Can UN direct disarmament? (2)

Can UN direct disarmament? (2)

By Imron Cotan and Iwan Wiranataatmadja

This is the second of two articles on the efforts of the UN to
eliminate weapons of mass destruction.

JAKARTA (JP): Some major powers, especially the United States,
the United Kingdom and France, have taken a more narrowed and
rigid position by blocking the Conference on Disarmament to
negotiate the treaty to ban totally nuclear weapons.

In other words, they firmly believe that the nonnuclear
weapons states have no role at all as far as these weapons of
mass destruction are concerned, denying the fact that once being
used, these weapons would entirely destroy whole nations, with no
exception.

They simply wish to "localize" this global agenda.
Accordingly, in every international forum, including the
Conference on Disarmament, these countries continue to insist
that the negotiations on nuclear weapons can only be properly
done at bilateral levels between and among those major powers.

This has, chief among all, totally run counter to the letter
and spirit of many international legally binding commitments from
which the mandate to multilaterally negotiate nuclear
disarmament, derived, inter alia, as the Final Document of the
First Special Session of the United Nations General Assembly
devoted to Disarmament (SSOD-I, 1978); the Partial Test Ban
Treaty; Article VI of the Non-Proliferation Treaty; and, the
latest, the decisions taken by the 1995 Review and Extension
Conference of the Non-Proliferation Treaty.

Some arguments have been put forward that the Final Document
of SSOD-1 no longer fits current global political realities and,
therefore, is obsolete. For many, that is not really the case. If
not all, almost all developing countries consider that it remains
valid until after the UN manages to conclude a new final document
replacing the existing one.

It is against this backdrop that some key players in the Non-
Aligned Movement, especially Indonesia, see an importance to
urgently reach a consensus on the dates of the Session.

Second, and on moral accounts, the international community is
firmly convinced that once being used, these abhorrent weapons
would jeopardize the very existence of all nations because their
impact cannot be contained in segmented geographic parameters.
Hence, the continuous presence of these weapons of mass
destruction undoubtedly merits global concern. Fitting it into a
bigger perspective, the need to multilaterally treat those
nuclear weapons -- if not more urgent -- is of no less importance
than dealing with the issue of eliminating these inhumane weapons
from the Middle East.

Third, albeit bilateral talks have significantly reduced the
number of nuclear warheads, their full implementation still hangs
in the balance because Russia has, so far, failed to ratify START
II. Moreover, while further reductions remain uncertain, the
existence of approximately 36,000 nuclear warheads in the
arsenals of the most powerful nuclear weapons states continues to
pose a great danger to humankind, particularly in a world where
arms conflicts can still be easily spotted.

Therefore, these bilateral endeavors need to be complemented
with multilateral negotiations in order to render them more
effective.

It is within this context that the Conference on Disarmament
comes into the picture, for it is still more than well-equipped
to be used as a forum to negotiate nuclear disarmament.

There are at least two underlying reasons to second this
argument. First, and of utmost importance, the present membership
of the 1995 Conference epitomizes geopolitical and military
realities of the post-Cold War era, where all nuclear weapons
states and key players in the international politics are
represented. Second, the 1995 Conference has proven its ability
to negotiate several yet-unprecedented disarmament agreements
regulating weapons of mass-destruction as previously described.
What renders the 1995 Conference limp now is the lack of
political will of the major powers to productively use it as a
forum, negotiating long-sought nuclear disarmament treaties.

Worse still, they have consistently tried, and continue to
dilute, attention of member states from, and change the order of
priority of, the multilateral negotiations by persistently
advocating that what the international community needs now is to
deal with the conventional weapons.

Therefore, it comes as no surprise that the 1995 Conference
has, since 1996, been experiencing an acute impasse due to these
recalcitrant attitudes of the major powers. The 1997 session was
the most unproductive, during which the participating states were
even unable to agree upon the agenda items to be negotiated.

