Can UN direct disarmament? (2)

By Imron Cotan and Iwan Wiranataatmadja

This is the second of two articles on the efforts of the UN to eliminate weapons of mass destruction.

JAKARTA (JP): Some major powers, especially the United States, the United Kingdom and France, have taken a more narrowed and rigid position by blocking the Conference on Disarmament to negotiate the treaty to ban totally nuclear weapons.

In other words, they firmly believe that the nonnuclear weapons states have no role at all as far as these weapons of mass destruction are concerned, denying the fact that once being used, these weapons would entirely destroy whole nations, with no exception.

They simply wish to "localize" this global agenda. Accordingly, in every international forum, including the Conference on Disarmament, these countries continue to insist that the negotiations on nuclear weapons can only be properly done at bilateral levels between and among those major powers.

This has, chief among all, totally run counter to the letter and spirit of many international legally binding commitments from which the mandate to multilaterally negotiate nuclear disarmament, derived, inter alia, as the Final Document of the First Special Session of the United Nations General Assembly devoted to Disarmament (SSOD-I, 1978); the Partial Test Ban Treaty; Article VI of the Non-Proliferation Treaty; and, the latest, the decisions taken by the 1995 Review and Extension Conference of the Non-Proliferation Treaty.

Some arguments have been put forward that the Final Document of SSOD-1 no longer fits current global political realities and, therefore, is obsolete. For many, that is not really the case. If not all, almost all developing countries consider that it remains valid until after the UN manages to conclude a new final document replacing the existing one.

It is against this backdrop that some key players in the Non- Aligned Movement, especially Indonesia, see an importance to urgently reach a consensus on the dates of the Session.

Second, and on moral accounts, the international community is firmly convinced that once being used, these abhorrent weapons would jeopardize the very existence of all nations because their impact cannot be contained in segmented geographic parameters. Hence, the continuous presence of these weapons of mass destruction undoubtedly merits global concern. Fitting it into a bigger perspective, the need to multilaterally treat those nuclear weapons -- if not more urgent -- is of no less importance than dealing with the issue of eliminating these inhumane weapons from the Middle East.

Third, albeit bilateral talks have significantly reduced the number of nuclear warheads, their full implementation still hangs in the balance because Russia has, so far, failed to ratify START II. Moreover, while further reductions remain uncertain, the existence of approximately 36,000 nuclear warheads in the arsenals of the most powerful nuclear weapons states continues to pose a great danger to humankind, particularly in a world where arms conflicts can still be easily spotted.

Therefore, these bilateral endeavors need to be complemented with multilateral negotiations in order to render them more effective.

It is within this context that the Conference on Disarmament comes into the picture, for it is still more than well-equipped to be used as a forum to negotiate nuclear disarmament.

There are at least two underlying reasons to second this argument. First, and of utmost importance, the present membership of the 1995 Conference epitomizes geopolitical and military realities of the post-Cold War era, where all nuclear weapons states and key players in the international politics are represented. Second, the 1995 Conference has proven its ability to negotiate several yet-unprecedented disarmament agreements regulating weapons of mass-destruction as previously described. What renders the 1995 Conference limp now is the lack of political will of the major powers to productively use it as a forum, negotiating long-sought nuclear disarmament treaties.

Worse still, they have consistently tried, and continue to dilute, attention of member states from, and change the order of priority of, the multilateral negotiations by persistently advocating that what the international community needs now is to deal with the conventional weapons.

Therefore, it comes as no surprise that the 1995 Conference has, since 1996, been experiencing an acute impasse due to these recalcitrant attitudes of the major powers. The 1997 session was the most unproductive, during which the participating states were even unable to agree upon the agenda items to be negotiated.

Apart from the substantive difficulties, there is also a need to confess that the Conference on Disarmament's Rules of Procedure partly contributed to the current impasse and needs to be thoroughly revisited, enabling it to confront the new challenges and fundamental changes in this post-Cold War era.

There are at least two rules which may be put under scrupulous scrutiny. First, Rule 18, which requires the 1995 Conference to conduct its work and adopt its decision by consensus and second, Rule 23, which only requires the 1995 Conference to establish ad hoc subsidiary bodies to facilitate the negotiations on each and every item in the agreed agenda.

As one might recall, Rule 18 throughout the history of the Rule has once been invoked, preventing the member states from concluding the negotiations on the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT). Albeit the Conference on Disarmament is a totally independent forum but it still operates within the gambit of the UN General Assembly.

However, Rule 18 has prevented the UN General Assembly from renegotiate the final draft of the CTBT as a genuine product of the Conference on Disarmament. Although the Australian government managed to circumvent the procedural bickering, the draft cannot be claimed as a legitimate product of the 1995 Conference. This will certainly cast doubts on its future entry into force. After all, with more than 60 member states, consensus building is indeed a futile exercise.

Rule 23 is also partly responsible for the slowness of the Conference on Disarmament to immediately embark upon substantive negotiations because it only requires the establishment of the ad hoc subsidiary bodies at the beginning of every annual session.

The first part of the Conference on Disarmament's yearly session is usually devoted to informal consultations on the establishment of these ad hoc committees. These unwarranted rounds of consultations can also be prolonged until the Session ends. A way out needs to be invented, such as amending this rule as to demanding the 1995 Conference to establish permanent bodies, thereby allowing immediate negotiations on all agreed agenda items.

Coupled with the political will of all member states, these amendments would certainly give the Conference on Disarmament what it needs to once again function as the sole multilateral disarmament negotiating forum. If that is the case, the ensuing question would be which of the agenda items originating from the Final Document of SSOD-I are less controversial and more likely to be negotiated in the near future.

