Between words, deeds on E. Timor

Between words, deeds on E. Timor

By Kusnanto Anggoro

JAKARTA (JP): Soon after taking office, President Megawati
Soekarnoputri issued a new presidential decree to expand the
scope of an ad hoc tribunal for atrocities committed in East
Timor. It may be too early to expect this decree to set a
breakthrough in trying those responsible for some of the worst
atrocities committed during 1999 in East Timor. The decree
appears to be intended more to appease international criticism
rather than genuinely uncover truth and justice.

Indeed, the decree would remove a constraint preventing the
prosecution of abuses that occurred before the referendum on Aug.
30, 1999, a position earlier rejected by the government of
Abdurrahman Wahid. It would include the killings in the churches
of Liquica and Suai (Apr. 6), the house of then leading
businessman Manuel Carrascalao (Apr. 17), and the murder of Dutch
journalist Sander Thoenes in Dili (Sept. 21). However, it still
excludes a number of cases including the 1999 killings in Maliana
(Sept. 8-9).

A thorough look at some cases may shed light on the limited
jurisdiction of the decree. All excluded cases appear to be those
containing either highly disputed areas of human right
infringement, for example sexual violence and intimidation,
and/or those with potentially close links to the Indonesian
security apparatus. Preparedness to bring the Suai and Liquica
cases to trial, however, may indicate Megawati's intention to
deal with the militias now based in West Timor.

This pattern suggests that Jakarta would not be prepared to
bring justice to the Maliana case in which people died in a
police station, which could thus implicate the deliberate role of
the Indonesian security forces.

Still, Jakarta would not easily give in to pressure to include
the cases of mass deportation in September 1999, when hundreds of
thousands of East Timorese were forced to move to the western
half of the Island.

A tribunal would be even more unlikely to cover events during
the decisive months of early 1999, when reports suggest the
Indonesian Military was involved in the formation of East
Timorese militias.

Therefore, past human rights violations in East Timor will
remain a pebble in Indonesia's diplomacy shoe for many years to
come. It remains to be seen whether Jakarta is prepared to move
further. Somehow, human rights have become legitimate concerns in
post-Cold War international relations. An international tribunal
for war crimes in East Timor is still a possibility.

However, many circles in Indonesia's legislature and in the
military view the issue of human rights, and other issues in
global governance, as Western instruments to undermine
Indonesia's emergence as a great power. Strong pressure on
Megawati's government will come consistently from purist human
rights activists, international and/or domestic. In bilateral,
interstate relations, the use of human rights issues as foreign
policy instruments may still fall short of other issues,
including military and economic might.

As history tells us, imposing an international war crimes
tribunal against state officials could be politically thorny.
Cases against Iraq's Saddam Hussein or even former U.S. Secretary
of State Henry Kissinger may be morally legitimate, but
politically impossible. The trial against Slobodan Milosevic was
only possible after the Serbian leader's defeat in a democratic
election and after a completely new regime emerged in Yugoslavia.

The regime that emerged in Indonesia from the ashes of
Soeharto's New Order differs very much from post-World War II
Germany and Japan, when a replacement made it possible for the
war crime trials of Nuremberg (1945) and Tokyo (1946).

Complicating all of these questions, many would be more
concerned about the stability of Megawati's government than on
the formation of an international tribunal. This trend has
already appeared from a recent objection by the Australian Senate
to demands for an international war crimes tribunal covering the
Indonesian occupation of East Timor (Australian Associated Press,
Aug. 22 2001).

Still, Jose Alexandre "Xanana" Gusmao, independence leader and
likely president of independent East Timor, offers a conciliatory
voice, saying that "we must, together, forget the past and build
on the future" (Suara Timor Lorosae, Aug. 20 2001).

It sounds reconciling. However, Jakarta must not consider all
of these concessions as an opportunity to apply a freer hand. If
it is to honorably settle the problems of human rights within its
own justice system then the trial of the East Timor cases must
proceed as soon as possible.

Dr. Kusnanto Anggoro is senior researcher with the Centre for
Strategic and International Studies and lecturer for the
postgraduate studies program of the University of Indonesia.