Breaking the cycle of violence in Indonesia

Breaking the cycle of violence in Indonesia

Annabel McGoldrick, Reporting the World, London, annabelmcg@aol.com
and Aya Muchtar, Contributor, Jakarta, aya@cbn.net.id

Since the fall of President Soeharto's New Order government
four years ago, many areas of Indonesia have been disfigured by
brutal fighting and bloodshed. A recent study by the Ministry of
Defense said no fewer 15 provinces were vulnerable to religious
and ethnic conflicts. What is more difficult is to take the next
step and ask the crucial questions -- what makes them vulnerable
and what could be done to protect them?

Thousands of capable people across the country are actively
seeking ways to improve the prospects for their communities.
Knowledge is power, and to empower peace actors, from grassroots
to government, it is important to know about the dynamics of
conflict and how they can trap people in repeating patterns of
behavior.

This is where an influential concept from the UK could prove
useful in Indonesia. The "cycle of violence" describes a syndrome
whereby trauma breeds trauma and fear breeds revenge and
retaliation. Above all, it offers clues for more effective
conflict prevention by directing our attention to where a variety
of different interventions can help the situation by breaking
this cycle.

The classic cycle of violence, which ensures that conflict
follows conflict, has roughly seven stages. They are all too
familiar to anyone who has paid serious attention to the Israeli-
Palestinian conflict, or violence in central Africa. The
agonizing death of Yugoslavia has been another showcase for this
highly recognizable pattern, and it's now flowing in many of
Indonesia's provinces.

This is how the cycle of violence works in the human psyche.

Perhaps you were there, or someone you know witnessed, say,
the riots in Kalimantan, or house-burnings in Poso; did you lose
a member of your family, a friend perhaps?

The first human reaction to such horror is to feel shocked and
frightened, disbelief that such an atrocity has taken place. As
people begin to come to terms with what has happened they then
feel pain, sometimes agonizing pain that dear loved ones have
gone. Then the grieving process begins.

Sometimes this takes many years -- Mari Fitzduff, professor of
conflict studies at the University of Ulster Northern Ireland,
recently explained at a conference in London how the constant
trickle of tragedies in the province prevented people from
grieving until the let-up in the violence of recent years.

As people come to terms with their grief and loss they then
feel angry -- why did this have to happen, why did they have to
die? Anger hardens to bitterness. Bitterness is anger plus
memory.

Crucially, bitterness stays in the system, as an emotion
constantly demanding that "something must be done" -- something
equal to, or worse than, what was done to me. So it fuels the
call for revenge.

The cycle of violence explored here is conceptualized by
Scilla Elworthy, director of the British NGO, the Oxford Research
Group. Dr Elworthy says that the cycle can only be dismantled
within the individual human mind and heart.

According to Dr Elworthy, "Intervention is needed at the point
before anger hardens into bitterness, revenge and retaliation."

"To be effective it must address the physical, the political
and the psychological security of people trapped in violence".

"One without the other is insufficiently strong to break the
cycle. In every case, the people involved in situations of
violence must be supported in the development of their own
resources for transformation."

In Indonesia there have been a number of interventions for
physical, political and psychological security which are
primarily concerned with conflict resolution or mitigation
initiatives. This is different from, and complimentary to, the
profoundly important role of relief, development and human-rights
agencies.

o Intervention for physical security

Peacekeeping: Where people have murdered, brutalized or
tortured each other, the first necessity is to keep them
physically separated. This is often a role of the UN, where it is
distinguished from peacebuilding and peacemaking -- working to
overcome trauma, restore confidence and encourage reconciliation.

In Indonesia, the mobile brigade and the Indonesian Military
(TNI) are often dispatched to a conflict zone, in the aftermath
of violence, to put up road blocks and forestall any further
attacks. But the record of these organizations is mixed.

Their own lack of resources, training and awareness,
particularly when it comes to respect for human rights, has often
limited their effectiveness. The International Crisis Group, a
Brussels-based think-tank, recently added its voice to those
criticizing the TNI as counter-productive, its officers accused
of ordering their men to provoke or maintain conflicts in order
to profit from them.

Protection: When civilians are threatened, driven from their
homes, or under attack they can be protected in a number of ways.
In Aceh protection is provided by Peace Brigades International
(PBI). Trained volunteers accompany local NGO staff in Aceh to go
about their daily tasks, providing a witness to any threats of
violence and intimidation.

Tentena, the mainly Christian town on the shores of Lake Poso,
has been caught up in the intercommunal clashes of recent years.
The Sintuwo Maroso Youth Convoy (Amsimar) is a group of mainly
university graduates providing protection to the 30 or so Muslims
who've stayed in their homes rather becoming refugees. They've
stood guard over the local mosque as well as the market place.

Weapons collection: When a province is awash with weapons
after violent clashes, effective schemes are needed to collect
and destroy the weapons. This job has been undertaken in recent
years by the police and TNI, but there has been some criticism of
these schemes being ineffective, even counter-productive.

The Malino Agreements for both Ambon and Poso contained weapon
collections schemes but residents feared that only a token number
of weapons were handed over.

However in July 2002 in Tobelo, North Maluku an army weapon-
sweeping operation proved a trigger for another round of violence
as it was considered unequal by the Muslim community. Thus
intervention aimed at physical security is unlikely to work
unless interventions to provide political and psychological
security are being carried out at the same time.

One of the most creative schemes put into practice was in El
Salvador in 1995. This was launched by a group of businessmen
whose trucks were being hijacked by heavily armed gangs.

The gangs were formed with guns left over from 12 years of
civil war, in response to a major source of insecurity -- not
having enough to eat. So for every gun surrendered, the
businessmen offered food vouchers worth US$100. By the end of the
second weekend vouchers worth $103,000 had been issued. The
President helped, and in three years over 10,000 weapons were
handed in.

The writers recently led a training program in peace
journalism for the British Council in Jakarta.