'Black economy' threatens Aceh peace

'Black economy' threatens Aceh peace

Wiryono Sastrohandoyo, Ahmad Humam Hamid and Brian Millen,
Jakarta

The military conflict is essentially but one part of the
problem in Aceh. The greatest threat to security in Aceh is the
mature criminal industries of smuggling, kidnapping and ransom,
extortion, illegal logging and the marijuana trade. Three of the
five points relate to the "black economy".

It is the protection and perpetuation of these industries that
will cause problems. Embedded in this black economy are the
interests of the government apparatus and the interests of the
Free Aceh Movement (GAM).

Although GAM's operational control is central for the conduct
of military operations, the operations themselves are responsible
for the maintenance of their finance and funding. Some degree of
collusion is suspected to exist between GAM and sections of the
government apparatus in the marijuana trade.

Businesses in Aceh face significant problems. Firstly, they
must transition in accordance with every other company in
Indonesia who are evolving from businesses under New Order
systems, to one that has to come to grips with a new political
paradigm of vast pluralism. There is considerable legislative
uncertainty in this process.

The Special Autonomy legislation requires the support of
approximately 71 to 72 subsequent pieces of legislation to make
it work and contests the political will of the government to
actually push these through.

Secondly, they need to apply strict security measures and a
degree of stability to ensure the safety of their assets and some
degree of certainty. What is crucial is companies coming to grips
with the fact that community development, community relations,
dealing with official and unofficial relationships within society
is crucially important to run their business.

New businesses are left with the challenge of implementing
heightened security measures to start their business, while
having to develop comprehensive community development programs
and relations, to achieve forms of community based security.

Rampant extortion has accelerated to levels hitherto unknown.
While some very large companies have rejected paying these
extortion payments, others have been paying at these increased
extortion levels.

Infrastructure developments that have been halted and in some
cases crippled have had significant impact on business in the
province. The power grid that will be completed in the Pidie
regency by July this year, and the Banda Aceh to Medan railroad
needs to be rebuilt and finished as soon as possible.

The road system will need to be opened up and improved for
there to be big business in Aceh. In the conflict resolution
process, there is a necessity for reconstruction and
redevelopment. It is this that will win the hearts and minds of
people. There may not be much new business occurring in Aceh for
at least three to four years, however, if the emergence of new
businesses started now, it would help the conflict resolution
process.

The peace process has provided a fresh opportunity for Aceh.
In the short term, assistance will be needed just to take care of
the immediate needs of the people.

Yet hand-outs will not do much in the long run. It is far
better to empower Aceh's skillful entrepreneurs and open the
doors to outside investment in order to integrate more profitably
in the greater economy of Indonesia. Economic development led by
the private sector is the key to improving welfare, however,
conditions in Aceh are not as yet conducive for such an approach.

The peace process is taking much longer to put into practice
than expected and the adversaries must learn to trust each other.

Another problem is the unprecedented flood of money rushing as
the result of the share in the oil and gas revenue. The flow of
income caught both government and the people by surprise.

No serious and well thought development plans have been
drafted, no strategies have been thought out about ways and means
to promote Aceh's long-term development. As often happens in such
cases, the government throws money at ill-conceived
infrastructure projects.

The Leja Galaska road with a budget of US$160-$170 million is
one such project. The temptation for contract commission and
kick-backs is proving too great to resist. The road, when it
comes into being will have cost the people double its real cost
and will begin to destroy the forest and hinterland of Aceh.

The government could have won the hearts and minds of the
people if it had spent a small portion of that money on food,
medicine, and shelter. Peace would then be almost tangible.

Ordinary Acehnese are hopeful at the prospect of peace, but
they keep asking about the whereabouts of government and evidence
of concrete measures to improve their lives. The peace agreement
is three months old now, but if you go to even moderately remote
areas in Aceh, no trace of the state can be found.

The absence of state governance below the subdistrict level
makes peace conditions indistinguishable from insurgency. People
say that the present government will be there until the general
elections in 2004, but looking at GAM's present operations in the
field, it seems unlikely that there will be a general election.

One of the critical threats to the peace agreement right now
is that GAM is taking advantage of the lull in the war. It uses
the standstill to gain control that it lost during the military
offensive, and to reestablish administrative control over many
parts of Aceh.

(One perception is that) GAM is using the peace period to
rally more people for independence. This relates to the
inefficacy of the local government who will remain there until
2005. People don't see any other alternative to GAM as the likely
government. How long is TNI willing to sit quietly while GAM
consolidates its forces? The way this problem is solved has
implications for Papua and other areas of Aceh, particularly if
the army manages to persuade the nation that the situation has
become intolerable.

The international community is inclined to sympathize with
insurgents partly because government suppression always tends to
exceed necessity, and because the rebel cause of "independence"
is universally hailed as good.

International observers are therefore quick to condemn
military violations of truces, but hesitant to censure rebel
brutality. Some of this partiality can be gleaned from the way
the Henry Dunant Center drafts peace documents.

Ambassador Wiryono Sastrohandoyo observed that the word "will"
translates to "must" when relating to an obligation of the
Indonesian government, but changes back to "will" when
performance is expected from GAM. Rather than fuss about details
like translation of words. Ambassador Wiryono prefers to push the
whole process along and bring it to a solution acceptable to all.

Mercy and sympathy ought to be addressed to the people, to the
widows and orphans, to the down-and-outs in the refugee camps,
and not to GAM. Activist Ahmad Humam Hamid recounts that the
moment the peace agreement was signed, GAM started to implement
their version of the peace plan.

Weapons were imported, the population was told that Aceh is
about to declare its independence, the UN will come, like in East
Timor, and TNI can do nothing. Dr. Hamid is appalled by the
estimate that until today the majority of the people in Aceh
received their information about the peace from GAM, not from the
government. Extortion continues openly. It is now called a "tax",
a Nangroe tax to support the struggle for independence.

GAM violates the peace accord and does so openly. The
government complains, but does not address the complaints to the
Joint Security Commission. The HDC is too busy trying to win
trust and confidence to call "a spade a spade" when violations do
occur. The government's chief negotiator understands, and
continues to push the process.

The above is taken from the writers' executive summary on
latest developments on Aceh for Strategic Intelligence's
Executive Forum held on Feb. 25 in Jakarta. Wiryono Sastrohandoyo
is Indonesia's Chief Negotiator for Aceh; Dr. Ahmad Humam Hamid
is Board Director, Aceh Care Human Rights Center, and Brig. Gen.
Brian Millen is Director of Research & Analysis, Assessments
Group Indonesia, a security risk and business intelligence
consultancy based in Jakarta.