Best or worse option

The power-sharing arrangement that President Abdurrahman Wahid offered to Vice President Megawati Soekarnoputri raises some very serious constitutional problems that have to be addressed before anyone, particularly Megawati, can make any commitment one way or another. A compromise is what Indonesia desperately needs today to resolve the current leadership crisis, but we still have to move with caution to ensure that we are not plunged deeper into the present national leadership crisis. In particular, we have to be sure that any transfer of power that the President offered on Friday would proceed in a constitutional manner.

The offer to "transfer all constitutional duties" to the Vice President suggests that Abdurrahman is now willing to accept the role of a figurehead president, or as head of state, and to allow Megawati to be fully in charge of the administration as head of government. This is a major departure from a President who only a few hours earlier had openly rejected the very notion of sharing his power with his deputy.

The toughest question to answer about his proposal is whether power sharing complies with the wording of the 1945 Constitution. The answer, as every one knows, is clearly not because the country's basic law vests all executive powers in the elected president, and not the vice president.

Proponents of the power-sharing concept have argued that to overcome the constitutional hurdle, the People's Consultative Assembly (MPR) could meet and issue a ruling to endorse this arrangement that would last until the next presidential election in 2004. They contend that this arrangement must be interim in nature given the political circumstances of the day.

If this arrangement is accepted and sealed by an MPR decree, the next questions is, who will present the accountability report to the MPR in 2004? Who will represent Indonesia at international summits? Who will sign various documents, from new laws, decrees to Cabinet appointments? The MPR must resolve these and a host of other issues about the authority and duties of the President and the Vice President before endorsing the arrangement.

Proponents of the power-sharing formula have argued that this would be the least costly solution in terms of human lives compared to other options, which they claim raise the possibility of violent backlashes by supporters of President Abdurrahman. Even if we accept the notion that it is the least costly, this option is, constitutionally, the messiest of them all.

The MPR would have to virtually rewrite articles in the Constitution pertaining to the powers and duties of the President to make this arrangement possible. That would leave the MPR and Megawati vulnerable to accusations of violating the Constitution. With such threats haunting them, we can be sure that the new government would be just as ineffective as the present one.

What is more, who can guarantee that Abdurrahman will not go back on his word, retake power by force by reciting the 1945 Constitution? Ironically, this was the path chosen by Indonesia's first president Sukarno, Megawati's father, when he put the nation in a state of emergency and reinstated the 1945 Constitution, and therefore his executive powers, which had hitherto been in the hands of a prime minister.

President Abdurrahman has, on more than one occasion, threatened to do the same in his battle with his political foes in the House of Representatives, but he has not been able to carry out his threat so far for lack of valid excuses and support. But once this new power-sharing arrangement is in force, he would have a stronger and even constitutional ground to move ahead with such a plan.

While we welcome the President's gesture to propose the power- sharing arrangement, it is important to point out that it is not the only option available to break the current impasse over the national leadership crisis. It is not necessarily the best one either, because it raises more questions than it provides answers. And it runs the risks of plunging the country into both leadership and constitutional crises at the same time.

There are other options that are still within the bounds of the 1945 Constitution. One is for President Abdurrahman to voluntarily resign, and the other is to allow the constitutional mechanism to resolve the problem. That means for the House of Representatives to meet on May 30 as scheduled, and which in all likelihood will recommend the MPR convene a special session to ask for President Abdurrahman's accountability report. Given the low standing of the President, the MPR will likely reject his report and oust him. Either option shows the President the door.

Any suggestion that these options will provoke violent backlashes from the President's supporters smack more of political blackmail. It is not surprising that these threats come from the President and some of his Cabinet ministers, whose job it is precisely to ensure that these things do not happen.

Nevertheless, by making the offer for a new power-sharing arrangement, the President has thrown the ball into Megawati's court. We hope she will make the right decision that is best not for herself personally, but for the entire nation.