellions continued, particularly after Francis Ona and Sam Kaouna established the Bougainville Revolutionary Army (BRA).

There have been a few large scale military operations in Bougainville in 1989, such as "operation blueprint", "operation footloose" and many smaller ones.

However, the Papua New Guinea Defense Force (PNGDF) which consists of 3,700 military personnel, divided into the army, navy and air force, plus members of the police have been unsuccessful in defeating the BRA, which consists of about 1,000 militia fighters and only 200 with modern weaponry.

The clash between PNG's defense forces and BRA can be regarded as a tribal war between a modern army and scantily equipped guerrillas who continue to use bows and arrows.

The PNG government has staged more than 12 sessions of dialog since 1989 in an attempt to conclude the rebellion in Bougainville. This has included broad-ranging talks with delegation from Bougainville in 1990 aboard the New Zealand ship, Endeavor.

The talks were undertaken only two months after Francis Ona had proclaimed independence of Bougainville from PNG on May 17, 1990 installing himself as president.

War and diplomacy have so far been ineffective in handling the crises in Bougainville. This led Chan to look to Sandline International's mercenaries in January 1997. This step led to a dispute between the government and the military under Brig. Gen. Jerry Singirok, preceding riots and demonstrations.

The failure of military operations in Bougainville has been caused by several factors. Firstly, PNG's defense forces found themselves undermanned, undertrained, underpaid and outflanked in it the offensive against the secessionist movement in Bougainville.

The defense forces have only 3,700 military personnel, divided into Army, Navy and Air Forces, scattered in military barracks in Port Moresby, Wewak, Manus, Kiunga, Vanimo, Kieta and Alotau.

Although the PNG military have been trained in Australia since 1991, the results have still been unsatisfactory. Some have also been trained in the U.S. and a few of them in the Indonesia.

The defense forces have also been underequipped. There are few armed vessels. There are no jet fighters or armed helicopters. This armory is just inadequate to support military operations in Bougainville.

Secondly, military operations have also been hindered by extensive intervention from the PNG politicians, particularly those from South Bougainville. It has reduced the army's fighting moral and caused extensive military frustration with civilian government.

Many in the military believe that civilian politicians pay insufficient attention to them and their families. The army has lost about 200 soldiers since the Bougainville rebellion erupted in 1988.

Thirdly, there has been a lack of cooperation and even open rivalry between the army and the police force.

Fourthly, the BRA has been supported by local and national politicians and the people of the Buka and Bougainville islands. The PNG military has basically been outflanked in their Bougainville operations.

Successful defeat of the Bougainville rebellion will depend on cooperation between civilian government, the military, and the police force.

Chan was probably wrong when he chose to use mercenaries to put down the rebellion. However, this decision was recommended by Australian military advisers stationed in Port Moresby. Chan failed to discuss the Sandline contract with Cabinet or Parliament as secrecy was necessary to avoid BRA's knowledge of the plans and criticism from the opposition.

However, the Australian media let the cat out of the bag just before mercenaries arrived in PNG, sparking a political crises. This is similar to former Australian prime minister Paul Keating's tactics with the Australia-Indonesia security agreement with President Soeharto. Keating kept knowledge of the discussions secret for 18 months before informing other members of the cabinet and public.

The Australian government should bear partial responsibility for the Bougainville crises, but it has stuck to the principle that it is an internal matter for PNG.

Is it appropriate for the Australian government to act as mediator considering its involvement in the dispute ? Besides the Bougainville copper mine, Australian companies have invested widely in the mineral resources sector, copper, gold, silver, oil and gas based operations.

Australia has a responsibility to strengthen the PNGDF by providing more effective military training and more military equipment. It is also in Australia's interests to help PNG to maintain stability and national unity.

The two countries have been tied up with the 1986 Joint Declaration of Principles part which of its is an obligation of one party to help another in a crisis.

Otherwise, PNGDF will always be ineffective in forcing BRA to participate in political dialogs with the PNG politicians. Furthermore Australia will be isolated from regional security problems in the South Pacific.

The writer is a researcher at the Center for Political and Regional Studies, Indonesian Institute of Sciences, Jakarta.