Challenges to RI foreign policy

Challenges to RI foreign policy

By Ali Alatas

This is the second of two articles based on a presentation by
the former minister of foreign affairs at the Aksara Foundation,
which focuses on the development of an interactive civil society.
The function was held on March 23.

JAKARTA: The Non-Aligned Movement and other developing
countries, including Indonesia, do acknowledge the basic right
and responsibility of the United Nations to help relieve human
suffering.

However, there is great sensitivity and concern regarding the
notion of circumscribing the principle of state sovereignty as
implied in humanitarian intervention.

For as succinctly stated by Algeria's president before last
year's UN General Assembly session: "Sovereignty is our last
defense against the rules of an unequal world".

Furthermore, most developing countries are acutely conscious
of the fact that they have practically no say in the decision-
making processes of the UN Security Council nor in the
surveillance of their implementation.

Some have also argued that to accord legitimacy to a new,
global doctrine of humanitarian intervention could have grave
destabilizing consequences for a state. Incidents and crises
could be "created" or precipitated by elements within societies
to seek international attention or provoke foreign interference.

External forces could initiate or exploit such internal
situations for their own, political ends. Moreover, those
committing humanitarian intervention will inevitably be from the
advanced countries of the North and those intervened upon will be
countries of the South, thus creating yet another dimension of
North-South contention and possible allegations of
neocolonialism.

Hence, Indonesia and other Non-Aligned Movement countries are
of the view that the fundamental questions posed by this evolving
international norm in favor of intervention need first to be
thoroughly discussed by the international community.

We would then arrive at consensus on the principles and
criteria, the mandate and guidelines for such intervention, as
well as on the specific circumstances and conditions under which
humanitarian intervention could take place.

In this effort, Indonesia and Indonesian diplomacy will
undoubtedly be expected to play an active role.

These are two fundamental trends in contemporary international
relations which I believe will test the validity and efficacy of
Indonesian diplomacy in the immediate years ahead.

Of course, there are and will be other challenges to the
conduct of our foreign policy in the global arena, e.g. how to
contribute effectively in ensuring the equitable reform and
democratization of the UN and especially of its Security Council;
plus how to maintain our active advocacy and role in disarmament
and in international and regional security issues, etc.

Unfortunately, the available time does not allow us to go
deeper into these aspects. However, I think you will agree with
me that success or failure in meeting the above global challenges
will largely depend on how we manage and overcome the more
specific, national challenges confronting Indonesia today.

Firstly, there is the enormous challenge of economic recovery
and restructuring after the devastating crisis of 1997.

Contrary to other disaster-struck countries like Thailand and
South Korea, the magnitude and complexity of our efforts at
restructuring and rebuilding the banking and corporate sectors
and resuscitating exports and foreign investment flows are
further exacerbated.

Indonesia simultaneously will have to continue efforts of
democratization, good governance, decentralization and regional
autonomy, while also trying to redefine the civilian-military
relationship.

The specific challenge posed to Indonesian foreign policy is
therefore to be able to exert an external diplomacy geared toward
optimizing cooperation and support, material as well as
political, from friendly countries and international
organizations, for the success of our financial/economic recovery
programs and our national development goals -- of course while
always steadfastly abiding by our basic principles of foreign
policy.

In other words, and as foreign minister Alwi Shihab has
stated, economic diplomacy will be the priority task.

We have done so before, in the 1960s and early 1970s, when we
were recovering from the 1965 disaster. And like before, it is
clear that to attain this priority, objective peace and
stability, not only domestically but also in the regional and
international context, are absolutely essential.

Thus, Indonesia's foreign policy has the parallel task to also
secure a regional and international environment of relative peace
and stability, an environment of cooperation and mutual goodwill,
without which national development and economic recovery will be
very difficult to achieve.

It is then quite natural that we focus our attention in the
first place to the countries in our immediate surroundings: East
and Southeast Asia.

And that explains why Indonesia has accorded and must continue
to accord high priority to its relations in the context of the
Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), the ASEAN
Regional Forum, the Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation forum, etc.

But in the global context, Indonesia's foreign policy will
also be called upon to continue striving toward the building of a
new world order of true independence, lasting peace, social
justice and equitable prosperity.

This will have to be done by nurturing friendship and
cooperation with all nations, irrespective of differences in
political and social systems, and based on the principles of
sovereign equality, territorial integrity, mutual benefit,
noninterference and peaceful coexistence.

Secondly, there is the challenge to safeguard the nation's
unity and territorial integrity. Feelings of resentment and
alienation and even tendencies toward separatism among people in
such restive provinces as Aceh and Irian Jaya undeniably
constitute a serious threat to national cohesion and integrity.

And this threat can only be overcome by the manner and degree
of success in which the government can fashion a political
solution to these problems. Nonetheless, the specific challenge
to Indonesian diplomacy will be, through heightened vigilance and
enhanced surveillance capacity, to prevent external intervention
in whatever form to further aggravate the situation.

Indonesia's diplomacy is also being directed toward preempting
any possible support from foreign quarters to separatist
movements in the country.

Thirdly, there is the challenge of restoring and maintaining
political stability and social order, without which neither
economic recovery nor democratization is possible.

As long as ethnic and religious strife persists, public safety
and order remain tenuous and anarchy threatens to overwhelm
democracy and the rule of law, there can be no confidence in
Indonesia among foreign investors and trading partners.

It should therefore be realized that even the most
sophisticated diplomacy will not be able to gloss over the facts
or to paint an image contradicting the realities on the ground.

So it is of vital importance, for Indonesia itself but equally
for the region as a whole, that the government and people are
able to respond effectively and successfully to these challenges.

Fourthly, there is the continuing challenge of how to deal
with the East Timor question. Although East Timor, as an issue of
contention or conflict is no more there, our ongoing discussions
and negotiations with the United Nations and UNTAET, as East
Timor's transitional administration, on such issues as the
disposition of remaining assets, Indonesia's withdrawal from the
Timor Gap treaty (where Australia, of course, is the other
interested party) will demand the continuing attention of our
Ministry of Foreign Affairs and other agencies.

It is inter alia for these purposes that recently President
Abdurrahman Wahid officially opened the Indonesian interests
office in Dili.

Also, the manner in which Indonesia will be handling the
adjudication of the alleged human rights violations in East
Timor, and the eventual verdicts reached by whatever national
tribunal that may be set up, will determine whether the UN
Security Council will continue to be seized with the question or
whether it can finally be put to rest.

Finally, the nurturing of mutually advantageous ties between
Indonesia and a prospective independent Timor Lorosae, and the
triangle relationship encompassing Australia as well, will no
doubt constitute a continuing challenge to Indonesian foreign
policy for many years to come.