Changing electoral behavior

Changing electoral behavior

Anton Doni

In 1955 and thereafter, political scientists believed that
Indonesians' political choices were bound solely by ideological
ties. One's choice was limited to alternatives within his/her
ideology: either nationalist, modern Muslim or traditional
Muslim. For Indonesians, a shift to another ideology is quite
difficult. If you were a modern Muslim, you tended to choose the
Masyumi party. If you had a secular or nationalist orientation,
you chose the Indonesian Nationalist Party (PNI), and if you were
more of a traditional Muslim you chose the Nadhlatul Ulama (NU).

Starting in the late 1960s, the New Order regime abandoned
those old choices, and manufactured new parties for the people to
choose from, requiring them to desert their previous affiliation.
The old symbols of culture-associated parties were suppressed.
Some were exchanged for new ones but without the influential
figures.

While some believed that suppression under the New Order had
eradicated all the old loyalties, many others believed they were
sustained. Especially in the 1999 election, many believed that
ideological voters were still significant. This belief, to some
extent, will therefore hinder real democratic choices in the 2004
election. But what precisely was the magnitude of the loyalty
factor in the 1999 election?

At a glance, the ideological attachments seemed significant if
we look at the pattern of electoral behavior in some selected
provinces: Central Java, East Java, Bali and Bangka Belitung in
Sumatra. In Central Java, Bali and Bangka Belitung, the
Indonesian Nationalist Party (PNI) won in the 1955 election and
the Indonesian Democratic Party of Struggle (PDI-P), a sort of
revived form of the PNI, won in 1999. In East Java, NU won in the
1955 election and the National Awakening Party (PKB), the revived
form of the NU, took the most votes in East Java in the 1999
election. Without considering that these two winning parties in
1999 were similarly aligned with the reformasi movement in their
campaigns, the distribution of political choices would confirm
the perception that ideological commitments are still key
determinants in voting behavior.

But, are ideological connections the only motivation for
Indonesian voters?

First, this does appear to be the case in relation to the
"choosing PDI-P" behavior, but there must be some other issues
aside from the ideological loyalties. The fact that PDI-P was not
the only choice for those with a nostalgia for PNI, simply
confirms this possibility. In a significant number of provinces
that went to Masyumi in the 1955 election, PDI-P was the choice
in 1999. Choosing PDI-P in those regions thus seems to prove that
ideological attachments are not the only determinant. Something
must have been different. Their number, 11 provinces, is quite
significant. The provinces; North Sumatra, South Sumatra,
Lampung, Bengkulu, Riau, Jakarta, West Java, as well as East and
Central Kalimantan all voted for PDI-P in 1999, but Masyumi took
the most votes in 1955 from each.

Second, with such a history of ideological ties, there is no
single pattern of voting behavior. Another aspect, in which
pragmatic considerations were the dominant issues that guided the
voting behavior was also shown by the Indonesian electorate.
Taking into account the economic and political context of the
1999 election, those ideas must be in relation to the economic
and political crisis, bringing to the front the need for economic
improvement, clean government and more freedom.

Third, rising pragmatic ideas were also confirmed in the fact
that Golkar, the party blamed by the reform movement but a
powerful and pragmatic political entity, was still the most
influential party in 15 provinces: All five provinces in
Sulawesi, East and West Nusa Tenggara, Papua and West Irian Jaya
provinces, North Maluku, West and South Kalimantan, West Sumatra,
Riau and Jambi. Thanks to the limited access to reform voices
from the student movement in Java, such pragmatic ideas as
freedom and clean government were indeed not the main issue for
voters in those regions. However, the development achievements
under the New Order was what Golkar could exploit as its selling
point to garner votes. Development was, of course at a price, but
it is a fact that past ideological attachments have a limit to
their influence in these regions.

So how about the 2004 election? Different directions have been
indicated in various surveys, with some opinions pointing to a
pragmatic choice and others saying voters will vote along
ideological lines. However, if it goes the way of ideology, it
would simply be because the current government has been unable to
address their existing pragmatic needs. Thus, it is a
fundamentally a pragmatic way of searching for alternatives in
this environment of poor alternatives.

If, as it seems from the 1999 results, a more pragmatic
electorate voted as a product of a massive political stimuli by
the reform movement and systematic political manipulation by the
New Order, then the challenge in this current absence of
nationwide stimuli will be for a more advanced transformation of
the fertile soil of democracy and development to be reinforced in
this coming 2004 election through various efforts of political
education.