Challenge of political Islam to Megawati

Challenge of political Islam to Megawati

Azyumardi Azra, Rector, State Islamic Studies Institute (IAIN),
Jakarta

The waves of anti-American mass-demonstrations seem to have
decreased significantly. But this does not mean that "political
Islam" will also diminish. There is strong evidence that
political Islam, which has gained momentum since the fall of
Soeharto, may continue to exert itself in the era of President
Megawati Soekarnoputri and even afterwards. It will thus continue
to affect not only the Megawati presidency, but also the course
of Indonesian politics as a whole.

The rise of political Islam in post-Soeharto Indonesia is
clear from several trends. First, the establishment of a great
number of "Islamic parties" that mostly adopt Islam as their
basis replacing Pancasila, formerly the sole basis of any
organization; second, increasing demands from certain groups of
Muslims for the official adoption and implementation of syariah
by, among other things, the reintroduction of the so-called
"Jakarta Charter" to the Preamble of the 1945 Constitution.

The third tendency is the proliferation of Muslim groups
considered by many as radicals, such as the Lasykar Jihad (Jihad
Troops), the Front Pembela Islam (Islamic Defense Front), the
Hizb al-Tahrir (Party of Liberation) and the Angkatan Mujahidin
Indonesia (the Jihad Fighter Group of Indonesia).

The three developments -- by no means exhaustive -- to some
appear to represent not only great challenges for Megawati's
presidency, but also to the existence of the Pancasila state.
Indeed, the very idea of transforming Indonesia into an Islamic
state could bring the future of democracy and pluralism in
Indonesia into question.

However, despite the recent tendency to cling more closely to
political and formal Islam, it remains difficult to imagine that
Indonesia would and could be transformed into an Islamic state.

The three new trends could be very alarming for those who are
concerned with the nation's future of democracy. Yet a number of
factors are at work that make the realization of the various
agendas of political Islam in Indonesia very unlikely.

Any discussion of Muslim politics should avoid sweeping
generalizations. The scholar Robert Hefner has argued that there
is no single, civilization-wide pattern of Muslim politics, but a
variety of competing organizations and ideals.

Hefner wrote in his 1999 book that the modern era's nation-
making and market globalization have, if anything, only increased
the pluralism and contestation of politics in the Muslim world.
Thus the most significant "clash of cultures" of today and the
new millennium is not that between distinct civilizations, but
between rival political traditions within the same Islamic
country.

The contest and rivalry among a variety of Islamic political
traditions are becoming increasingly complex with the
contemporary Islamic revival.

The "revival of religion" -- including Islam -- that has swept
many parts of the globe over at least the last two decades has
revived old debates on the relationship between Islam and
politics. Both at the theoretical and practical levels Muslim
intellectuals, scholars, ulema and leaders have been entangled in
such issues as the compatibility or incompatibility between Islam
and contemporary ideas and practices of democracy, civil society
and human rights.

Again, there is no single and monolithic answer to these
questions. One thing to be sure of is that most Muslims have
accepted -- albeit tacitly -- the modern form of the nation-
state. But one can also be sure that there is a great number of
differences among Muslims, for instance, over the kind and level
of democracy that would and could be implemented in their
respective countries.

While Islamic revival is continually gaining momentum, there
are signs that many secular nation-states in the Muslim world
have failed to deliver on their promises. This failure has not
only eroded the credibility of secular regimes in the eyes of an
ever-growing number of Muslims, but has also created strong
skepticism about the viability of modern nation-states.

This is evident from attempts carried out by certain Muslim
movements, regarded by many as radicals, such as the Hizb al-
Tahrir, Gama'ah Tafkir wa al-Hijrah and other splinter groups of
the Ikhwan al-Muslimun, to replace secular regimes and nation-
states with the classic model of an "Islamic state", better known
as the caliphate (al-khilafah), or in contemporary discourse
among these movements, a "universal caliphate".

The proponents of the universal caliphate believe that this
kind of Islamic political entity led by a single caliph is the
answer and the only solution to resolve Muslim disunity and
powerlessness vis-a-vis the Western powers.

The contemporary revival of the idea of a single and universal
caliphate, undoubtedly, is very problematic. The idea is mostly
based on historical and religious romanticism as well as a
misconception of not only the very meaning of the caliphate but
also of the historical development of the caliphate itself in the
post-Prophet Muhammad period.

Supporters of the caliphate have confused and have failed to
distinguish between the original and genuine caliphate during the
Rightly Guided Caliph (al-khulafa' al-rashidun) period and the
despotic monarchies of the Umayyads, Abbasids and the Ottomans.
While at least the first two caliphs i.e. Abu Bakr and Umar ibn
al-Khattab, were elected on their merits, the subsequent
"caliphs" in the post al-khulafa' al-rashidun period were
essentially kings who enjoyed uncontested rights and privileges
over all other Muslims.

Therefore, modern thinkers on the caliphate such as Jamal al-
Din al-Afghani, `Abd al-Rahman al-Kawakibi, Rashid Rida, Sayyid
Qutb and Abu al-A`la al-Mawdudi have all refused to recognize the
credibility and legitimacy of those Muslim kings as "caliphs".

One should be aware, however, that these thinkers proposed
different, if not conflicting ideas, on some of the main themes
of the caliphate. Al-Kawakibi and Rida, for instance, insisted
that the caliph should be an Arab of the Quraysh tribe.

Al-Mawdudi strongly refutes this idea; to him the caliph
should be democratically elected to represent all Muslims based
on merit by a special electing body, the Majlis al-Shura. He says
that the lofty position of the caliph must not be reserved for
Arabs, since they have no special privileges over other non-Arab
Muslims.

Despite all the conceptual and practical problems surrounding
the feasibility and viability of the caliphate today and in the
new millennium, the idea seems to have continually attracted
certain elements of Muslims throughout the world.

In Southeast Asia, particularly in Indonesia, the idea of the
caliphate has been promoted by such organizations as Hizb al-
Tahrir and Jamaah Tarbiyah at least since the 1990s.

Under Soeharto, these movements were very careful not to
invite the regime to take firm actions against their activities.
They survived his harsh rule and made themselves more pronounced
in the post-Soeharto period.

The above is based on the writer's presentation at the Joint
Public Forum on Indonesia, held by Singapore's Institute of
Southeast Asian Studies and Jakarta's Centre for Strategic and
International Studies in Singapore, Nov. 1.