Challenge of investigative reporting for Indonesian journalists

Insiden Balibo 1975, Terbunuhnya Lima Wartawan Itu (Balibo Incident 1975, the Killing of Five Journalists); By James Dunn; Introduction by George Junus Aditjondro; Translator: Nug Katjasungkana; Editor: Irawan Saptono; ISAI and Fortilos, 1999; 76 pp; Rp 6,000

JAKARTA (JP): Two options have been offered by the government in the case of East Timor: either broad autonomy, or freedom (independence). This is the climax of a controversy that has been going on since 1975.

Under Soeharto's government, the public was always informed that the integration of East Timor was the wish of the East Timorese themselves. The fact that all that time many East Timorese continued to struggle for independence was not considered as a big problem. Those who intended to maintain sovereignty, in fact, were labeled as GPK (Movement to Disturb Security). Disinformation came into circulation through licensing journalists from the Antara news agency, and other nonindependent media.

During the early days of the military operation under the leadership of Gen. Benny Moerdani, with the architect Ali Murtopo, the world community, as well as the Indonesian government, did not seem to care much about what really happened there. But now, they have started to open their eyes, thanks to the persistence of foreign journalists who tracked their way through the dark haze that was intentionally cast over the former Portuguese colony.

But this effort to shed light on the situation in East Timor was not without victims. On Oct. 16, 1975, during an Indonesian military attack on Maliana -- a regional center that was quite important at the time, five journalists from two Australia television stations were killed within less than an hour of each other. They died after taking shelter in a house that was marked with the word Australia and a crude picture below of the national flag in the subdistrict called Balibo -- a target on the way to Maliana.

Unfortunately, the scandal received no serious attention from the international community. There are at least three reasons why this incident was simply covered up.

First, the Cold War was still going on. The U.S. government, which would normally make an issue of something of this nature, increasingly closed its eyes -- in fact, a leaked portion of a secret document mentions that the CIA knew all about the planned attack described above. For the U.S., supporting Soeharto's government as an ally in the war against communism (associated with Fretilin) was much more important than questioning military violations involving attacks on civilians.

Second, the Australian government itself, especially under Gough Whitlam, apparently prioritized its economic relationship with the Indonesian government over fighting for the journalists who were killed. (Though it should be noted that among these five journalists, only two were Australian citizens -- Greg Shakleton, 29, and Tony Stewart, 21. The others were Gary Cunningham, 27, from New Zealand, and Malcolm Rennie, 28, and Brian Peters, 29, both from Great Britain. But they all worked for the Australian television stations HSV-7 and the Nine Network). The political- economic relationship between Jakarta and Canberra was considered much more important than making an issue of the occupation of a small area which Australia also once invaded, in 1942.

Third, the Indonesian government's political campaign was effective in convincing the public that the journalists were killed in crossfire between Fretilin forces, which were trying to hold Balibo against the anticommunist Timor Lorosae forces. Their deaths were then often referred to as an episode in a "civil war" -- the terminology is misleading because it neglects the fact that there was intense interference from Indonesia's intelligence and military.

This does not mean, however, that efforts to uncover the truth about the killing of this group of journalists simply ceased.

Many journalists, such Hamish McDonald and David Jenkins (who was later barred from entering Indonesia) from the Sydney Morning Herald daily newspaper, as well as diplomats such as James Dunn, worked hard to gather information. Through interviews with eyewitnesses, and "reconstructing" the scene, a strong suspicion developed that the five journalists were not killed in the crossfire of a "civil war", but rather were killed deliberately to cover up the fact of Indonesia's military invasion.

Tragically, the deaths of these five journalists (or six, if we include another journalist, Roger East, who was shot dead on Dec. 7, 1975, on a Dili pier), provoked no protest whatsoever from the Australian government. In fact, the Australian government -- through official intelligence -- actually had detailed knowledge of Indonesia's military operation that had the potential to endanger the lives of this group of journalists who intended to cover events there.

An opportunity did emerge for the Indonesian press to take up the issue on Oct. 20, 1988, when, at the end of his testimony (broadcast on ABC television), East Timorese activist Olandino Guterres implicated Yunus Yosfiah (who, at the time, was acting operational commander but is now the minister of information), in the killing. But the efforts to reopen this case have, apparently, already been stifled.

A delegation from the Brussels-based International Federation of Journalists had earlier met Yunus to confirm this case. Just as he had answered to ABC TV reporters, Yunus stated he knew absolutely nothing about the shooting of the five journalists. Nevertheless, various international organizations, such as the Committee to Protect Journalists (New York), still regard this incident as something suspicious that must be investigated openly.

This translated book, originally titled East Timor: The Balibo Incident in Perspective, provides the Indonesian public with a more comprehensive understanding of this event that the government had covered up for the past 24 years.

-- Heru Hendratmoko

The reviewer is a member of the Alliance of Independent Journalists.