Can Asia-Pacific security vacuum really be filled?

Can Asia-Pacific security vacuum really be filled?

Denny Roy looks at whether the prospective vacuum created in the
Asia-Pacific in the wake of a U.S. military withdrawal will
actually be filled by another power.

The assumption that a withdrawal of U.S. influence from the
Asia-Pacific would create a power or security "vacuum" has become
commonplace among analysts of the region. This assumption,
however, has been largely unexamined. The "vacuum" metaphor
implies that if the dominant power, or hegemony, abdicates its
role as shaper and enforcer of the rules of international
interaction, the forces of nature will immediately and inevitably
suck another country into this role as a replacement.

But the "vacuum" effect is only one possible response to the
diminution of great power influence. While the emergence of a
power vacuum in the region is a strong possibility, this outcome
is not inevitable. History bears out this conclusion.

After the First World War, Great Britain was clearly finished
as the world's dominant power. No other major European power was
in any position to take up global leadership. Two rising powers
reacted in opposite ways to this hegemonic breakdown. In the
Pacific, Japan, which had previously cooperated with the dominant
power (and would return to this pattern again after World War
II), opted to build its own regional hegemony, the Greater East
Asia Co-prosperity Sphere. But the U.S., by then the world's
strongest power (although militarily under-armed), declined the
global leadership role of which it was capable.

There was no "vacuum". The vulnerable Japanese decided to take
control of an uncertain and threatening external environment, but
the Americans, militarily secure and economically almost self-
sufficient, saw no compelling reason to strive for hegemony.

The reason the "power vacuum" is not a sure thing is that
rising, middle-rank countries have both incentives and
disincentives for opportunistic expansion. One incentive is
control of the international or regional system, which the
dominant power can adjust to serve its own interests. Another
incentive is defensive: blocking a neighboring state (and
potential enemy) from gaining additional capabilities and
privileges that would result in an increase of its relative
power.

These incentives, however, are potentially balanced by
countervailing considerations. A state that suddenly becomes more
assertive will frighten its neighbors, which will likely respond
by forming an alliance to contain the threatening state. Another
disincentive to unilateral expansion is economic interdependence:
peaceful cooperation may be a more effective way to amass
national wealth than coercion and conquest. In theory, then, a
rough balance obtains between the factors that would give rise to
a vacuum and the factors that would prevent a vacuum.

Moving from the abstract to the concrete, do the particular
characteristics of the Asia-Pacific region make it susceptible to
the vacuum effect? There are two bright spots. First, the smaller
states of the region have become stronger since the Japanese
invasion of the Pacific War. These states are now better able to
protect themselves and to contribute resources to a defensive
alliance. Second, ASEAN has proved it can foster cooperation and
dialogue for Southeast Asian states.

But conditions that would guarantee peace and stability in a
post-hegemonic environment do not yet exist. Northeast Asia has
no real counterpart to ASEAN, and the establishment of effective
multilateral organizations faces the serious obstacles of
historical animosity (Chinese versus Japanese, Japanese versus
Koreans, North Koreans versus South Koreans, and so on) and
seemingly insoluble political grievances (divided Korea, divided
China, disputed territories, and so forth).

Economic interdependence in the region is uneven; the major
ties are bilateral connections between Japan and everyone else,
and states trade more with outside countries than among
themselves.

Only the Russians and the Chinese have nuclear weapons,
further skewing the imbalance between the strong and the weak
states, and creating the potential for nuclear blackmail should
the U.S. nuclear umbrella be removed.

Political systems throughout the region remain highly
dissimilar, running the gamut from democracy to hard-core
authoritarianism. While Japan is clearly content with the status
quo and would not undertake a major military buildup unless
provoked, the same cannot be confidently said of China.

Thus, while the vacuum effect is not inevitable here, it will
remain the most likely outcome unless purposeful action is taken
to avoid it. Regional states would be wise to use this decade or
so of breathing space to strengthen the disincentives to
opportunistic, unilateral expansion by deepening the culture of
multilateralism, ingraining the habits of consultation and
compromise, and avoiding steps that would increase neighbors'
sense of insecurity. The ideal the region should work towards is
a no-vacuum outcome in which no government suddenly increases its
military capabilities or political demands in the wake of a U.S.
withdrawal.

Instead, governments in the region might agree to maintain the
present system of economic and political regimes, or meet
together to formulate new regimes, and all would continue to
pursue their interests through established diplomatic channels
and peaceful economic competition.

Dr. Denny Roy is a Research Fellow at the Strategic and Defense
Studies Center at the Australian National University.