'Bughot', from law to politics

By M. Ishom Hadzik

JOMBANG, East Java (JP): In the early 1950s, Indonesian Muslims were preoccupied with the question, "When a Muslim woman, who no longer has a wali nasab (guardian by lineage, such as father or uncle), is married by a wali hakim (appointed religious official), is her marriage religiously legal?"

The question emerged against the backdrop of an ideological conflict between two large groups -- those who wanted a state based upon the Pancasila ideology and the 1945 Constitution, and those who sought for an Islamic state that was based upon the Jakarta Chapter.

The protracted tension annoyed then President Sukarno so much that he endeavored to end it by issuing the 5 July 1955 presidential decree, dissolving the Konstituante (constituent assembly) and re-installing the 1945 Constitution.

Before the decree was issued, however, ulemas agreed there must not be any vacuum in the law and administration. They had to decide whether Sukarno's administration and his policies were religiously lawful. So a group of the Muslim scholars -- reportedly, with the encouragement of Sukarno -- held the Conference of Ulemas at the Cipanas Palace in early 1954.

They came out of the conference declaring Sukarno as Indonesia's "powerful emergency leader" (waliyyul amri adl dlaruri bisy syaukah). All subsequent decisions of the president, as holder of the highest executive power, as well as those of the other state apparatuses, would then be considered legitimate under Islamic law.

The same recognition would also be accorded to any actions that the president and the state apparatuses undertook to safeguard public order and the state's sovereignty. The ulemas issued their edict (fatwa) in reference to the work of scholars such as Murtadla Az Zabidi in the book Syarah Ihya and Taqiuddin Al Husaini in the book Kifayat Al Akhyar.

By the same token, the marriages performed by wali hakim appointed by Sukarno's government were then accepted as lawful. Otherwise, the consequences would have been unthinkable; countless children would have been categorized as being born out of wedlock according to Islamic law.

The edict was adopted in the congress of Nahdlatul Ulama held in Surabaya between Sept. 8 and 13, 1954.

It was around the same time that Sukarno faced increasing pressure from the continuing conflict between civil and military authorities in Jakarta, as well as the growing separatism in outer regions.

Among the separatist movements were the DI/TII led by Kartosuwiryo in West Java, the rebellion of Kahar Muzakar in South Sulawesi, and the PRII/Permesta under Zulkifli Lubis in West Sumatra.

Sukarno needed all the political support he could get to fight the secessionist movements -- but he could not get if from the fragile legislature and Cabinet. The edict, however, would be the perfect political support for his campaign against the secessionists -- in Islamic legal terms, they were committing bughot or treason.

The historical details cited above illustrate how Sukarno managed to transfer his status as the all-powerful emergency leader, waliyyul amri, from a legal context into a political one.

He used the ulemas' edict on the legality of his presidential institution to politically legitimize his campaigns against armed separatist movements -- many of whose members were Muslim figures.

Strangely, the ulemas who issued the edict allowed Sukarno to do what he did. Under Islamic law, the silence of ulemas over the implementation of an edict can be taken as tacit approval (ijma sukuti).

There were indeed Muslim scholars (kiai) who rejected the status of waliyyul amri for Indonesia, which was not an Islamic state. They believed that persuasion should precede the institution of an emergency status with repressive measures against those accused of committing bughot.

Sukarno's use of "political edict", against his opponents and the separatist movements, is now apparently being emulated by the supporters of President Abdurrahman "Gus Dur" Wahid. This is evident from the recent intensive discussions by his supporters in Surabaya, East Java, and Sukabumi, in West Java, on the question of bughot.

Gus Dur's supporters have even anticipated the worst-case scenario, where the President would be forcibly removed by his opponents, by recruiting jihad fighters. This is an emulation of the Resolution on Jihad issued on Nov. 10, 1945, in Surabaya by then NU chairman K.H. Hasyim Asy'ari, before the heroic resistance against the Dutch movement.

The use of the terms bughot and jihad in defense of Gus Dur's position is not only incorrect, but also unwise. This is why Gus Dur himself has rejected the call for a jihad, knowing that the term can only be used in the context of defending Islam.

Physical measures -- in reference to the Koran, Surat Al Hujurat verse 9 -- are confined only to those who have taken up arms against the government. The Free Aceh Movement is an example, maybe. They have committed bughot and the government can launch military operations in Aceh.

Applying bughot and jihad against those resisting Gus Dur by criticizing or holding street demonstrations, however, would be overkill. It would not only harden the resistance, but also create an impression that Gus Dur is far more authoritarian than Soeharto was.

Whereas Soeharto applied the subversion law to eliminate his political enemies, Gus Dur's regime is making use of political edicts to crush his opponents. A contradiction if ever there was one, considering Gus Dur's outspoken criticism of people "politicizing religions".

The writer runs Pesantren Al Masruriyah Tebuireng, a Nahdlatul Ulama boarding school in Jombang, East Java.