'Bughot', from law to politics

'Bughot', from law to politics

By M. Ishom Hadzik

JOMBANG, East Java (JP): In the early 1950s, Indonesian
Muslims were preoccupied with the question, "When a Muslim woman,
who no longer has a wali nasab (guardian by lineage, such as
father or uncle), is married by a wali hakim (appointed religious
official), is her marriage religiously legal?"

The question emerged against the backdrop of an ideological
conflict between two large groups -- those who wanted a state
based upon the Pancasila ideology and the 1945 Constitution, and
those who sought for an Islamic state that was based upon the
Jakarta Chapter.

The protracted tension annoyed then President Sukarno so much
that he endeavored to end it by issuing the 5 July 1955
presidential decree, dissolving the Konstituante (constituent
assembly) and re-installing the 1945 Constitution.

Before the decree was issued, however, ulemas agreed there
must not be any vacuum in the law and administration. They had to
decide whether Sukarno's administration and his policies were
religiously lawful. So a group of the Muslim scholars --
reportedly, with the encouragement of Sukarno -- held the
Conference of Ulemas at the Cipanas Palace in early 1954.

They came out of the conference declaring Sukarno as
Indonesia's "powerful emergency leader" (waliyyul amri adl
dlaruri bisy syaukah). All subsequent decisions of the president,
as holder of the highest executive power, as well as those of the
other state apparatuses, would then be considered legitimate
under Islamic law.

The same recognition would also be accorded to any actions
that the president and the state apparatuses undertook to
safeguard public order and the state's sovereignty. The ulemas
issued their edict (fatwa) in reference to the work of scholars
such as Murtadla Az Zabidi in the book Syarah Ihya and Taqiuddin
Al Husaini in the book Kifayat Al Akhyar.

By the same token, the marriages performed by wali hakim
appointed by Sukarno's government were then accepted as lawful.
Otherwise, the consequences would have been unthinkable;
countless children would have been categorized as being born out
of wedlock according to Islamic law.

The edict was adopted in the congress of Nahdlatul Ulama held
in Surabaya between Sept. 8 and 13, 1954.

It was around the same time that Sukarno faced increasing
pressure from the continuing conflict between civil and military
authorities in Jakarta, as well as the growing separatism in
outer regions.

Among the separatist movements were the DI/TII led by
Kartosuwiryo in West Java, the rebellion of Kahar Muzakar in
South Sulawesi, and the PRII/Permesta under Zulkifli Lubis in
West Sumatra.

Sukarno needed all the political support he could get to fight
the secessionist movements -- but he could not get if from the
fragile legislature and Cabinet. The edict, however, would be the
perfect political support for his campaign against the
secessionists -- in Islamic legal terms, they were committing
bughot or treason.

The historical details cited above illustrate how Sukarno
managed to transfer his status as the all-powerful emergency
leader, waliyyul amri, from a legal context into a political one.

He used the ulemas' edict on the legality of his presidential
institution to politically legitimize his campaigns against armed
separatist movements -- many of whose members were Muslim
figures.

Strangely, the ulemas who issued the edict allowed Sukarno to
do what he did. Under Islamic law, the silence of ulemas over the
implementation of an edict can be taken as tacit approval (ijma
sukuti).

There were indeed Muslim scholars (kiai) who rejected the
status of waliyyul amri for Indonesia, which was not an Islamic
state. They believed that persuasion should precede the
institution of an emergency status with repressive measures
against those accused of committing bughot.

Sukarno's use of "political edict", against his opponents and
the separatist movements, is now apparently being emulated by the
supporters of President Abdurrahman "Gus Dur" Wahid. This is
evident from the recent intensive discussions by his supporters
in Surabaya, East Java, and Sukabumi, in West Java, on the
question of bughot.

Gus Dur's supporters have even anticipated the worst-case
scenario, where the President would be forcibly removed by his
opponents, by recruiting jihad fighters. This is an emulation of
the Resolution on Jihad issued on Nov. 10, 1945, in Surabaya by
then NU chairman K.H. Hasyim Asy'ari, before the heroic
resistance against the Dutch movement.

The use of the terms bughot and jihad in defense of Gus Dur's
position is not only incorrect, but also unwise. This is why Gus
Dur himself has rejected the call for a jihad, knowing that the
term can only be used in the context of defending Islam.

Physical measures -- in reference to the Koran, Surat Al
Hujurat verse 9 -- are confined only to those who have taken up
arms against the government. The Free Aceh Movement is an
example, maybe. They have committed bughot and the government can
launch military operations in Aceh.

Applying bughot and jihad against those resisting Gus Dur by
criticizing or holding street demonstrations, however, would be
overkill. It would not only harden the resistance, but also
create an impression that Gus Dur is far more authoritarian than
Soeharto was.

Whereas Soeharto applied the subversion law to eliminate his
political enemies, Gus Dur's regime is making use of political
edicts to crush his opponents. A contradiction if ever there was
one, considering Gus Dur's outspoken criticism of people
"politicizing religions".

The writer runs Pesantren Al Masruriyah Tebuireng, a Nahdlatul
Ulama boarding school in Jombang, East Java.