Cairo, Yalta and Beijing talks

Lee Kyong-hee, Editor-in-chief, The Korea Herald, Asia News Network, Seoul

The past is a curious creature. Still, one intriguing question about 20th century regional history is why Korea, not Japan, was divided when World War II ended with Emperor Hirohito's "unconditional" surrender.

The "three great allies" issued the Potsdam Declaration on July 26, 1945. An ultimatum directed at Japan to hasten its surrender simply stipulated that "the terms of the Cairo Declaration shall be carried out and Japanese sovereignty shall be limited to its four main islands and such minor islands as we determine."

That was 11 days before the atomic bomb was dropped on Hiroshima and nine days before the Soviet Union declared war on Japan. Curiously, Hirohito and Japan's militarist government were dragging their feet when further resistance seemed futile. The emperor reached his "sacred decision" to capitulate days after the three allied powers warned that "We shall brook no delay."

U.S. President Harry S. Truman, Nationalist Chinese President Chiang Kai-shek and British Prime Minister Winston Churchill signed the declaration.

In December 1943, it was not Truman, but Franklin D. Roosevelt, who led the Cairo talks where the three allies agreed that Japan would be expelled from all territories it had used violence and greed to seize.

They specified that "the aforesaid three great powers, mindful of the enslavement of the people of Korea, are determined that in due course Korea shall become free and independent."

Koreans who learned of the Cairo talks thought "in due course" meant "immediately after liberation." However, the great powers had a four-party trusteeship in mind that might last for several decades. After liberation, Koreans strongly resisted their plan.

In February 1945, the allies met again at the Crimean resort of Yalta. The agenda spanned the formation of the United Nations; a four-party occupation of Germany; and the Soviet Union's joining in the war with Japan after Germany's defeat.

Its secret agreements aside, the West yielded undue concessions in the tripartite talks to the Soviet Union, triggering the Cold War. At Yalta, two months before Roosevelt's death, there is no evidence that his failing health impaired his judgment.

The Yalta agreement does not specifically mention Korea. It states that the five nations that would have permanent seats on the Security Council should consult with each other prior to the U.N. conference "on the trusteeship of territories detached from the enemy as a result of the present war."

America and Great Britain also agreed that the Soviet Union would declare war against Japan on the condition that "the former rights of Russia violated by Japan's treacherous attack in 1904 shall be restored."

The clause provides the historical background of Korea's virtual division at the hands of the American and Russian occupation armies a few months after the war's end. The events of 1904 must refer to Japan's attack on the Russian fleet at Port Arthur and its ensuing victory.

Russia recognized Japan's "free hand" in Korea under the 1905 peace treaty; Roosevelt believed that Japan's control of Korea would effectively curb Russian power. Also, he considered it necessary as a quid pro quo for Japan's recognition of U.S. hegemony in the Philippines.

This understanding between Washington and Tokyo, contained in the secret Taft-Katsura Memorandum, allowed rising Japan to force a weak and divided Korea into signing the 1905 Protectorate Treaty. It remained America's basic policy toward Korea before Pearl Harbor.

The Russo-Japan rivalry over Korea and Manchuria dates back to the late 19th century. A secret proposal to partition the peninsula along the 39th parallel in 1896 failed to materialize. It might have been one reason the Soviet Union readily accepted the U.S. proposal to bisect the peninsula along the 38th parallel shortly before Japan's surrender on Aug. 15, 1945.

In yet another intriguing turn of events, the two Koreas sat with the four powers -- the U.S., China, Japan and Russia -- in Beijing last month to discuss the North's nuclear arms. No wonder everyone arrived with different objectives and tactics, shaped by their varying memories.

This complicated mishmash of history and tangled relations call for the multilateral dialog in Beijing to set a broad agenda that will create a permanent peace regime for a unified Korea, not to mention defusing North Korea's desperate survival game.