Challenge of creating a civil society in Indonesia

Challenge of creating a civil society in Indonesia

This is the second of two articles based on a paper presented
by Michael Leifer at the conference on Indonesia and the world at
the beginning of the 21st century jointly organized by The
Jakarta Post and the Centre for Strategic and International
Studies in Jakarta on Oct. 17.

JAKARTA (JP): Without seeking to offer gratuitous advice, I
would, nonetheless like to identify three related problems which
arise in seeking to create a civil society in the Indonesian
version and which Indonesians might address:

1. One fundamental challenges or obstacles would arise from
the very roots of the current political order which has been
responsible for such remarkable economic success. The New Order
was established out of political and economic chaos and decay in
the context of a subversive challenge with an external dimension
which required placing a high premium on security defined in
terms of internal threat to the identity of the state. Not only
was it deemed necessary to define and address security in terms
of the restoration of order but with the important change of
national and international priorities it was deemed necessary
also to conceive of security as a critical precondition to
economic development itself seen as the key to future stability.
To that end, political activity was strictly controlled and with
some justification. This strictness has been modified over time
but only up to a point.

It is, of course, well understood that democracy underpinned
by a civil society is not only an ideal but is also a politically
intoxicating potion. Democracy in its plural form engenders
strong debate and contention and is therefore capable of causing
divisions within society which can be destructive, especially if
there are preexisting religious and communal differences which
can be easily inflamed.

Without seeking to apportion blame for shortcomings in the
role of the United Nations and any individual states in the
conflicts in former Yugoslavia, the human tragedy arising from
acute religious and cultural tensions which have their roots deep
in history is only too apparent and a salutary lesson for all
countries with human diversity contained within their bounds.

Indonesia's goal has been that of unity in diversity since
independence and national experience particularly during the
course of the 1950s served to point out the problems of
fulfilling that ideal aspiration. It is understandable,
therefore, for any government in Jakarta to continually bear in
mind its heavy responsibility for upholding the cohesion and
integrity of the state. Moreover, there is also the thought that
the educated middle class, however noble in intentions, are a
privileged section of society and that government has to look
well beyond that limited constituency in fulfilling its national
responsibilities.

In that respect, and bearing in mind the origins and
priorities of the New Order, then one obstacle to civil society
is the extent to which a political approach required at one
historical juncture is maintained intact despite deep-seated
economic and social change. A long-standing concern with a set
political order based on a culture of security arising from
Indonesian circumstances, which has encouraged
depoliticalization in the interest of a related stability and
economic development, is one evident obstacle to the measure of
progressive political relaxation which would serve the objects of
a civil society. To that extent, the ideal virtues of a civil
society may be seen to represent not only a step into the
political unknown but also one which once taken may be difficult
to retrace should the state run into difficulty.

2. Closely related to the question of the preservation of
political order so as to avoid the release of primordial and
other destructive social forces and to underpin economic
priorities, there is the sensitive matter of corporate
entitlement. We know full well the circumstances in which the
doctrine of dwi fungsi was conceived, developed and applied. Its
origins go back to the time of national revolution when the
judgment was made that the political leadership of the republic
had compromised its ideals in too readily bowing to the Dutch.

From that moment, the view was born that politics was too
serious a matter to be left to politicians and the Indonesian
political system has reflected such a view. Dwi fungsi has
evolved over time but it exists in essence as a prerogative and
privileged status. At issue, however, is to what extent can such
a status be maintained and justified with the kind of social
change that comes with strong economic development. That is not
for me to say but for Indonesians to debate among themselves.

Some observers have argued that if an armed forces devotes
itself unduly to political activity there is a strong prospect of
its professional competence and military role being undermined as
a consequence. Moreover, to the extent that a political role is
sustained beyond historically appropriate circumstances, then the
national standing of the institution may itself be damaged,
particularly if the popular view emerges that what is being
protected is corporate privilege rather than national interests.

However it may be justified. The concept of dwi fungsi is
based on a prerogative role which is not easy to reconcile with
the notion of a civil society. As I have said, that is a subject
for Indonesians to debate among themselves. Their very ability to
debate it constructively will be one indicator of the prospects
for a civil society.

3. Another sensitive subject is that of political succession
which has to be faced by all governments of mortal men. It is no
secret that Indonesia has had only one experience of such
fundamental political change and that was highly traumatic. There
is a conventional wisdom which would argue strongly that in order
for such change to take place in the fullness of time in an
orderly way so that the achievements of the decades of stable
government are not prejudiced then the Pandora's box of political
excitement ought not to be opened up. In that way, a volatile
open political process would be avoided.

How the process of change is managed ultimately is again a
problem for Indonesians to solve but the concurrence of that
problem with continuing significant social change may well mean
that a choice will have to be made between conceding and
containing demands for a more civil society in the interest of
stable political order.

In addressing some of the reasons why civil society may have
to be subordinated to other priorities, there is a danger,
however, of failing to recognize the degree of social change
which has been the experience of Indonesia during the past three
decades and well as the change at the global level which has
discredited the Marxist model of political economy and which has
undermined its attractiveness for dissident groups. Communism has
not only failed as a political system but also as a model of
political economy which is why it is possible to be somewhat
confident about its loss of appeal and diminished threat to
national security.

I would add by way of conclusion, that one overall challenge
to the realization of an Indonesian version of civil society to
suit and serve Indonesian circumstances is whether or not
government continues to address issues of the 21st century in
terms of a particular traumatic defining experience of the mid-
20th century. A failure to revise ideas and concepts which were
appropriate and necessary to the conditions of stability and
economic success at an earlier historical juncture could give
rise to unanticipated political difficulties particularly when a
new generation of political leaders is obliged to assume the
heavy responsibility for steering the Indonesian ship of state in
a changing social context.

To that extent, the notion of openness which has become the
code-word for democratization, also lends itself to debate. It
has been interpreted as requiring responsibility, which is
understandable. However, there is a sense in which that
responsibility is deemed to be owed only by the practitioners of
openness to government, whereas there is a danger of neglecting a
corresponding obligation on the part of government to its
citizens to provide a credible form of accountability. There is a
danger of governments assuming a fixed mind-set, so that the very
phenomenon of opposition which is one dimension of the concept of
civil society may be perceived in terms of disloyalty to the
state and even incompatible with the virtues of Pancasila.

The very idea of loyal opposition may seem unduly Western and
alien to Indonesian culture and circumstances and I am not
recommending it. But, the great danger is that the very process
of conceiving of political choice and opposition in negative
terms may give rise to a self-fulfilling prophecy with adverse
consequences for political order by encouraging the very
disloyalty which the government seeks to prevent.

Even more so is the danger of assuming that new generations of
Indonesians are not capable of understanding the responsibilities
as well as the right which obtain under the general rubric of
civil society.

Indeed, it would seem appropriate to point out during this
period of commemoration of the fiftieth anniversary of
independence, that one of the arguments advanced for denying
independence, and not only to Indonesians, was that the people of
the colonized country were not ready to assume their
responsibilities but required continuing tutelage.

It would be a terrible irony, if fifty years after the
proclamation of Indonesia's independence, Indonesians were to be
denied greater political emancipation on the basis of a similar
argument to that once employed by the former colonial power.

Dr. Michael Leifer is professor of political science at the
London School of Economics.