Needless to say, all nonnuclear weapons countries, including Indonesia, have and continue to attach utmost importance to the agenda item on nuclear disarmament for obvious reasons. However, taking into account the current situations with which the Conference on Disarmament is being confronted, these countries need to be open-minded to any ideas or proposals that may lead to its speedy and eventual negotiations.

In other words, the 1995 Conference needs to draw "a balanced program of work", covering nuclear and nonnuclear agenda items acceptable to all member states.

There should be no substantive and practical hindrance whatsoever for the Conference on Disarmament to embark upon a full-fledged negotiation on the Negative Security Assurances; to assure the security of the nonnuclear weapons states against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons within the frame work of a subsidiary body.

The demand by non-aligned and other neutral countries in the 1995 Conference (known as the Group of 21) for an immediate negotiation on this subject has a solid basis, especially for Indonesia as a faithful member of the NPT Conference and as a signatory state to the CTBT.

Better still, commitments have been made and well-documented in the decisions taken in the 1995 NPT Review and Extension Conference which, inter alia, stipulate that all parties concerned should start negotiating these commitments that "could take form of a legally binding regime".

However, it is really regrettable that some of those nuclear weapons states not only considered the Conference on Disarmament as no longer an appropriate forum but also stressed that any discussion on this matter could only by possible if it is linked and carried out in the frame work of the NPT Conference.

All participating states in the Conference on Disarmament fully understand the motive behind and the perceived result of the move. Some countries have hoped to corner India and Pakistan -- the threshold nuclear weapons states -- so that these two countries would let go their nuclear options and join the NPT in exchange of negative security assurances.

It should be noted that these targeted nations have for decades steadfastly stood against these sorts of pressure, nor they have recently indicated their willingness to budge from these principled positions.

To continue disengaging themselves from the negotiations to conclude a legal regime on negative security assurances -- which all nonnuclear weapons states are entitled to -- and trying to manipulate the prevailing situations should be aborted by the nuclear weapons states. While absolutely unrealistic, it also keeps the majority of nonnuclear weapons states hostage, which would only do damage to the credence of the NPT Conference and the future endeavors of its states parties.

Another less-controversial agenda item upon which the 1995 Conference may work is the Transparency in Armament.

In this more affluent world, transparency in military might and equipment is a must in order to allay concerns of all states, especially the neighboring ones. It is also true the recent scientific and technological edge has opened new vistas for the invention of a novel generation of conventional weapons -- with tremendous destructive powers and which may possess strategic postures.

This certainly would also undermine the peace and security at the regional as well as at the global level. Not to mention the excessive accumulation of conventional weapons by certain states, which has triggered arms conflicts all over the world, especially in Africa. Should these frightening trends continue unabated, the international community would helplessly witness the next millennium once again marred by senseless conflicts similar to those we are about to leave behind.

In order to avoid these miserable situations, from the perspective of the nonnuclear weapons states, the following conclusions and suggestions can be drawn and put forward. First, the Conference on Disarmament is still well positioned to negotiate a series of disarmament treaties, especially those regulating nuclear weapons for at least two underlining reasons. One, it represents the real and existing world political powerhouses. Two, the existence of nuclear weapons continues to pose a global threat which merits global or multilateral actions, which only the Conference on Disarmament can so far contemplate. Indeed, global issues deserve global actions.

Albeit, bilateral talks have so far significantly reduced the arsenals of nuclear weapons, the world will be much better off if they are coupled with successful multilateral negotiations. In other words, these two measures are indeed mutually reinforcing.

Second, the current impasse -- with which the Conference on Disarmament is being confronted -- might well be circumvented if all member states, especially those nuclear weapons states, live up to their international obligations and commitments and show their sense of flexibility, thereby allowing the 1995 Conference to assume its mandated functions.

Good lessons should be derived from the failures of the Conference on Disarmament to conclude the CTBT and to negotiate the Treaty on Antipersonnel Land mines. Concerted efforts are to be taken to avoid such unfortunate instances from rekindling in the future.

Third, whether one likes it or not, the 1995 Conference's Rules of Procedure are partly to blame for the failures of the Conference on Disarmament to engage in meaningful exercises, especially Rule 18 and Rule 23. It might be timely to respectively amend them, thereby allowing the UN General Assembly to assume its duties, if and when the 1995 Conference fails to discharge its mandate. And, at the same time, do away with a routine protracted debate on the establishment of ad hoc subsidiary bodies at each and every yearly session.

Fourth, pending the results of the UN SSOD-IV, the 1995 Conference's agenda derived from the Final Document of the SSOD- I, should be maintained with nuclear disarmament peaks on the agenda. Understanding the difficulties of some of the nuclear weapons states, the Group of 21 should be ready to draft a balanced program of work of the 1995 Conference, covering Negative Security Assurances and Transparency in Armament, which are less problematic.

To allow this to happen, member states should desist from extorting other participating states to kowtow to their unrealistic demands at the expense of the rest.

Last but not least, all countries should honor their international responsibilities and show their sense of flexibility, thereby allowing the Conference on Disarmament to once again assume its function as the sole multilateral disarmament negotiating body. Failure to do so would have direct bearings on the future of our planet.

The writers are former United Nations Disarmament Fellows and observers of international peace and security affairs residing in Jakarta.

Window: Needless to say, all nonnuclear weapons countries, including Indonesia, have and continue to attach utmost importance to the agenda item on nuclear disarmament for obvious reasons.