Bureaucratic web hampers reform

By Marco Kusumawijaya

JAKARTA (JP): The World Bank has canceled the disbursement of the US$300 million social safety net loan to Indonesia due to the government's failure to meet the loan conditions. The bank states that the slow pace of meaningful change in institutions and bureaucratic culture is often the source of the failure.

The bank's president, James Wolfensohn, had said, in his previous visit to Jakarta last year, that 10 to 40 percent of loans had been corrupted.

This news is of utmost concern to most Indonesians, that despite the dragging political reform movement, very little change has been made in the bureaucracy.

This may not be the concern of the "elite" but it certainly is the main reason why most Indonesians desire reform. They want better public services, and they know that, without change in bureaucratic practices, the reform movement will mean nothing more than a transfer of the power that controls the country's wealth, without directly improving the delivery of public goods and services.

Unless embracing reform in the bureaucracy, political reform is close to meaningless to them. Hence the rapidly emerging cynicism among Indonesians about the political elite and the reform movement in general.

Why is reform in the bureaucracy not taking place despite the more significant political reform?

Answers to this question are neither easy nor singular; but more than two years after the change of government, surely this is an appropriate time to reflect on this. Bureaucratic reform is strategic not only as the single most important indicator of the success or failure of the reform movement in the eyes of common people, but also a determinant factor for long term competitiveness in the 21st century.

The bureaucracy in Indonesia has developed into a web, possessing a life of its own. You try to change it, and either end up entangled by it or stung to death. In this bureaucracy there is no such thing as a "professional civil servant" who will readily follow the commands of legitimate political leaders.

The fact that the bureaucracy had been the servant of a single, monolithic and closed New Order has made it almost totally impenetrable to outsiders.

There are valuable lessons merely in compiling experiences of current cabinet members, on how they get along with a bureaucracy inherited from the New Order. The word is that the ministers' will does not always prevail, and in some cases they are very much steered by the bureaucrats instead of the reverse.

In the case of the National Urban Development Corporation (PERUMNAS), for example, it is only logical that, in the decentralization era, this body should return the plots it controls to local authorities or community-based organizations, instead of opting to remain one of the country's instruments of centralized control of assets.

We must also rethink the Indonesian Bank Restructuring Agency from this point of view.

There is no doubt that very strong political leadership is needed to change the bureaucracy. Such leadership is possible with the direct support of the people. Therefore, the argument for a direct election is valid at least from this angle.

However, in this economic crisis, it may not be a wise idea to push for a reduction in personnel in the much criticized bureaucracy.

Jakarta, for example, has to cope with absorbing an additional 50,000 employees -- former officers of national bodies -- into its local bureaucracy. The crisis may seem like a very good opportunity to realize the urgency of bureaucratic reform, but it certainly is bad timing, unless the government has a very credible and solid plan to revive the economy as well.

Former British prime minister Margaret Thatcher had strong political support and a sound economic plan when she launched "The Next Steps" to reform the bureaucracy of the United Kingdom, an initiative continued by Tony Blair's government.

And this had not been without trial-and-error until she found the strategic points, among others: "uncoupling steering and rowing and exposing public services to market competition," as David Osborne and Peter Plastrik wrote in their 1996 book, Banishing Bureaucracy.

"Strategy" may well be the needed key word within the context of Indonesia's scarce and crippled resources. A strategy should use key leverage points to make fundamental changes that will in turn bring further changes creating a domino effect.

We need to think hard about strategy before using available resources, instead of asking for more money in each instance. The notions of "think first, act later" and "being thrifty" should be part of Indonesia's new culture above and before anything else.

But that is not all.

The World Bank document uses the specific terms "bureaucratic culture". Perhaps to understand this we only need to follow the court proceedings of the land-swap case of the Indonesian Logistics Agency (BULOG).

When asked why he did not remind then president Soeharto of the ministerial regulation that he was about to violate regarding the land swap deal, former finance minister Mar'ie Muhammad, replied " "How could I possibly remind the president!"

Moerdiono, the former state secretary, was quoted as saying that "If reminded by a minister, the president would usually not violate any existing law or regulation".

The first quote indicates a paternalistic bureaucratic mentality, while the second points to the formal approach by a professional, loyal bureaucrat. Both lack courage, entrepreneurship and creativity required in a highly competitive global economy.

No matter how bad the situation is, pessimism is definitely not an option. Urgent steps are needed before the country plunges into the 21st century ill equipped and without proper direction.

The question of how far we can change is the second priority, and must of course relate to all local conditions, and will depend on the political will of political leaders with popular backing or pressure.

Actually there are now dozens of initiatives being taken using aid from foreign donors. They work at both the local and national levels. Most importantly, they work not only on the "supply" side of local and national government bodies, but also on the "demand" side -- the community level.

Those involved in such initiatives try to make the people articulate their demand for concrete changes in public services and goods. Interventions on the demand side might be more strategic than others.

But they need two strategic components: freedom of information and transparency on the supply side. If both of these components are effective, there is hope that the bureaucratic web may be penetrable and dismantled for reform.

The writer is a Jakarta-based architect and expert on urban issues.