Apart from the substantive difficulties, there is also a need
to confess that the Conference on Disarmament's Rules of
Procedure partly contributed to the current impasse and needs to
be thoroughly revisited, enabling it to confront the new
challenges and fundamental changes in this post-Cold War era.

There are at least two rules which may be put under scrupulous
scrutiny. First, Rule 18, which requires the 1995 Conference to
conduct its work and adopt its decision by consensus and second,
Rule 23, which only requires the 1995 Conference to establish ad
hoc subsidiary bodies to facilitate the negotiations on each and
every item in the agreed agenda.

As one might recall, Rule 18 throughout the history of the
Rule has once been invoked, preventing the member states from
concluding the negotiations on the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty
(CTBT). Albeit the Conference on Disarmament is a totally
independent forum but it still operates within the gambit of the
UN General Assembly.

However, Rule 18 has prevented the UN General Assembly from
renegotiate the final draft of the CTBT as a genuine product of
the Conference on Disarmament. Although the Australian government
managed to circumvent the procedural bickering, the draft cannot
be claimed as a legitimate product of the 1995 Conference. This
will certainly cast doubts on its future entry into force. After
all, with more than 60 member states, consensus building is
indeed a futile exercise.

Rule 23 is also partly responsible for the slowness of the
Conference on Disarmament to immediately embark upon substantive
negotiations because it only requires the establishment of the ad
hoc subsidiary bodies at the beginning of every annual session.

The first part of the Conference on Disarmament's yearly
session is usually devoted to informal consultations on the
establishment of these ad hoc committees. These unwarranted
rounds of consultations can also be prolonged until the Session
ends. A way out needs to be invented, such as amending this rule
as to demanding the 1995 Conference to establish permanent
bodies, thereby allowing immediate negotiations on all agreed
agenda items.

Coupled with the political will of all member states, these
amendments would certainly give the Conference on Disarmament
what it needs to once again function as the sole multilateral
disarmament negotiating forum. If that is the case, the ensuing
question would be which of the agenda items originating from the
Final Document of SSOD-I are less controversial and more likely
to be negotiated in the near future.

Needless to say, all nonnuclear weapons countries, including
Indonesia, have and continue to attach utmost importance to the
agenda item on nuclear disarmament for obvious reasons. However,
taking into account the current situations with which the
Conference on Disarmament is being confronted, these countries
need to be open-minded to any ideas or proposals that may lead to
its speedy and eventual negotiations.

In other words, the 1995 Conference needs to draw "a balanced
program of work", covering nuclear and nonnuclear agenda items
acceptable to all member states.

There should be no substantive and practical hindrance
whatsoever for the Conference on Disarmament to embark upon a
full-fledged negotiation on the Negative Security Assurances; to
assure the security of the nonnuclear weapons states against the
use or threat of use of nuclear weapons within the frame work of
a subsidiary body.

The demand by non-aligned and other neutral countries in the
1995 Conference (known as the Group of 21) for an immediate
negotiation on this subject has a solid basis, especially for
Indonesia as a faithful member of the NPT Conference and as a
signatory state to the CTBT.

Better still, commitments have been made and well-documented
in the decisions taken in the 1995 NPT Review and Extension
Conference which, inter alia, stipulate that all parties
concerned should start negotiating these commitments that "could
take form of a legally binding regime".

However, it is really regrettable that some of those nuclear
weapons states not only considered the Conference on Disarmament
as no longer an appropriate forum but also stressed that any
discussion on this matter could only by possible if it is linked
and carried out in the frame work of the NPT Conference.

All participating states in the Conference on Disarmament
fully understand the motive behind and the perceived result of
the move. Some countries have hoped to corner India and Pakistan
-- the threshold nuclear weapons states -- so that these two
countries would let go their nuclear options and join the NPT in
exchange of negative security assurances.

It should be noted that these targeted nations have for
decades steadfastly stood against these sorts of pressure, nor
they have recently indicated their willingness to budge from
these principled positions.

