Best or worse option

Best or worse option

The power-sharing arrangement that President Abdurrahman Wahid
offered to Vice President Megawati Soekarnoputri raises some very
serious constitutional problems that have to be addressed before
anyone, particularly Megawati, can make any commitment one way or
another. A compromise is what Indonesia desperately needs today
to resolve the current leadership crisis, but we still have to
move with caution to ensure that we are not plunged deeper into
the present national leadership crisis. In particular, we have to
be sure that any transfer of power that the President offered on
Friday would proceed in a constitutional manner.

The offer to "transfer all constitutional duties" to the Vice
President suggests that Abdurrahman is now willing to accept the
role of a figurehead president, or as head of state, and to allow
Megawati to be fully in charge of the administration as head of
government. This is a major departure from a President who only a
few hours earlier had openly rejected the very notion of sharing
his power with his deputy.

The toughest question to answer about his proposal is whether
power sharing complies with the wording of the 1945 Constitution.
The answer, as every one knows, is clearly not because the
country's basic law vests all executive powers in the elected
president, and not the vice president.

Proponents of the power-sharing concept have argued that to
overcome the constitutional hurdle, the People's Consultative
Assembly (MPR) could meet and issue a ruling to endorse this
arrangement that would last until the next presidential election
in 2004. They contend that this arrangement must be interim in
nature given the political circumstances of the day.

If this arrangement is accepted and sealed by an MPR decree,
the next questions is, who will present the accountability report
to the MPR in 2004? Who will represent Indonesia at international
summits? Who will sign various documents, from new laws, decrees
to Cabinet appointments? The MPR must resolve these and a host of
other issues about the authority and duties of the President and
the Vice President before endorsing the arrangement.

Proponents of the power-sharing formula have argued that this
would be the least costly solution in terms of human lives
compared to other options, which they claim raise the possibility
of violent backlashes by supporters of President Abdurrahman.
Even if we accept the notion that it is the least costly, this
option is, constitutionally, the messiest of them all.

The MPR would have to virtually rewrite articles in the
Constitution pertaining to the powers and duties of the President
to make this arrangement possible. That would leave the MPR and
Megawati vulnerable to accusations of violating the Constitution.
With such threats haunting them, we can be sure that the new
government would be just as ineffective as the present one.

What is more, who can guarantee that Abdurrahman will not go
back on his word, retake power by force by reciting the 1945
Constitution? Ironically, this was the path chosen by Indonesia's
first president Sukarno, Megawati's father, when he put the
nation in a state of emergency and reinstated the 1945
Constitution, and therefore his executive powers, which had
hitherto been in the hands of a prime minister.

President Abdurrahman has, on more than one occasion,
threatened to do the same in his battle with his political foes
in the House of Representatives, but he has not been able to
carry out his threat so far for lack of valid excuses and
support. But once this new power-sharing arrangement is in force,
he would have a stronger and even constitutional ground to move
ahead with such a plan.

While we welcome the President's gesture to propose the power-
sharing arrangement, it is important to point out that it is not
the only option available to break the current impasse over the
national leadership crisis. It is not necessarily the best one
either, because it raises more questions than it provides
answers. And it runs the risks of plunging the country into both
leadership and constitutional crises at the same time.

There are other options that are still within the bounds of
the 1945 Constitution. One is for President Abdurrahman to
voluntarily resign, and the other is to allow the constitutional
mechanism to resolve the problem. That means for the House of
Representatives to meet on May 30 as scheduled, and which in all
likelihood will recommend the MPR convene a special session to
ask for President Abdurrahman's accountability report. Given the
low standing of the President, the MPR will likely reject his
report and oust him. Either option shows the President the door.

Any suggestion that these options will provoke violent
backlashes from the President's supporters smack more of
political blackmail. It is not surprising that these threats come
from the President and some of his Cabinet ministers, whose job
it is precisely to ensure that these things do not happen.

Nevertheless, by making the offer for a new power-sharing
arrangement, the President has thrown the ball into Megawati's
court. We hope she will make the right decision that is best not
for herself personally, but for the entire nation.