'Bimbogate' diverts U.S. attention
As the financial turmoil afflicting Asia has developed over the last six months, the role played by the United States has been critical. The Jakarta Post Asia correspondent Harvey Stockwin attempts an overview of the U.S. posture towards Asia's crisis, and how it will be affected by the alleged scandal arising from President Bill Clinton's attempt to clear himself of charges of sexual transgressions.
HONG KONG (JP): President Bill Clinton's so-called "bimbo eruption" could not have come at a worst time for East or Southeast Asia. "Bimbo eruption" sounds like a boil that needs to be lanced -- and politically, that is precisely the situation which Clinton faces.
The alleged scandal arises when Asia, by contrast, is faced by a situation in which the world's fourth largest nation, Indonesia, seems close to financial collapse, as a result of the free fall of the rupiah, and a seemingly inevitable partial default on its foreign borrowings.
Even before the world outside the American Middle Kingdom ever heard of Ms Monica Lewinsky, the Clinton administration appeared to be giving less than its full attention to what is arguably the most serious Asian crisis since the Vietnam War.
Now, as what will probably be called "Bimbogate" threatens Clinton's effectiveness and durability, and attains cyclonic force in the frenzied world of the sensation-seeking U.S. media, it appears that the Americans are in real danger of joining the Japanese: instead of providing and sustaining a solution to the East and Southeast Asian financial crisis, the Americans, too, may become part of the problem.
They were in danger of becoming that anyway. Ever since the great Southeast Asian stock and currency slide began last July, to be quickly followed by the great East Asian Economic setback, the Clinton administration has been faced with a delicate diplomatic problem.
On the one hand, the Clinton administration was bound, by the very nature of the crisis, to take positions which the super- sensitive would misconstrue as inconsiderate at best, or neocolonial at worst -- as some sections of South Korean opinion already have done.
On the other hand, the Americans simply had to take a fairly firm stand, even if they did intend to visit the Asian crises mainly on the coattails of the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World Bank.
The obvious answer was to combine a firm posture with a policy of careful consideration and empathy for its friends and allies on the other side of the Pacific. The U.S. had no choice, for example, but to insist repeatedly to the South Koreans that their lack of openness to the outside world lay near the heart of their economic crisis and must be rectified. It would have been easier to stress this if it had been accompanied by some high-level visits to convey reassurance, thereby trying to undermine predictable Korean xenophobia.
Leaving aside what Clinton really does accomplish inside the Oval Office, in the real world it has been a case of "none of the above".
U.S. policy towards South Korea has mirrored the self- defeating softness of past U.S. policy towards Japan -- thereby implicitly accepting essentially mercantilist policies which are neither in the American nor the East Asian longterm interest.
Unable to pay enough attention to Korea, until events on the money markets forced it to do so, the administration soft- pedaled its justifiable demands for a more open economy. But that soft-pedaling has still been enough to enable xenophobia to take firmer hold. The Americans are in the unenviable position of being damned if they do, and damned if they don't.
Meanwhile Koreans are writing articles lauding the success of their "campaign" to radically reduce the "enemy" of foreign imports as a triumph of economic good sense. Nowhere is it pointed out in such articles that if Americans, Asians and Europeans felt the same way about curtailing Korean imports, the Korean crisis would become unimaginably worse, and South Korea would never have achieved its present level of development.
It is difficult to escape the conclusion that, at the heart of the trouble with they have handled the regional crises, the Americans have failed because they did not take the creeping crisis seriously enough as early as they should have done.
Clinton himself illustrated this as he attended the Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation forum summit in December in Vancouver and was reported as referring to the crisis as merely being a "glitch" in regional progress -- far too sanguine a view in view of what had already happened at that stage.
There may have been some U.S.-Singapore interaction at work in Clinton's remark. Singapore had also tended towards a far too relaxed view of the crisis, possibly because its stock and currency have been less badly affected than any other nation. Prime Minister Goh Chok Tong had long called the crisis a mere "blip" on the ASEAN radar screen. Goh and Clinton played golf together prior to Clinton making his "glitch" remark.
Be that as it may, the lack of an American sense of urgency, regarding Asia's financial woes, has been well illustrated in relation to Thailand. On the one hand, if an appropriate degree of toughness early on had emanated from Washington DC in relation to regionally damaging procrastination in Bangkok, it might have helped to bring about the earlier fall of the excessively corrupt Chavalit government.
On the other hand, now that there has been a democratic change to an administration which at least faces up to Thailand's difficulties, the U.S. seems only inclined to support it with words. This seemed to be the pattern as the Thai Minister of Finance Tarrin Nimmanahaeminda visited Washington just before Bimbogate burst upon the scene.
Given the Thai perception of themselves as longtime allies of the United States, as well as being a nation seeking to strengthen both its democracy and its economy, it really was essential for the Clinton administration to give some tangible sign of support. As far as can be seen it was not forthcoming and the Thai sense of disappointment was palpable. Washington was seen, in Bangkok, as favoring far-from-democratic Indonesia.
In point of fact, the America-centric nature of current U.S. foreign policy was almost certainly illustrated by the treatment accorded to Finance Minister Tarrin, even before Bimbogate. Having already failed to get Congress to renew Clinton's ability to "fast-track" trade agreements (a crucial failure as far as Asia is concerned), the Clinton administration is also far from certain about securing Congressional approval of an American replenishment of its pledges to the IMF.
This replenishment, involving renewal of periodic pledges plus support for a new emergency fund, is absolutely vital if the IMF is to fulfill the role being allotted to it in the current crises.
Anxious to demonstrate its toughness to Congress, Clinton and Treasury Secretary Rubin no doubt felt they could not afford to "replenish" the Thais. Hence they could only give Tarrin verbal support, as domestic political considerations took precedence over what should have been an important foreign policy imperative.
Put another way, the Clinton administration was on the defensive in its Asia policy before Bimbogate broke -- and now that the alleged scandal and its accompanying media frenzy has broken, it will probably be even more on the defensive.
The sorry tale was superbly illustrated as Rubin finally got around to delivering a lengthy and substantial speech about the Asian financial crisis on Jan. 21 at Georgetown University. "Simply put," Rubin said, "we cannot afford to stand back and gamble that the crisis will resolve itself".
But that is precisely what the U.S. has appeared to do for far too long. Rubin's speech itself should have been delivered months ago -- then his articulation of American views and policy regarding the crisis might have had greater impact.
Given the delay in delivering the U.S. crisis assessment, it would have been better if Clinton himself had now delivered the speech. But Clinton's mind was almost certainly elsewhere. Ironically, Rubin's articulation of U.S. aims was drowned out in the American media by the breaking scandal.
Ironically, too, Asian leaders beset by financial woes will probably not be carefully reading the Rubin speech as they should be doing.
Much more likely, they will be eagerly absorbing cables from their ambassadors in Washington assessing whether or not a second U.S. presidential resignation is in the offing, or whether a distracted Clinton presidency is likely to have the effect of deepening Asia's ongoing crisis.