Wed, 01 Mar 2000

Behind TNI's support for Gus Dur

The public has been watching closely whether the Indonesian Military has reflected resistance or support to its recent changes. Jusuf Wanandi, the chairman of the supervisory board of the Center for Strategic and International Studies in Jakarta, takes a closer look at the issue.

JAKARTA (JP): There was a lot of hype surrounding President Abdurrahman's decision to relieve Gen. Wiranto from his position as coordinating minister for political affairs and security, with some saying that it had created a wrong image of the Indonesian Military (TNI) and its future role in Indonesian society.

The decision by the President has indeed put the TNI more under civilian control. However, it was not as dramatic a measure as was portrayed in the media; drastic steps had been taken earlier by the President in an attempt to consolidate the TNI with officers that were loyal to him. That is why he immediately got the support of the TNI leadership when he removed Wiranto from the Cabinet.

The excessive speculations about a military coup have been mostly hot air. The warning by United States Ambassador to the United Nations Richard Holbrooke about the consequences of a coup was just that: a warning. This was the analysis by specialists and observers who closely follow the political scene here, especially relating to the TNI.

There are several reasons for TNI's support for the President. The TNI leadership under Adm. Widodo AS has accepted the fundamental changes that are taking place in the country toward the establishment of democracy. This means that in the end, after a period of transition, the TNI's political role will end, resulting in a professional TNI under civilian control.

TNI began to make the adjustment under Wiranto's leadership, but it did not achieve a fundamental change, because its older leaders (Wiranto and his generation) had so many of the spoils of the Soeharto regime, a process which continued under his successor's B.J. Habibie.

Since their political role has been the basis of their spoils for over 40 years (starting from when the state of emergency was proclaimed in 1958), it has not been easy for the TNI to let it go easily.

For instance, it took a neutral position during the general elections in June 1999 and in the presidential elections in October 1999. However, it was less neutral in the choice of the new Golkar leadership in July 1998 and during the special session of the People's Consultative Assembly in November 1998. But most of all it has not been able to discipline its forces from abuses of human rights and the country's laws, especially during situations of high tension or conflict. The TNI's task is indeed to maintain law and order. However, it has implemented this task with rampant abuses and excesses.

Since part of these abuses were made in the last two years of Wiranto's command, he is responsible for them. The accusations against him are not only in regard to the abuses in East Timor but also those that took place elsewhere, including the killings of students at Trisakti University and the abduction of political activists in early 1998.

These are the reasons why the TNI has lost much of the Indonesian people's support for its continued political role. Besides, the general trend toward democracy demands a limited TNI role under the authority of civilians. That does not mean, however, that the TNI will not have an important role as the state's apparatus to maintain law and order and contribute to the nation's unity.

However, they can only do so effectively in the future if they become professional and are under civilian rule. Without these changes, there will be great opposition to them from the people and neither stability nor peace will be achieved. It will also become a divisive issue that could split the country.

The TNI's younger generation, who are now in the second echelon, differ from their seniors because they understand and appreciate the social and political changes that are taking place. They recognize that in the eyes of the public the TNI has been compromised since they were the praetorian guards of Soeharto. That is why they are looking for a new paradigm, a new doctrine, a new structure and a new organization that will guarantee TNI's professionalism.

The nature of TNI's professionalism will need to be defined by the Indonesian people. This transformation needs the political support of the civilian leadership and adequate financial resources. The efforts by younger military members toward professionalism should be supported, because only professionalism will guarantee the unity of TNI and will give it new legitimacy, something which is critical to keep the country together and to maintain law and order under a democratic civilian regime.

Those two objectives are important to economic development and solving regional conflicts, especially in Aceh and Maluku, which are critical to national unity.

Only a regime under President Abdurrahman and Vice President Megawati Soekarnoputri with conservative ideologies on the role and importance of the TNI (albeit under complete civilian control), and with a good personal rapport and trust with the new TNI leadership under Widodo, can provide the necessary political support and the budgetary requirements that are indispensable for the professionalization of the TNI. This opportunity should be used by all parties to push for reforms supporting TNI's professionalism in the medium term.