Challenge of creating a civil society in Indonesia
This is the second of two articles based on a paper presented by Michael Leifer at the conference on Indonesia and the world at the beginning of the 21st century jointly organized by The Jakarta Post and the Centre for Strategic and International Studies in Jakarta on Oct. 17.
JAKARTA (JP): Without seeking to offer gratuitous advice, I would, nonetheless like to identify three related problems which arise in seeking to create a civil society in the Indonesian version and which Indonesians might address:
1. One fundamental challenges or obstacles would arise from the very roots of the current political order which has been responsible for such remarkable economic success. The New Order was established out of political and economic chaos and decay in the context of a subversive challenge with an external dimension which required placing a high premium on security defined in terms of internal threat to the identity of the state. Not only was it deemed necessary to define and address security in terms of the restoration of order but with the important change of national and international priorities it was deemed necessary also to conceive of security as a critical precondition to economic development itself seen as the key to future stability. To that end, political activity was strictly controlled and with some justification. This strictness has been modified over time but only up to a point.
It is, of course, well understood that democracy underpinned by a civil society is not only an ideal but is also a politically intoxicating potion. Democracy in its plural form engenders strong debate and contention and is therefore capable of causing divisions within society which can be destructive, especially if there are preexisting religious and communal differences which can be easily inflamed.
Without seeking to apportion blame for shortcomings in the role of the United Nations and any individual states in the conflicts in former Yugoslavia, the human tragedy arising from acute religious and cultural tensions which have their roots deep in history is only too apparent and a salutary lesson for all countries with human diversity contained within their bounds.
Indonesia's goal has been that of unity in diversity since independence and national experience particularly during the course of the 1950s served to point out the problems of fulfilling that ideal aspiration. It is understandable, therefore, for any government in Jakarta to continually bear in mind its heavy responsibility for upholding the cohesion and integrity of the state. Moreover, there is also the thought that the educated middle class, however noble in intentions, are a privileged section of society and that government has to look well beyond that limited constituency in fulfilling its national responsibilities.
In that respect, and bearing in mind the origins and priorities of the New Order, then one obstacle to civil society is the extent to which a political approach required at one historical juncture is maintained intact despite deep-seated economic and social change. A long-standing concern with a set political order based on a culture of security arising from Indonesian circumstances, which has encouraged depoliticalization in the interest of a related stability and economic development, is one evident obstacle to the measure of progressive political relaxation which would serve the objects of a civil society. To that extent, the ideal virtues of a civil society may be seen to represent not only a step into the political unknown but also one which once taken may be difficult to retrace should the state run into difficulty.
2. Closely related to the question of the preservation of political order so as to avoid the release of primordial and other destructive social forces and to underpin economic priorities, there is the sensitive matter of corporate entitlement. We know full well the circumstances in which the doctrine of dwi fungsi was conceived, developed and applied. Its origins go back to the time of national revolution when the judgment was made that the political leadership of the republic had compromised its ideals in too readily bowing to the Dutch.
From that moment, the view was born that politics was too serious a matter to be left to politicians and the Indonesian political system has reflected such a view. Dwi fungsi has evolved over time but it exists in essence as a prerogative and privileged status. At issue, however, is to what extent can such a status be maintained and justified with the kind of social change that comes with strong economic development. That is not for me to say but for Indonesians to debate among themselves.
Some observers have argued that if an armed forces devotes itself unduly to political activity there is a strong prospect of its professional competence and military role being undermined as a consequence. Moreover, to the extent that a political role is sustained beyond historically appropriate circumstances, then the national standing of the institution may itself be damaged, particularly if the popular view emerges that what is being protected is corporate privilege rather than national interests.
However it may be justified. The concept of dwi fungsi is based on a prerogative role which is not easy to reconcile with the notion of a civil society. As I have said, that is a subject for Indonesians to debate among themselves. Their very ability to debate it constructively will be one indicator of the prospects for a civil society.
3. Another sensitive subject is that of political succession which has to be faced by all governments of mortal men. It is no secret that Indonesia has had only one experience of such fundamental political change and that was highly traumatic. There is a conventional wisdom which would argue strongly that in order for such change to take place in the fullness of time in an orderly way so that the achievements of the decades of stable government are not prejudiced then the Pandora's box of political excitement ought not to be opened up. In that way, a volatile open political process would be avoided.
How the process of change is managed ultimately is again a problem for Indonesians to solve but the concurrence of that problem with continuing significant social change may well mean that a choice will have to be made between conceding and containing demands for a more civil society in the interest of stable political order.
In addressing some of the reasons why civil society may have to be subordinated to other priorities, there is a danger, however, of failing to recognize the degree of social change which has been the experience of Indonesia during the past three decades and well as the change at the global level which has discredited the Marxist model of political economy and which has undermined its attractiveness for dissident groups. Communism has not only failed as a political system but also as a model of political economy which is why it is possible to be somewhat confident about its loss of appeal and diminished threat to national security.
I would add by way of conclusion, that one overall challenge to the realization of an Indonesian version of civil society to suit and serve Indonesian circumstances is whether or not government continues to address issues of the 21st century in terms of a particular traumatic defining experience of the mid- 20th century. A failure to revise ideas and concepts which were appropriate and necessary to the conditions of stability and economic success at an earlier historical juncture could give rise to unanticipated political difficulties particularly when a new generation of political leaders is obliged to assume the heavy responsibility for steering the Indonesian ship of state in a changing social context.
To that extent, the notion of openness which has become the code-word for democratization, also lends itself to debate. It has been interpreted as requiring responsibility, which is understandable. However, there is a sense in which that responsibility is deemed to be owed only by the practitioners of openness to government, whereas there is a danger of neglecting a corresponding obligation on the part of government to its citizens to provide a credible form of accountability. There is a danger of governments assuming a fixed mind-set, so that the very phenomenon of opposition which is one dimension of the concept of civil society may be perceived in terms of disloyalty to the state and even incompatible with the virtues of Pancasila.
The very idea of loyal opposition may seem unduly Western and alien to Indonesian culture and circumstances and I am not recommending it. But, the great danger is that the very process of conceiving of political choice and opposition in negative terms may give rise to a self-fulfilling prophecy with adverse consequences for political order by encouraging the very disloyalty which the government seeks to prevent.
Even more so is the danger of assuming that new generations of Indonesians are not capable of understanding the responsibilities as well as the right which obtain under the general rubric of civil society.
Indeed, it would seem appropriate to point out during this period of commemoration of the fiftieth anniversary of independence, that one of the arguments advanced for denying independence, and not only to Indonesians, was that the people of the colonized country were not ready to assume their responsibilities but required continuing tutelage.
It would be a terrible irony, if fifty years after the proclamation of Indonesia's independence, Indonesians were to be denied greater political emancipation on the basis of a similar argument to that once employed by the former colonial power.
Dr. Michael Leifer is professor of political science at the London School of Economics.