Bush's hard line trips up the reformers in Iran

Ray Takeyh, International Security Studies, Yale University, Los Angeles Times, Los Angeles

In a reversal of a long-standing U.S. approach, President Bush has essentially given up on Iran's reform movement and on the prospects for gradual moderation of Iran's Islamic system. The administration is appealing directly to the Iranian people to actively change their government. Borrowing a page from President Reagan's "evil empire" strategy, the Bush team hopes to subvert the "axis of evil" by supporting dissidents against the regime.

The only problem with this approach is that it is likely to further undermine Iran's already halting democratic transition and further strengthen reactionary forces.

Evidence of this policy shift was contained in a July 12 statement released by Bush, offering unsolicited support to student protesters. The president castigated the "members of the ruling regime and their families" for obstructing "reform while reaping unfair benefits."

In more explicit language, Zalmay Khalilzad, senior national security official, similarly noted, "U.S. policy is to support the Iranian people in their quest to decide their own destiny."

Although both of these statements seem innocuous -- even inspirational -- they display a dangerous naivete about Iran's political scene. The statements were released only days after thousands of students defied a government ban and marched to commemorate the July 1999 incidents in which student protests were ended by an unprecedented crackdown. Even more provocative was the resignation of a prominent reformist cleric, who quit his post on the eve of this anniversary with a blistering critique of Iran's political situation.

This kind of assertiveness from Iran's streets and its seminaries is rare and potentially powerful, and the confluence briefly put Iranian politics in flux.

Sadly, Bush's well-intentioned words quickly swung the momentum back to the hard-liners and made the plight of the student protesters much more precarious. The hard-liners were quick to take advantage of Bush's denunciation, calling for national unity against foreign intervention in Iran's internal affairs.

Under the pretext of apprehending the "fifth column," they quickly shuttered one of the last remaining reform newspapers, Nowruz, and banned one of Iran's most venerable liberal parties, the Freedom Movement.

The frustrated reformers whom the president is seeking to appeal to were united in their disapproval of his stratagem.

The reformers Bush hoped to liberate from the clutches of the theocracy were only further repressed by his ill-advised conduct. Even if it hadn't prompted a backlash, it is unclear that the new policy offers quite the rewards that its proponents seem to believe.

Iranians remain intensely suspicious of external influence, and while the disproportionately young population might not remember the 1979 revolution, they all revere the memory of Prime Minister Mohammed Mossadegh, toppled by a U.S.-sponsored coup in 1953. As a result, Iranians are far less likely to be guided by U.S. direction on how to fix their current political predicament than their generally pro-American, liberal and globalized attitudes might suggest.

Moreover, they might well resent the deleterious effect of U.S. sanctions and the stigma of Bush's branding their country part of an "axis of evil."

The Islamic Republic of Iran is not the Soviet Union, where there existed a clear demarcation between dissidents and the regime. In Iran, the reformers have penetrated key governing institutions and are struggling to assert control over others.

The best way to aid the cause of reform in Iran is for Washington, D.C., to temper its rhetoric and relax its economic sanctions. By gradually integrating Iran into the global economy, the United States can assist the reformers in rehabilitating the economy and consolidating their power base.

In the long run, such a policy can best marginalize the hard- liners who require international tension and conflict with the "Great Satan" to deflect attention from their poor record of governance.

Iran today is a state undergoing its most acute crisis since the Islamic revolution. Despite chaos and the looming shadow of violence, the old order will change; coercion or cosmetic reforms cannot stop the transformation. Given its failure to understand the complexities and nuances of Iran's politics, the best thing for the Bush administration is to do nothing. At least that policy has the benefit of doing no harm.