To continue disengaging themselves from the negotiations to
conclude a legal regime on negative security assurances -- which
all nonnuclear weapons states are entitled to -- and trying to
manipulate the prevailing situations should be aborted by the
nuclear weapons states. While absolutely unrealistic, it also
keeps the majority of nonnuclear weapons states hostage, which
would only do damage to the credence of the NPT Conference and
the future endeavors of its states parties.

Another less-controversial agenda item upon which the 1995
Conference may work is the Transparency in Armament.

In this more affluent world, transparency in military might
and equipment is a must in order to allay concerns of all states,
especially the neighboring ones. It is also true the recent
scientific and technological edge has opened new vistas for the
invention of a novel generation of conventional weapons -- with
tremendous destructive powers and which may possess strategic
postures.

This certainly would also undermine the peace and security at
the regional as well as at the global level. Not to mention the
excessive accumulation of conventional weapons by certain states,
which has triggered arms conflicts all over the world, especially
in Africa. Should these frightening trends continue unabated, the
international community would helplessly witness the next
millennium once again marred by senseless conflicts similar to
those we are about to leave behind.

In order to avoid these miserable situations, from the
perspective of the nonnuclear weapons states, the following
conclusions and suggestions can be drawn and put forward. First,
the Conference on Disarmament is still well positioned to
negotiate a series of disarmament treaties, especially those
regulating nuclear weapons for at least two underlining reasons.
One, it represents the real and existing world political
powerhouses. Two, the existence of nuclear weapons continues to
pose a global threat which merits global or multilateral actions,
which only the Conference on Disarmament can so far contemplate.
Indeed, global issues deserve global actions.

Albeit, bilateral talks have so far significantly reduced the
arsenals of nuclear weapons, the world will be much better off if
they are coupled with successful multilateral negotiations. In
other words, these two measures are indeed mutually reinforcing.

Second, the current impasse -- with which the Conference on
Disarmament is being confronted -- might well be circumvented if
all member states, especially those nuclear weapons states, live
up to their international obligations and commitments and show
their sense of flexibility, thereby allowing the 1995 Conference
to assume its mandated functions.

Good lessons should be derived from the failures of the
Conference on Disarmament to conclude the CTBT and to negotiate
the Treaty on Antipersonnel Land mines. Concerted efforts are to
be taken to avoid such unfortunate instances from rekindling in
the future.

Third, whether one likes it or not, the 1995 Conference's
Rules of Procedure are partly to blame for the failures of the
Conference on Disarmament to engage in meaningful exercises,
especially Rule 18 and Rule 23. It might be timely to
respectively amend them, thereby allowing the UN General Assembly
to assume its duties, if and when the 1995 Conference fails to
discharge its mandate. And, at the same time, do away with a
routine protracted debate on the establishment of ad hoc
subsidiary bodies at each and every yearly session.

Fourth, pending the results of the UN SSOD-IV, the 1995
Conference's agenda derived from the Final Document of the SSOD-
I, should be maintained with nuclear disarmament peaks on the
agenda. Understanding the difficulties of some of the nuclear
weapons states, the Group of 21 should be ready to draft a
balanced program of work of the 1995 Conference, covering
Negative Security Assurances and Transparency in Armament, which
are less problematic.

To allow this to happen, member states should desist from
extorting other participating states to kowtow to their
unrealistic demands at the expense of the rest.

Last but not least, all countries should honor their
international responsibilities and show their sense of
flexibility, thereby allowing the Conference on Disarmament to
once again assume its function as the sole multilateral
disarmament negotiating body. Failure to do so would have direct
bearings on the future of our planet.

The writers are former United Nations Disarmament Fellows and
observers of international peace and security affairs residing in
Jakarta.

Window: Needless to say, all nonnuclear weapons countries,
including Indonesia, have and continue to attach utmost importance
to the agenda item on nuclear disarmament for obvious reasons.