Bush reinventing 'War on terror'

Mushahid Hussain, Inter Press Service, Islamabad

Two years down the line, facing difficulties in Afghanistan and Iraq and stiff opposition at home and abroad, U.S. President George W Bush has tried to re-invent the "war on terror".

Addressing the National Endowment on Democracy in Washington earlier this month, U.S. President George W Bush enunciated what he proclaimed proudly as a "new policy" -- a "Forward Strategy on Freedom in the Middle East", apparently bidding goodbye to "60 years of Western nations excusing and accommodating the lack of freedom in the Middle East" since that policy "did nothing to make us safe".

He added that "it would be reckless to accept the status quo" because "as long as the Middle East remains a place where freedom does not flourish, it will remain a place of stagnation, resentment, and violence ready for export".

Much is being made of this speech of the U.S. president. It needs to be understood in its context and timing, the probable motivations and possible implications.

The speech comes at a time of the U.S.' international isolation, the worst such period for U.S. foreign policy since the Vietnam War, which also pitched world opinion against Washington. Difficulties are being aggravated both in Iraq and Afghanistan with the U.S. looking toward Muslim nations for a bailout, while Muslims feel they are a target of the "war on terror."

Compounding these difficulties are the beginnings of a difficult presidential election year, with Bush's political survival hinging on some signs of success in the "war on terror" plus revival of the U.S. economy.

His audience seemed to be a curious three-in-one mixture of Muslim public opinion, which needs to be enticed with a "new" more palatable "message" since they are alienated from their own regimes as well as with Washington's policies, U.S. public opinion in order give reassurance that the "do-gooder" U.S. government is on the right track, and Israel and its powerful lobby in the U.S., which will be decisive to Bush's political fortunes.

Given this context, Bush's hyperbolic commitment to democratic ideals would essentially emanate from three basic reasons.

First, a new ex-post facto justification for the Iraq war is badly needed, the earlier one about weapons of mass destruction having been demolished since none have been found and apparently did not exist.

So the narrative has changed from the negative reason to attack and invade Iraq -- to prevent the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction-to a positive reason, namely, promoting democracy not just in Iraq but in the entire Middle East.

Second, since the U.S. president has admitted that the Washington is likely to be engaged in the region for decades, the "war on terror" needs to be given the populist wrapping of an ideology, so that military might is given a moral face.

Therefore, the "war on terror" has become all about bringing democracy to the Middle East, not about seeking oil or protecting Israel or erecting the colonial-style foundations of an imperial U.S.

Third, the U.S. government realizes the hostility that its policies are encountering in the Muslim world. A better way to sell U.S. policy to a disaffected Muslim public opinion is to distance itself from Muslim regimes, with the gentle chiding of allies to move toward democracy.

U.S. support for autocratic regimes has been one of the bases of critique of its policies in the Muslim world.

Two problems emerge in the process: U.S. credibility, and what concrete action Washington has in mind to promote this "new policy".

The U.S. government gave a commitment to a road map for a Palestinian state by 2005, but that policy is in tatters due to Israeli intransigence and the collective efforts by Washington and Tel Aviv for "regime change" in Palestine have failed miserably. Mahmoud Abbas is history, while Yasser Arafat remains the resilient survivor.

On foreign policy issues, the U.S. has had success in pressuring Muslim countries to change and do policy U-turns in the aftermath of Sept. 11.

Pakistan did so on the Taliban, ditching its erstwhile allies and switching in time to be with the U.S. government. Saudi Arabia unveiled its peace plan at the March 2002 Arab League Summit, swapping recognition of Israel in return for end of its occupation and establishment of an independent Palestine state.

Syria supported the U.S. resolution on Iraq in the UN Security Council. Malaysia agreed to invite the U.S.-nominated Iraq Governing Council to take the seat for Iraq at last month's Organization of Islamic Conference summit.

Iran reversed itself on the nuclear issue, by agreeing to inspections and the end of enrichment of uranium that could be used to build nuclear weapons.

But will the U.S. government exert the same pressure on its Muslim friends on democracy as it did on foreign policy? That is highly doubtful, since the stakes are higher given the U.S. fear of unleashing instability and unpredictable political forces to replace the status quo.

Former U.S. President Jimmy Carter was accused by his conservative detractors of helping to unleash the political forces that toppled the shah of Iran, given his sermons on human rights. Similarly, by no stretch of the imagination would the U.S. prefer the status quo to be replaced in such strategic Muslim countries as Saudi Arabia, Pakistan or Egypt.

However, Muslim countries themselves need to read the writing on the wall and seek reform by setting their own houses in order. Even in Iran, the aging cleric and once the nominated successor of Ayatollah Khomeini, Ayatollah Hussain Ali Montazeri, has called for an end to "absolute rule by one man".

Ultimately, democracy in the Middle East will not emerge from the barrel of a U.S. gun but by the yearnings and struggle of its own people. That is the inexorable wave of the future.