BIN's problem in regaining public trust not easy

BIN's problem in regaining public trust not easy

Ardimas Sasdi, Staff Writer, The Jakarta Post, ardimas@thejakartapost.com

The National Intelligence Agency (BIN) seized the Bali
bombings as an opportunity to defend itself against charges that
it had failed to inform the public of potential terrorist attacks
and the existence of terrorist cells in Indonesia.

BIN was formerly known as the State Intelligence Coordinating
Board (Bakin), but changed its name in December 2000 in an
attempt to distance itself from the dreaded intelligence body of
the New Order era.

Muhyar Yara, a spokesman for the agency, said in a radio
interview on Oct. 15 in Jakarta that the agency had informed the
public a year ago of the existence of international terrorist
networks in Poso, Central Sulawesi. The information, however, had
been largely ignored because of public cynicism and suspicion
surrounding the agency's motives behind the alert notice.

"Politicians and government officials questioned the validity
of the information and even accused BIN of trying to create a new
'ghost' terrorist with the notice.

"On one occasion a year ago, I was involved in a heated
argument with the chief editor of a Jakarta daily. At that time,
he told me that he did not trust me and even said that he was not
afraid of terrorists, but of the agency supervising terrorists.
Now that the (Bali) incident has happened, I want to see the
editor again to hear what he would say," Muchyar said.

The Jakarta Post ran a front-page article on Aug. 24, 2001,
that carried the warning from BIN chief Lt. Gen. (ret) A.M.
Hendropriyono that Indonesia was vulnerable to infiltration by
international terrorists.

"Terrorism has a tendency to flourish in a country which is in
transition toward democracy. So, democratization should be
coupled with the promotion of surveillance. We must be alert and
be prepared. It is our responsibility (to fight terrorism),"
Hendropriyono was quoted in the article.

Muchyar's complaints about the negative attitude of the public
in regards the warning can be understood by looking at the series
of efforts taken by the intelligence agency to restore its image,
including the appointment of Lt. Gen. (ret.) Z.A. Maulani as its
chief during former president B.J. Habibie's administration, and
outspoken, and former Golkar Party legislator Muchyar as
spokesman of the agency.

The problem besetting an intelligence agency like BIN and its
predecessor Bakin, which had been a tool of repression to silence
critics of government for the three decades of Soeharto's regime,
is not a simple matter as many people had been victimized by the
security apparatus.

Like most intelligence agencies of developing countries, BIN's
case is an image problem and thus is not easy for the agency to
solve. The image of an intelligence agency is usually formed by
the perception of a person or a group of people who have dealt
with the agency. In many cases, public perception of an
intelligence agency is negative.

First-year students of communication science are often told by
their professors that communication is a matter of perception.
This perception, once drawn, is something which cannot be changed
easily unless there is strong effort by its subject for self-
change or self-reform. Even so, such an attempt to redefine one's
image usually requires a long period of time.

The existence of BIN as an intelligence agency was, and is,
inseparable from the military, one of the backbones of Soeharto's
New Order government along with Golkar. As with BIN, Golkar
changed its name to the Golkar Party following Soeharto's fall
from power in May 1998, after having ruled the country with an
iron hand since the mid-60s.

Soeharto used his intelligence agencies to create fear among
the public from the outset of his term as president, and terror
was carried out by the security apparatus. An example is the fate
of the Indonesian Communist Party (PKI), which was blamed for the
attempted coup d'etat of Sept. 30, 1965, that resulted in the
death of several Army generals. The coup was crushed by
Soeharto's loyal Army, the remaining members and remnants of PKI
purged, and the party outlawed.

Soeharto continued to use terror to create fear among the
public through the periodic use of violence, including the
Lampung massacres and the kidnapping of student activists in the
1990s, to name a few from a long list of such cases.

Hendropriyono, who was appointed BIN chief last year, is
himself a problematic figure with his alleged involvement in the
bloody Talangsari incident in 1989, a military-led operation to
crush followers of extremist elements. Official statements on the
number of casualties give a figure of 27; unofficial sources,
however, said more than 300 people, including three residents who
were not members of the extremist group, were killed.

Hendropriyono, who was then a colonel and Lampung military
resort commander, was allegedly responsible for this bloody clash
between military resort officers and local Talangsari residents.
The incident has not been, until today, properly solved through a
transparent legal process at court.

Antara news agency reported on Oct. 28 that Vice President
Hamzah Haz instructed Hendropriyono not to repeat the obsolete
paradigm of the agency as accomplice to the government, during a
meeting at Hamzah's Jakarta office. Ironically, Hamzah and his
party were categorized as an "opposition party" during the New
Order regime and as such, were apparently targets of strict
surveillance by military and intelligence agents.

Hamzah's order to Hendropriyono came not long after President
Megawati Soekarnoputri issued a decree on Oct. 22, which
empowered BIN with the authority to coordinate intelligence. The
decree also stipulated that BIN has a duty to guide and ensure
integrated planning and implementation of all intelligence
activities.

In redefining such a deep-rooted, negative image, it must be
remembered that the victims of torture or of kidnappings carried
out by the military are so traumatized by their experiences that
they still choose not to speak about their experiences, even
though the actual incident occurred a long time ago. Even
activists such as Haryanto Taslam of the Indonesian Democratic
Party of Struggle, who bravely challenged party leader Megawati,
still keep mum when asked about their experiences under military
detention.

Experiences of trauma and torture cause such emotional and
psychological scars that, when the individuals contact any
stimulus of pain or suffering as experienced by victims or
witnesses of similar terror cases, the memories of their own
experiences are forced out of their subconscious and relived.

BIN's attempt to convince the population of its intelligence
findings is part of its efforts to regain public trust. In the
above context, however, the road to this goal is long and bumpy
as the memories of past violations by the intelligence and the
military are still fresh in the minds of the public.